Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. v. McFerrin
156 Tex. 69, 1956 Tex. LEXIS 548, 291 S.W.2d 931 (1956)
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Rule of Law:
A motorist's statutory duty to stop at a railroad crossing when an approaching train is "plainly visible" and in "hazardous proximity" is not an absolute duty; it is conditioned on whether a reasonably prudent person, under the same circumstances, would have seen the train and appreciated the hazard. Separately, evidence of a person's habit of care is inadmissible to prove conduct on a specific occasion when there is an eyewitness to the event.
Facts:
- R. T. McFerrin was driving his automobile on a gravel road that ran parallel to a railroad track for approximately 600 feet.
- The road then made a curve to the right to cross the railroad track at a right angle.
- A train operated by the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad was traveling on the track in the same direction as McFerrin's car, approaching from his rear and to his right.
- McFerrin's vehicle slowed down as it made the curve toward the crossing.
- The train and McFerrin's car collided at the crossing, resulting in McFerrin's death.
- The only eyewitness to the moments just before the collision was the train's fireman.
- After the collision, McFerrin's car was found to be in second gear.
Procedural Posture:
- Ruth Adele McFerrin sued the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. for wrongful death in a Texas trial court.
- The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict on special issues in favor of McFerrin.
- The trial court entered judgment on the verdict for McFerrin.
- The Railroad, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals.
- The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Railroad, as petitioner, was granted a writ of error to appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas.
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Issue:
Does a motorist's statutory duty to stop for a train that is 'plainly visible' and in 'hazardous proximity' depend on whether a reasonably prudent person, under the same circumstances, would have perceived the train and the hazard?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Calvert
Yes. A motorist's statutory duty to stop when a train is 'plainly visible' and in 'hazardous proximity' is not absolute, but is evaluated under the common-law standard of a reasonably prudent person. The court rejected the railroad's contention that a collision conclusively proves a train was in 'hazardous proximity,' as this would function as a harsh rule of evidence requiring 'perfect foresight' from the motorist. Instead, the court held that these statutory conditions must be judged by what a reasonably prudent person, situated as the motorist was and exercising ordinary care, should have seen and known. Applying this standard, the court found that the train was 'plainly visible' and in 'hazardous proximity' as a matter of law once McFerrin was in the stopping zone. However, an instructed verdict for the railroad was improper because the testimony of its employee, the fireman, that McFerrin failed to stop was not conclusive, as he was an interested witness and circumstantial evidence (the car being in second gear) cast doubt on his testimony. The court ultimately reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court committed a harmful error by admitting testimony about the deceased's habit of always stopping at that crossing, adopting the majority rule that such habit evidence is inadmissible when an eyewitness exists.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Garwood
No. The statutory phrases 'plainly visible' and 'in hazardous proximity' should be interpreted according to their plain, objective meaning based on the physical facts, not through the lens of a reasonably prudent person. The majority's interpretation renders the statute futile because it merely restates the pre-existing common-law duty of care, which did not require a new legislative act. The legislature's intent was likely to create a stricter, more absolute standard to enhance safety at railroad crossings, not to codify the common law. Applying the reasonably prudent person standard weakens the statute and makes the duty to stop more uncertain for motorists. The judge agrees with the majority's result (remanding for a new trial) but fundamentally disagrees with its interpretation of the statutory duty.
Analysis:
This case is significant for establishing that statutory duties of care, even when phrased in seemingly absolute terms like 'plainly visible,' will be interpreted through the framework of the common-law 'reasonably prudent person' standard unless the legislature clearly indicates otherwise. This decision prevents such safety statutes from becoming tools of strict liability against motorists and confirms the judiciary's tendency to harmonize statutes with common-law negligence principles. Furthermore, the court's holding on habit evidence resolved conflicting decisions in Texas by adopting the majority U.S. rule, clarifying that such evidence is inadmissible when an eyewitness is available, thereby setting a firm precedent for how conduct may be proven in future negligence cases.
