Monica L. McDowell Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church Will Ackles
397 F.3d 790, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2235, 85 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,829 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
The First Amendment's ministerial exception bars ministers from bringing Title VII claims against their religious employers that challenge core personnel decisions like termination, but it does not bar claims for sexual harassment or retaliation where the remedy sought is limited to damages for harm caused by the abusive conduct itself.
Facts:
- Jane Elvig served as an associate pastor at Calvin Presbyterian Church.
- Elvig alleged that a senior pastor at the church subjected her to ongoing sexual harassment, including unwelcome remarks and gestures.
- She complained about the pastor's conduct to the appropriate church authorities, but they took no action to stop the harassment.
- After she complained, Elvig alleged that the senior pastor began retaliating against her.
- Elvig pursued her claims through the Presbyterian Church's internal disciplinary process and ultimately lost.
- Subsequently, the Church terminated Elvig's employment and prevented her from seeking other pastoral positions within the Presbyterian denomination.
Procedural Posture:
- Jane Elvig sued the Calvin Presbyterian Church in the United States District Court, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII.
- The district court granted the Church's motion to dismiss the complaint on the pleadings, holding that the ministerial exception barred the entire suit.
- Elvig, as the appellant, appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court in part, holding that Elvig's claims for harassment and retaliation could proceed, while her claims related to her termination were barred.
- The Church, as the appellee, filed a petition for rehearing en banc, asking the full Ninth Circuit to reconsider the panel's decision.
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Issue:
Does the First Amendment's ministerial exception completely bar a minister's Title VII claims against her church for sexual harassment by a supervisor and subsequent retaliation?
Opinions:
Majority - Synthesized from the panel opinion as defended by W. Fletcher and Kozinski
No, the First Amendment's ministerial exception does not completely bar a minister's Title VII claims for sexual harassment and retaliation. While the exception protects a church’s core decisions regarding the selection, supervision, and termination of its ministers, it does not create a shield from all liability for tortious conduct. The court distinguished between claims that challenge protected employment decisions (like hiring and firing) and claims that seek damages for unlawful conduct (like sexual harassment). Because Elvig sought damages for the harm caused by the harassment itself, not reinstatement or damages from her termination, that portion of her claim does not intrude upon the church's constitutionally protected right to choose its ministers. This approach is consistent with precedent allowing parishioners to sue churches for torts like negligent supervision of abusive clergy, which also indirectly impacts church employment practices but is not constitutionally barred. The inquiry into a church's affirmative defense under Ellerth/Faragher is a secular one, focusing on the reasonableness of the church's actions to prevent and correct harassment, not an intrusive evaluation of religious doctrine.
Dissenting - Synthesized from the dissents of Kleinfeld, Gould, and Bea
Yes, the First Amendment's ministerial exception should completely bar a minister's Title VII claims for sexual harassment and retaliation. The majority's distinction between employment decisions and supervisory conduct is false and unworkable. Allowing hostile work environment suits inevitably impinges on a church’s protected hiring and firing decisions, as churches will alter their practices to avoid the risk of litigation and large damage awards. Furthermore, allowing such suits creates excessive government entanglement with religion, in violation of both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. To adjudicate the claim and the church's available affirmative defenses, secular courts will be forced to intrusively review and judge the 'reasonableness' of a church's internal governance, discipline, and theological responses to conflict, which the Constitution forbids. This ruling creates a circuit split and improperly narrows a vital protection for religious autonomy.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the scope of the ministerial exception in the Ninth Circuit, establishing a key distinction between a minister's employment 'status' (hiring/firing) and workplace 'conduct' (harassment). By allowing hostile work environment claims to proceed while barring claims for termination, the court created a new path for ministers to seek redress for certain workplace harms. This ruling created a split with other federal circuits that had interpreted the ministerial exception more broadly, setting the stage for future Supreme Court review. It forces religious institutions to navigate potential Title VII liability for supervisory conduct while retaining autonomy over core personnel decisions, complicating the boundary between church and state in employment law.
