Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians
526 U.S. 172, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2190, 143 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
Indian treaty rights, including usufructuary rights, are not extinguished by implication upon a state's admission to the Union. Congress must clearly and expressly state its intent to abrogate such treaty rights.
Facts:
- In 1837, the United States and several Bands of Chippewa Indians entered into a treaty whereby the Chippewa ceded land in present-day Wisconsin and Minnesota.
- Article 5 of the 1837 Treaty guaranteed the Chippewa the "privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild rice" on the ceded lands, to continue "during the pleasure of the President of the United States."
- In the late 1840s, Minnesota political and business interests began advocating for the removal of the Chippewa from the ceded lands.
- On February 6, 1850, President Zachary Taylor issued an Executive Order that revoked the Chippewa's usufructuary privileges and required them to remove from the ceded territory to their unceded lands.
- The federal government's attempt to enforce the removal by changing the location of annuity payments led to a disastrous winter encampment at Sandy Lake, where approximately 400 Chippewa died from disease and starvation.
- Following widespread public and political opposition to the removal policy, the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs formally suspended the removal effort in August 1851.
- In 1855, the U.S. and several Chippewa Bands, including the Mille Lacs Band, signed a new treaty ceding more land. The treaty stated the Indians would "relinquish and convey...any and all right, title, and interest" they had in any other lands in Minnesota, but did not explicitly mention the 1837 usufructuary rights.
- In 1858, Minnesota was admitted to the Union as a state. The enabling act did not mention Indian treaty rights.
Procedural Posture:
- The Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians filed suit against the State of Minnesota in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.
- The plaintiff tribe sought a declaratory judgment affirming their usufructuary rights under the 1837 Treaty and an injunction against state interference.
- The United States intervened as a plaintiff, and several Minnesota counties and private landowners intervened as defendants.
- The District Court bifurcated the proceedings into a rights-determination phase (Phase I) and a regulatory-issues phase (Phase II).
- After a bench trial in Phase I, the District Court held that the Mille Lacs Band retained its usufructuary rights under the 1837 Treaty.
- The District Court ruled that the rights were not extinguished by the 1850 Executive Order, the 1855 Treaty, or Minnesota's admission to the Union.
- The State of Minnesota, as appellant, appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment, holding that the Chippewa's rights survived all three potential extinguishing events.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted the State of Minnesota's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Do the Chippewa Indians retain their usufructuary rights to hunt, fish, and gather on ceded lands, guaranteed by the 1837 Treaty, despite an 1850 Executive Order revoking those rights, an 1855 Treaty ceding further land, and Minnesota's 1858 admission to the Union?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O'Connor
Yes. The Chippewa Indians retain the usufructuary rights guaranteed to them under the 1837 Treaty. First, the 1850 Executive Order was ineffective because the President lacked the authority to order the removal of the Chippewa from the ceded lands. The portion of the order revoking usufructuary rights was not severable from the invalid removal portion, as the order embodied a single, coherent policy of removal. Second, the 1855 Treaty did not abrogate these rights; canons of treaty construction require interpreting the treaty as the Indians would have understood it and resolving ambiguities in their favor. The historical context shows the 1855 Treaty was a land-purchase agreement, and its broad language was intended to extinguish other land claims, not previously guaranteed usufructuary rights. Third, Minnesota's admission to the Union did not extinguish the rights under the equal footing doctrine, as Congress must clearly express its intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights, which it did not do in the statehood act. The precedent of Ward v. Race Horse is unpersuasive because its premise that treaty rights are irreconcilable with state sovereignty has been rejected by subsequent case law.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No. The Chippewa Indians' usufructuary rights were extinguished. First, the 1850 Executive Order was a valid exercise of presidential authority. The 1837 Treaty explicitly made the privilege contingent on the "pleasure of the President," and President Taylor clearly and lawfully expressed his pleasure that the rights should end. The removal provision of the order was a valid means of enforcing the revocation. Second, the 1855 Treaty's plain language, in which the Chippewa relinquished "any and all right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature," is unambiguously broad enough to include the usufructuary rights. Third, under the precedent of Ward v. Race Horse, the temporary and precarious nature of a privilege held "during the pleasure of the President" meant it was extinguished upon Minnesota's admission to the Union on an equal footing with other states.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No. Joining the Chief Justice's dissent, the Chippewa's rights were extinguished. Furthermore, the majority's dicta regarding the scope of state regulation is incorrect. The 1837 Treaty granted a mere "privilege," not a vested "right." This distinction is crucial; while a reserved "right" might limit state regulation to only that which is necessary for conservation (the "conservation necessity" standard), a lesser "privilege" is likely subject to the full scope of the state's non-discriminatory police power and conservation laws, just like any other citizen.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies several key principles of modern federal Indian law. It strongly reaffirms the canons of treaty construction that treaties must be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them and that ambiguities must be resolved in their favor. The ruling significantly curtails the equal footing doctrine as a basis for impliedly extinguishing Indian treaty rights, effectively limiting the precedent of Ward v. Race Horse. By requiring a "clear evidence" standard for congressional abrogation, the Court established a high bar for states seeking to terminate treaty-based rights, ensuring that such rights cannot be easily eroded by implication or subsequent historical events.
