Minor v. Minor
737 S.E.2d 116, 224 N.C. App. 471, 2012 WL 6584305 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
When family members are involved, there is a strong presumption that possession of property is permissive. This presumption is not rebutted when one spouse's right to occupy the land is derived from the other spouse who acknowledges the true owner's title, as cohabiting with a spouse is not considered a taking under a claim of right for adverse possession purposes.
Facts:
- In 1972, Grover and Caroleen Minor (Plaintiffs) became the record owners of a property with a log cabin.
- In 1980, their son, Tyson Minor, married Sandra Ann Minor (Defendant).
- Between 1984 and 1986, Tyson and Sandra began living in the cabin on the Plaintiffs' property.
- Grover Minor testified that he gave his son, Tyson, permission to live on the property, and this permission extended to Sandra as Tyson's wife.
- Sandra believed she and Tyson owned the property and made improvements without asking permission.
- Tyson Minor testified that he always knew his father owned the property and that his presence was permissive.
- In 1988, Sandra wrote a check to pay what she believed were property taxes, but which were documented as leasehold taxes.
- Tyson and Sandra separated around 2001, with Tyson moving off the property. Grover allowed Sandra to remain until 2008 when divorce proceedings began.
Procedural Posture:
- Grover and Caroleen Minor (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint for summary ejectment against Sandra Ann Minor (Defendant) in small claims court.
- The small claims court entered a judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs.
- Defendant appealed the judgment to the district court.
- In the district court, Defendant filed a counterclaim to quiet title to the property by adverse possession.
- A jury trial was held on the adverse possession claim, resulting in a verdict for the Plaintiffs.
- The jury found Defendant's possession was exclusive and hostile, but not actual, open, notorious, and continuous for twenty years.
- The trial court denied the Defendant's post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.
- Defendant (Appellant) appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals, with Plaintiffs as Appellees.
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Issue:
Did the trial court commit reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that a claimant could acquire title by adverse possession to a portion of a larger tract of land, rather than the entire tract?
Opinions:
Majority - Beasley, Judge
No. The trial court's failure to give the requested instruction was harmless error because the defendant's adverse possession claim fails as a matter of law. The court reasoned that to acquire title by adverse possession, the claimant's possession must be hostile for a continuous twenty-year period. However, North Carolina law presumes that use of property among family members is permissive, a presumption which the Defendant failed to rebut. Her right to be on the property was derivative of her husband's, who acknowledged his parents' ownership. Citing a New York case, the court stated that cohabiting with a spouse is not a taking under a claim of right. Any hostile possession could not have begun until 2008 when the Plaintiffs asked her to leave, far short of the twenty-year statutory period. Therefore, even with the requested jury instruction, the outcome would have been the same.
Dissenting - Elmore, Judge
Yes. The trial court's failure to give the requested instruction was reversible error, and the case should be remanded for a new trial. The dissent argues that the majority overstepped its review by re-evaluating the element of hostility. The jury's verdict sheet explicitly found that the Defendant's possession was 'exclusive and hostile,' and an appellate court should not substitute its own factual findings for the jury's. The only issue on appeal was the jury instruction. Since the Defendant presented evidence of her possession of specific, smaller portions of the property (e.g., fences, gates, a barn), the instruction was supported by evidence and was a correct statement of law. The trial court's failure to give it was therefore a prejudicial error requiring a new trial.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high bar for establishing adverse possession among family members by strengthening the presumption of permissive use. It establishes that one spouse's permissive use, derived from the title-holding family members, can legally nullify the other spouse's claim of hostile intent, even if that spouse subjectively believed they were an owner. The decision illustrates that a court may find an instructional error to be harmless by concluding that the claimant could not succeed on the merits of their case anyway. The dissent highlights a crucial tension between an appellate court's deference to a jury's factual findings and its power to correct legal errors.
