Minnesota v. Murphy
465 U.S. 420 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing in a non-custodial meeting between a probationer and a probation officer. A probationer must affirmatively invoke the privilege; it is not considered compelled testimony unless the state explicitly threatens a penalty, such as probation revocation, for exercising the right to remain silent.
Facts:
- In 1980, Marshall Murphy was sentenced to three years' probation for false imprisonment.
- The terms of Murphy's probation required him to participate in a sexual offender treatment program, report to his probation officer, and be truthful with the officer 'in all matters.'
- In September 1981, a counselor from the treatment program informed the probation officer that Murphy had admitted to a rape and murder committed in 1974.
- The probation officer decided she should provide this information to the police and wrote to Murphy, asking him to meet to discuss a 'treatment plan' for the rest of his probation.
- Murphy voluntarily arranged and attended a meeting in the probation officer's office.
- During the meeting, the officer confronted Murphy with the information from the counselor.
- Murphy then admitted that he had committed the 1974 rape and murder.
- After the confession, the probation officer told Murphy she had a duty to report the information to the police and encouraged him to turn himself in.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Minnesota indicted Marshall Murphy for first-degree murder in a state trial court.
- Murphy filed a pretrial motion to suppress testimony regarding his confession to his probation officer, claiming it was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
- The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
- The Minnesota Supreme Court, the state's highest court, reversed the trial court's order, holding that the confession was inadmissible.
- The State of Minnesota, as Petitioner, was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court to review the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Murphy is the Respondent.
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Issue:
Does the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' privilege against self-incrimination prohibit the introduction into evidence of a probationer's incriminating statements made to his probation officer in a subsequent criminal prosecution, when the probationer was required to be truthful but failed to assert the privilege during the questioning?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
No. The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the introduction of the probationer's statements because the privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing and Murphy failed to invoke it. The general rule is that a witness who desires the protection of the privilege must claim it. This case does not fall into the exceptions where the privilege is self-executing. First, this was not a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings, as there was no formal arrest or restraint on Murphy's freedom of movement. Second, this was not a 'penalty' case where the state attempts to compel testimony by threatening a sanction for silence. Murphy's probation condition required him to be truthful, but it did not state that his probation would be revoked if he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege; a reasonable person would not have perceived such a threat, especially since the state cannot constitutionally penalize someone for a valid exercise of the privilege.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes. The Fifth Amendment privilege should prohibit the introduction of these statements because they were compelled. The State of Minnesota presented Murphy with a 'Hobson's choice' by requiring him to 'BE TRUTHFUL... in all matters' upon pain of probation revocation. This threat of a substantial sanction for refusing to answer questions deprived him of a free choice to remain silent, relieving him of the duty to formally claim the privilege. The threat itself is sufficient to render the testimony compelled, regardless of whether Murphy subjectively feared revocation or whether the state could legally carry out the threat. Furthermore, the probation officer used deceit to secure the meeting and exploited the trust inherent in the probationer-officer relationship, reinforcing the coercive nature of the interrogation and making it fundamentally unfair to use the resulting confession.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege for individuals on probation, distinguishing routine probation supervision from custodial interrogation or coercive 'penalty' situations. The Court placed the onus on the probationer to affirmatively claim the privilege, reinforcing the general principle that the right is not self-executing. This narrows the exceptions established in cases like Miranda and Garrity, making it more difficult for defendants to suppress statements made in non-custodial settings to government officials. The ruling solidifies the idea that compulsion, for Fifth Amendment purposes, requires more than just a general obligation to be truthful or the focused nature of an investigation; it requires either the inherent coercion of custody or an explicit threat of a penalty for silence.
