Mitchell v. Archibald & Kendall, Inc.
573 F.2d 429 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
A landowner's duty to protect a business invitee from the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties does not extend beyond the physical boundaries of the landowner's premises to an adjacent public thoroughfare, even if the landowner directed the invitee to wait in that off-premises location.
Facts:
- Lawrence Mitchell, a truck driver, arrived at the Archibald & Kendall, Inc. (A & K) warehouse in Chicago to deliver a cargo of A & K's products.
- Because the receiving dock was occupied, an A & K employee instructed Mitchell to park his truck and wait on Fulton Street, a public street directly opposite the warehouse.
- A & K had a regular practice of using this area of Fulton Street as a waiting zone for trucks making deliveries to its warehouse.
- While waiting in his truck on Fulton Street as instructed, two unknown men approached Mitchell and demanded his money.
- When Mitchell refused, one of the men shot him in the face with a shotgun, causing permanent injuries.
- A & K knew of prior criminal acts occurring on and around its premises, including an armed robbery of another truck driver in a similar situation approximately three weeks earlier.
- Mitchell had no knowledge of the high risk of criminal attacks in that specific area.
Procedural Posture:
- Lawrence and Algerie Mitchell (plaintiffs) filed a diversity suit against Archibald & Kendall, Inc. (defendant) in the United States District Court.
- The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
- The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff for a criminal attack occurring on a public street.
- Final judgment was entered in favor of the defendant, Archibald & Kendall, Inc.
- The Mitchells (appellants) appealed the district court's judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, where A & K was the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a landowner owe a duty to a business invitee to protect them from foreseeable criminal attacks by third parties that occur on a public street adjacent to the landowner's premises, when the landowner's employee directed the invitee to wait in that location?
Opinions:
Majority - Pell, Circuit Judge.
No. A landowner's duty to protect a business invitee against criminal acts by third parties is limited to the area within the premises owned and controlled by the landowner and does not extend to an adjacent public street. The court, applying Illinois law and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, determined that a landowner's duty is strictly confined to the land they possess. Specifically, Restatement § 344 subjects a possessor of land to liability for harm to invitees only 'while they are upon the land.' The defining characteristic for imposing a duty is the right of control over the property; a landowner has no right to control a public thoroughfare and therefore has no duty to police it or protect invitees there. The court rejected the argument that A & K's custom of using the street as a waiting area made it part of the 'premises,' adhering to a formalistic, property-line-based definition of duty.
Dissenting - Fairchild, Chief Judge
Yes. A landowner who engages in an affirmative act that exposes an invitee to a recognizable and high degree of risk of harm from criminal conduct creates a duty to protect or warn the invitee. The dissent argues that the majority's general rule is inapplicable here because A & K's own affirmative conduct—ordering Mitchell to park in a specific location known to be dangerous—greatly increased the risk of harm. This act of creating the dangerous situation is what gives rise to the duty. Citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B, Comment e, the dissent contends that a duty can arise 'where the actor’s own affirmative act has created or exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such misconduct.'
Analysis:
This case firmly establishes a bright-line rule limiting a landowner's duty to the geographical boundaries of their property. It signifies a preference for a formalistic, premises-based liability framework over a more flexible standard based on foreseeability or risk creation. The decision makes it significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to hold property owners liable for injuries occurring on adjacent public ways, even when the owner's business practices and instructions contribute to the plaintiff's presence there. The dissent's focus on 'affirmative acts' creating risk provides a potential, though rejected, avenue for future litigants to argue for an exception to this strict premises-liability rule.
