M.L.B. v. S.L.J.
519 U.S. 102 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A state may not, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition an indigent parent's right to appeal a termination of parental rights on their ability to pay for the preparation of the judicial record.
Facts:
- M. L. B. and S. L. J., the biological parents of two children, divorced after nearly eight years of marriage.
- The children remained in the custody of their father, S. L. J., by agreement.
- S. L. J. subsequently married J. P. J.
- Approximately one year later, S. L. J. and his new wife, J. P. J., sought to terminate M. L. B.'s parental rights to allow J. P. J. to adopt the children.
- The complaint alleged that M. L. B. had failed to maintain reasonable visitation and was in arrears on child support payments.
Procedural Posture:
- S. L. J. and J. P. J. filed suit against M. L. B. in a Mississippi Chancery Court (a trial court) to terminate M. L. B.'s parental rights.
- The Chancellor held a hearing and entered a decree terminating M. L. B.'s parental rights.
- M. L. B. filed a timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi and paid the initial filing fee.
- The Chancery Court Clerk estimated the cost for preparing the record for appeal at $2,352.36.
- M. L. B., unable to afford the fees, filed a motion with the Supreme Court of Mississippi to proceed with her appeal in forma pauperis.
- The Supreme Court of Mississippi, the state's highest court, denied M. L. B.'s motion, effectively dismissing her appeal.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi.
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Issue:
May a State, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent's ability to pay for record preparation fees?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No. A State may not deny a parent, because of their poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which a trial court found them unfit to remain a parent. The Court's precedents concerning access to judicial processes reflect both equal protection and due process concerns, which converge in this case. While due process does not require a state to provide an appeal, once it does, it cannot 'bolt the door to equal justice' for the indigent. Parental rights termination decrees are uniquely destructive of a fundamental family relationship and are quasi-criminal in nature, involving a severe, state-imposed sanction and stigma. Aligning this case with Mayer v. Chicago, which extended the right to a free transcript to petty offenders, the Court found the individual's interest in the parent-child bond 'far more precious than any property right.' The state's financial interest in offsetting court costs is not a sufficient justification to deny appellate access in this circumscribed category of cases, where the risk of error is considerable and the stakes for the parent are immense.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
No. Given the existing appellate structure in Mississippi and the fundamental interests at stake, the Due Process Clause is a sufficient basis to hold that the State may not erect a financial bar to this petitioner's appeal. The cases most on point are Boddie, Lassiter, and Santosky, all of which rested exclusively on the Due Process Clause. These precedents, which address procedures involving the rights and privileges inherent in family relations, compel the conclusion that Mississippi may not condition the appeal on the prepayment of costs beyond the petitioner's means.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
Yes. A state may condition a civil appeal on the prepayment of fees, as neither the Due Process nor Equal Protection Clause requires a state to provide free transcripts in civil cases. Due process does not require an appeal at all if the trial-level proceeding was fair, which it was here. The majority incorrectly extends the equal protection principles of Griffin v. Illinois, which applies to criminal defendants, into the civil arena. This decision rests on a discredited 'disparate impact' theory of equal protection and creates an unprincipled distinction between parental termination and other important civil cases, which will inevitably open the floodgates to demands for free assistance in a wide variety of civil litigation.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Rehnquist
Yes. For the reasons stated in Justice Thomas's dissent, the Griffin-Mayer line of cases should not be extended to invalidate Mississippi's refusal to pay for the petitioner's appellate transcript in this civil case.
Analysis:
This decision carves out a significant exception to the general rule that states are not constitutionally required to waive fees for indigents in civil appeals. By classifying parental rights termination as a 'quasi-criminal' proceeding due to its severity and finality, the Court extended the logic of criminal procedure access-to-justice cases like Griffin v. Illinois into a specific area of civil law. The ruling establishes that when a fundamental right as critical as the parent-child relationship is at stake, the state's interest in collecting fees is insufficient to bar an indigent litigant's access to appellate review. This creates a powerful precedent for arguments that certain civil proceedings involving fundamental rights and severe state-imposed sanctions demand heightened procedural protections, blurring the traditionally sharp line between civil and criminal procedure for indigents.
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