Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky
138 S. Ct. 1876, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3685, 201 L. Ed. 2d 201 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
A state law banning individuals from wearing 'political' apparel in a polling place is unconstitutional under the First Amendment if the term 'political' is so broadly and vaguely defined that the restriction is not reasonable. To be reasonable, such a restriction must be capable of objective, workable, and reasoned application.
Facts:
- Minnesota enacted a statute that prohibits a person from wearing a 'political badge, political button, or other political insignia' inside a polling place on Election Day.
- The statute does not define the term 'political'.
- In anticipation of the 2010 election, state officials distributed an 'Election Day Policy' to provide guidance on the ban's enforcement.
- The policy specified that prohibited items included not only candidate and party names, but also 'issue oriented material' (like 'Please I.D. Me' buttons) and material from groups with 'recognizable political views' (like the Tea Party).
- On Election Day in 2010, Andrew Cilek, executive director of the Minnesota Voters Alliance (MVA), attempted to vote while wearing a 'Please I.D. Me' button and a T-shirt with the words 'Don't Tread on Me' and a Tea Party Patriots logo.
- Cilek was initially turned away from the polling place twice because of his apparel.
- After a third attempt, Cilek was permitted to vote, but an election judge recorded his information for potential referral to law enforcement for violating the ban.
- Other voters associated with MVA's affiliate group were also confronted by election officials and asked to cover up Tea Party shirts or had their information recorded for wearing 'Please I.D. Me' buttons.
Procedural Posture:
- Minnesota Voters Alliance (MVA) and others sued state officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, challenging the political apparel ban on First Amendment grounds.
- The District Court denied the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order and later granted the State's motion to dismiss.
- The plaintiffs, as appellants, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the facial challenge but reversed on the as-applied challenge, remanding the case.
- On remand, the District Court granted summary judgment to the State on the as-applied challenge.
- The plaintiffs, as appellants, again appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's decision.
- MVA, Cilek, and Jeffers, as petitioners, sought and were granted a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court to review the facial constitutionality of the law.
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Issue:
Does Minnesota's law banning any 'political badge, political button, or other political insignia' inside a polling place violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
Yes, Minnesota's law banning political apparel inside a polling place violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. While states can permissibly restrict some forms of advocacy in polling places to maintain order and decorum, the restriction must be reasonable. A polling place is a nonpublic forum, where speech restrictions must be reasonable in light of the forum's purpose and must be viewpoint-neutral. Although Minnesota's objective to create an 'island of calm' is permissible, its ban on 'political' apparel fails the reasonableness test because the term 'political' is undefined, vague, and subject to arbitrary enforcement. The State's interpretive guidance, which bans 'issue oriented material' and apparel from groups with 'recognizable political views,' is unworkable, as it would require election judges to be experts on every candidate's platform and every group's political leanings. This lack of a discernible standard gives election officials excessive discretion, rendering the law incapable of reasoned application and therefore an unreasonable restriction on speech.
Dissenting - Justice Sotomayor
No, the Court should not have declared the law unconstitutional at this stage. The majority correctly acknowledges that states have a valid interest in regulating polling places, but it errs by invalidating the statute on its face without first allowing Minnesota's courts to interpret it. The proper course of action would have been to certify the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court to provide a definitive construction of the term 'political.' Such an interpretation might have narrowed the statute in a way that would satisfy constitutional requirements. By prematurely striking down the law based on hypothetical applications and its own interpretation of state guidance, the Court speculates about the statute's meaning and undermines principles of judicial federalism.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the 'reasonableness' standard for speech restrictions in nonpublic forums, particularly polling places. The Court affirmed that states have a legitimate interest in creating a peaceful voting environment but held that this interest does not justify vague and overly broad speech prohibitions. By striking down Minnesota's law, the Court requires states to draft more precise regulations that provide objective, workable standards for enforcement. This precedent pressures states to move away from ambiguous terms like 'political' and toward more specific prohibitions, such as banning apparel that explicitly names candidates, parties, or ballot measures, thereby protecting issue-based and passive political speech from arbitrary censorship by election officials.
