Monge v. California
141 L. Ed. 2d 615, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4218, 524 U.S. 721 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to noncapital sentencing proceedings. Therefore, it does not bar the retrial of a sentence enhancement allegation that an appellate court has found to be supported by insufficient evidence.
Facts:
- Monge was previously convicted of assault.
- The record of that conviction described the offense as 'assault with a deadly weapon.'
- Subsequently, Monge committed several marijuana-related offenses.
- California's 'three-strikes' law provided for a significant sentence enhancement if a defendant's current felony was preceded by a 'serious felony.'
- Under California law, a prior assault conviction qualified as a 'serious felony' only if the defendant had personally used a deadly weapon or inflicted great bodily injury during its commission.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Monge in a California trial court with several marijuana offenses and alleged a prior 'serious felony' conviction for sentence enhancement purposes.
- A jury found Monge guilty of the substantive drug offenses.
- In a separate bench trial on the enhancement allegation, the trial court found the allegation to be true and imposed an enhanced sentence.
- Monge appealed to the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal found the evidence supporting the enhancement allegation was insufficient and held that a retrial on the allegation was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
- The State appealed to the California Supreme Court.
- The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that double jeopardy does not bar retrial of a prior conviction allegation in a noncapital case.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among state and federal courts.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bar the retrial of a noncapital sentence enhancement allegation when an appellate court has found the evidence from the first sentencing proceeding to be insufficient?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O'Connor
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the retrial of a noncapital sentence enhancement allegation after a finding of insufficient evidence. Historically, double jeopardy protections are inapplicable to sentencing proceedings because the determinations at issue do not place a defendant in jeopardy for an 'offense.' The narrow exception established for capital sentencing in Bullington v. Missouri does not extend to the noncapital context, as that exception was rooted in the unique severity and finality of the death penalty, which requires heightened procedural reliability. Protections in noncapital sentencing are a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional command, and applying double jeopardy here might create a disincentive for states to provide such protections.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial of the sentencing allegation. The core principle established in Burks v. United States is that the prosecution is forbidden from having a second opportunity to supply evidence it failed to produce in the first proceeding. This case involves a finding of evidentiary insufficiency, which is distinct from a reversal for legal error. By allowing a remand, the majority permits the State a 'second bite at the apple,' which directly contravenes the fundamental fairness undergirding the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
Yes. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial because the 'sentencing enhancement' was functionally an element of a greater offense. A fact that increases the maximum possible punishment to which a defendant is exposed is not a mere sentencing factor but an element of the crime that must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the enhancement increased Monge's maximum sentence, it constituted an element of a more serious crime. The appellate court's finding of insufficient evidence was therefore the functional equivalent of an acquittal of this greater offense, and the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a retrial.
Analysis:
This decision firmly limits the application of double jeopardy protections in sentencing, confining the rule of Bullington v. Missouri to the unique context of capital cases. The Court's reasoning emphasizes that the Bullington exception stems not just from trial-like procedures but from the constitutional need for heightened reliability due to the death penalty's finality. This ruling grants prosecutors a 'second bite at the apple' in noncapital sentence enhancement proceedings, reinforcing the distinction between guilt-innocence determinations and sentencing. Justice Scalia's dissent notably presages the Court's later shift in jurisprudence in cases like Apprendi v. New Jersey, which would eventually treat facts that increase statutory maximum sentences as elements of the offense requiring proof to a jury.
