Mitchell v. Forsyth
472 U.S. 511 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
A district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable final decision under the collateral order doctrine. Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known at the time of the action.
Facts:
- In 1970, the FBI learned that a group known as the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (ECCSL) was planning to blow up federal heating tunnels and kidnap National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger.
- On November 6, 1970, Attorney General John Mitchell, citing national security concerns, authorized a warrantless wiretap on the telephone of William Davidon, a physics professor and member of the ECCSL.
- The wiretap remained in place from late November 1970 until January 6, 1971.
- During the surveillance, the government intercepted three conversations between Davidon and Keith Forsyth.
- The conversations involving Forsyth were innocuous and were never used against him in any proceeding.
- In 1972, Forsyth learned of the wiretap during discovery in an unrelated criminal case.
Procedural Posture:
- Keith Forsyth sued former Attorney General John Mitchell in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for damages from a warrantless wiretap.
- The District Court denied Mitchell's motion for summary judgment on the basis of absolute immunity and also denied summary judgment on qualified immunity, finding a factual dispute.
- Mitchell, as appellant, appealed the denial of absolute immunity to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which remanded for further factfinding.
- On remand, the District Court again denied absolute immunity. It also reconsidered qualified immunity under the new objective standard of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, again denied it, and granted summary judgment on liability to Forsyth, the plaintiff.
- Mitchell again appealed to the Third Circuit, which affirmed the denial of absolute immunity but ruled it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the qualified immunity denial, deeming it not a final, appealable order.
- Mitchell then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on an issue of law, constitute an immediately appealable 'final decision,' and if so, was the Attorney General entitled to qualified immunity for authorizing a warrantless wiretap for domestic security purposes at a time when the law on such wiretaps was unsettled?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
Yes. A district court's denial of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision under the collateral order doctrine, and the Attorney General was entitled to such immunity. Qualified immunity is not merely a defense to liability but an entitlement not to stand trial or face the burdens of litigation. Because this entitlement is effectively lost if a case proceeds to trial, a denial is an immediately appealable collateral order. On the merits, Mitchell is entitled to qualified immunity because his actions in 1970 did not violate 'clearly established' law. At that time, the constitutionality of warrantless wiretaps for domestic national security purposes was an open question, with the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States having explicitly reserved the issue and lower courts being divided. The definitive ruling that such wiretaps were unconstitutional did not come until United States v. United States District Court (Keith) in 1972, after the conduct at issue here occurred.
Concurring - Chief Justice Burger
Concurs in the judgment and agrees with the majority's reasoning on the appealability and merits of qualified immunity. However, he writes separately to argue that the Attorney General, as the President's chief aide in protecting national security, should be entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in the exercise of the President's discretionary power in that area.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
Concurs in the judgment and agrees that the denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable and that Mitchell is entitled to qualified immunity. Because the qualified immunity holding is sufficient to resolve the case, she would not reach the question of whether the Attorney General is entitled to absolute immunity for national security functions.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Concurs in the judgment on the grounds that Mitchell was entitled to absolute immunity. He argues that because Mitchell was exercising the delegated, discretionary 'power of the President' in the sensitive area of national security, a function specifically exempted from the prohibitions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, he should receive the same absolute immunity as the President.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Brennan
Agrees that the Attorney General is not entitled to absolute immunity but dissents from the holding that a denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable. He argues that such a denial does not meet the 'collateral order' doctrine's requirement of being 'completely separate from the merits,' as the immunity inquiry is closely related to the underlying liability question. He warns that this holding will allow government officials to delay meritorious litigation with interlocutory appeals, thereby undermining the final judgment rule and harming plaintiffs with strong claims.
Analysis:
This decision significantly altered the landscape of civil rights litigation against government officials by establishing that denials of qualified immunity are immediately appealable. This provides defendants with a powerful procedural tool to halt trial court proceedings and seek appellate review, potentially causing significant delays and increased costs for plaintiffs. The ruling reinforces the objective standard from Harlow v. Fitzgerald, emphasizing that immunity is an 'immunity from suit' itself, not just a defense to liability, thereby protecting officials from the burdens of discovery and trial. By defining 'clearly established' law as a standard that is not met when a legal question is 'open,' the case makes it more difficult to overcome a qualified immunity defense in novel or developing areas of law.
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