Moning v. Alfono
254 N.W.2d 759, 400 Mich. 425 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
A manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer of a product owe a legal duty of due care to a bystander foreseeably affected by the product's use. Whether marketing a potentially dangerous product, such as a slingshot, directly to children constitutes a breach of that duty by creating an unreasonable risk of harm is a question of fact for a jury to decide.
Facts:
- Joseph Alfono, age 11, purchased two slingshots from defendant Campbell Discount Jewelry.
- The slingshots were manufactured by defendant Chemtoy Corporation and distributed by defendant King Tobacco and Grocery Company.
- Alfono gave one of the slingshots to his playmate, Royal Moning, age 12.
- While playing, Alfono was using his slingshot to shoot projectiles.
- A projectile fired from Alfono's slingshot struck Moning in the eye.
- As a result of the injury, Moning lost the sight in the affected eye.
Procedural Posture:
- Royal Moning sued Joseph Alfono and the slingshot's manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in a state trial court.
- The claim against the Alfono family was settled out of court.
- At the conclusion of Moning's presentation of evidence, the remaining defendants made a motion for a directed verdict.
- The trial court judge granted the directed verdict, finding for the defendants.
- Moning, as appellant, appealed the decision to the intermediate state appellate court, the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants (appellees).
- Moning then appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court for review.
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Issue:
Does marketing a product like a slingshot directly to children create a question of fact for a jury as to whether the manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer breached their duty of due care by creating an unreasonable risk of harm to a foreseeable bystander?
Opinions:
Majority - Levin, J.
Yes, marketing a product like a slingshot directly to children creates a question of fact for a jury as to whether the manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer breached their duty of due care by creating an unreasonable risk of harm. The court reasoned that while the existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court, the specific standard of care in a given situation is a question of fact for the jury. The court held that manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers do owe a duty of due care to foreseeable bystanders like Moning. The central issue is not the existence of a duty, but whether the defendants' conduct—marketing slingshots directly to children—was a breach of that duty. This determination requires balancing the utility of the conduct against the magnitude of the risk of harm. Because reasonable people could differ on this balance, the question of whether the risk was unreasonable must be resolved by a jury applying the community's judgment, rather than by a court as a matter of law.
Dissenting - Fitzgerald, J.
No, marketing a product like a slingshot directly to children does not create a jury question because the defendants, as a matter of law, did not owe a duty to refrain from manufacturing or selling slingshots to minors. The dissent argues that the existence of a duty is entirely a question of law for the court. To find that the defendants owed a duty not to sell slingshots to children would be a legislative act, effectively banning a common toy by judicial fiat. The dissent views slingshots, like baseball bats or bows and arrows, not as inherently dangerous instrumentalities but as common toys whose risks are well-known. It contends that the court should not extend the doctrine of negligent entrustment to an entire class of users (children) for a non-defective, common product, and that imposing such a duty is the role of the legislature, not the judiciary.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the respective roles of the judge and jury in negligence cases involving the sale of potentially dangerous, non-defective products to minors. By framing the key inquiry as a question of the specific standard of care rather than the existence of a duty, the court makes it more difficult for such cases to be dismissed by a judge as a matter of law. The ruling effectively extends the principles of negligent entrustment from a specific individual known to be incompetent to a broader class of users (children), thereby increasing potential liability for manufacturers and retailers who market certain products directly to them. This precedent encourages a more flexible, fact-sensitive analysis of negligence that relies on a jury's determination of what constitutes an 'unreasonable risk' in modern society.
