Monasky v. Taglieri
589 U.S. (2020)
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Rule of Law:
The determination of an infant's habitual residence under the Hague Convention is a fact-intensive inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances, not a categorical test requiring an actual agreement between the parents. A trial court's determination of habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact that should be reviewed on appeal for clear error.
Facts:
- In 2011, Michelle Monasky, a U.S. citizen, and Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, were married in the United States.
- The couple relocated to Milan, Italy in 2013, where they both found employment and had no definitive plans to return to the U.S.
- The marriage deteriorated, and Taglieri allegedly became physically abusive toward Monasky.
- In May 2014, Monasky became pregnant. While she privately explored options for returning to the U.S., the couple jointly made preparations for raising their child in Italy, such as finding a larger apartment.
- Their daughter, A.M.T., was born in Italy in February 2015.
- On March 31, 2015, following another argument, Monasky fled with A.M.T. to a safe house operated by Italian police.
- In April 2015, Monasky took the two-month-old A.M.T. from Italy to Ohio to live with her parents.
Procedural Posture:
- Domenico Taglieri filed a petition in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for the return of his child, A.M.T., to Italy.
- After a four-day bench trial, the District Court (the trial court) found Italy was A.M.T.'s habitual residence and granted the petition, ordering the child's return.
- Michelle Monasky, the appellant, appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
- A divided three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's order.
- The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, also affirmed the trial court's decision in a divided opinion.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Monasky's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the determination of an infant's 'habitual residence' under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction require an actual agreement between the parents to raise the child in a particular country?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No. A child's habitual residence under the Hague Convention depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, and an actual agreement between the parents is not a prerequisite. The term 'habitual residence' is a fact-driven inquiry intended to locate the child's home, which for an infant, involves considering the parents' intentions and circumstances but is not reducible to a single dispositive factor. The Convention's drafters deliberately chose this flexible, factual standard over rigid legal concepts like domicile to ensure custody disputes are heard in the country where the child is most integrated. An actual-agreement requirement would thwart the Convention's purpose by allowing one parent to unilaterally block the establishment of a habitual residence, leaving the most vulnerable children unprotected. This totality-of-the-circumstances approach aligns with the 'clear trend' among other signatory nations, promoting the uniform international interpretation the Convention requires.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
No. The conclusion that an actual parental agreement is not necessary to establish an infant's habitual residence is compelled by the plain meaning of the treaty's text. The ordinary meanings of 'habitual' (customary, usual) and 'residence' (a place of abode) inherently call for a fact-driven inquiry that considers a host of factors, rather than a single, rigid legal test. While the decisions of sister signatories are supportive, the Court should rely principally on this textual analysis rather than on a relatively recent consensus in foreign case law, which could shift over time. The primary guide for interpretation must be the treaty's text itself.
Concurring - Justice Alito
No. A child's habitual residence is essentially the child's 'home,' a multifaceted concept that signifies the place where the child has been living for an extended period, unless that presence was intended to be merely temporary. The determination of this 'home' is a heavily factual inquiry. For this reason, while the majority's conclusion is correct, the standard of review on appeal is more accurately described as abuse of discretion rather than clear error, though the practical difference is minimal. The key point is that the trial court's determination is entitled to great deference on appeal.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a flexible, fact-based 'totality of the circumstances' standard for determining a child's habitual residence, decisively rejecting rigid, bright-line rules such as requiring proof of parental agreement. By aligning U.S. jurisprudence with the clear international consensus, the Court promotes uniformity in Hague Convention cases. The ruling reinforces that habitual residence is primarily a question of fact for the trial court, which in turn justifies the holding that appellate courts must apply a deferential 'clear error' standard of review. This approach prioritizes the specific circumstances of each child's life over formal legal constructs, while also promoting the Convention's goal of expeditious proceedings by limiting the scope of appellate review.
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