Minneci v. Pollard
181 L. Ed. 2d 606, 132 S. Ct 617, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 573 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
An implied cause of action for damages under the Eighth Amendment (a Bivens action) is not available against employees of a privately operated federal prison where an adequate alternative remedy exists under state tort law.
Facts:
- Richard Lee Pollard was a federal prisoner housed in a facility operated by a private company, the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation.
- Pollard slipped on a cart in the prison's butcher shop, possibly fracturing both of his elbows.
- Following the injury, Pollard alleged that a prison guard forced him to put on a jumpsuit, causing excruciating pain, and that guards made him wear painful arm restraints during transport to an outside clinic.
- Pollard claimed that prison medical personnel failed to follow the outside clinic's treatment instructions, including failing to provide a splint, physical therapy, and necessary nerve studies.
- He alleged that while his arms were disabled in casts, prison officials did not provide alternative meal arrangements, forcing him to sell personal items to buy food from the commissary.
- Pollard also asserted he was denied basic hygienic care, was not given sufficient pain medication, and was forced to return to work before his injuries had fully healed.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard Lee Pollard filed a pro se complaint in the U.S. District Court against several employees of the private prison operator.
- A Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the complaint, finding that a Bivens action was unavailable against private prison employees.
- The District Court adopted the recommendation and dismissed Pollard's complaint.
- Pollard, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal, holding that Pollard could bring an Eighth Amendment Bivens action against the private employees (appellees).
- The prison employees, as petitioners, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the Eighth Amendment provide a federal prisoner with an implied cause of action for damages (a Bivens action) against employees of a privately operated federal prison when state tort law provides an adequate alternative remedy?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Breyer
No, the Eighth Amendment does not provide an implied cause of action for damages against employees of a privately operated federal prison when state tort law provides an adequate alternative remedy. The Court applies the two-step framework from Wilkie v. Robbins, which first asks whether an 'alternative, existing process' provides a convincing reason to refrain from creating a Bivens remedy. Here, state tort law offers such a process. Unlike federal employees who are generally immune from state tort suits under the Westfall Act, employees of private firms can be sued under state law. The Court distinguishes Carlson v. Green, which involved government employees for whom no such alternative remedy was available. The Court holds that state tort remedies for negligence and failure to provide care are adequate because they need not be perfectly congruent with a Bivens action, but must only provide 'roughly similar incentives' for deterrence and compensation.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No, an implied cause of action should not be extended. Justice Scalia joins the Court's opinion but writes separately to reiterate his view that Bivens itself was wrongly decided. He describes Bivens as a 'relic of the heady days' when the Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action from the Constitution. He argues that the Court has abandoned this practice in statutory cases and should do the same in constitutional cases. Therefore, he would limit Bivens and its progeny to the precise circumstances they involved and refuse to extend them.
Dissenting - Justice Ginsburg
Yes, an implied cause of action under the Eighth Amendment should be available to a federal prisoner regardless of whether the facility is publicly or privately operated. Justice Ginsburg argues that a prisoner's constitutional remedy for an Eighth Amendment violation should be uniform and not depend on the 'vagaries' of state tort law. She distinguishes Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, which denied a Bivens action against a corporate entity, by noting that this case involves a suit against individual officers. Such a suit serves the core Bivens purpose of individual deterrence, which was absent in Malesko. Denying a federal remedy here creates an unjustified disparity between prisoners in government-run facilities and those in privately run facilities.
Analysis:
This decision significantly restricts the availability of Bivens actions, continuing a decades-long trend of narrowing the doctrine. It establishes that the existence of an adequate state-law remedy is a 'convincing reason' for courts to refuse to imply a federal constitutional tort, particularly against private individuals performing federal functions. The ruling creates a clear divide: federal employees remain more susceptible to Bivens claims due to their immunity from state tort suits, while employees of private contractors are largely shielded from Bivens so long as state tort law provides a viable alternative. This places a high bar on future plaintiffs, who must demonstrate the inadequacy of state remedies before a Bivens claim against a private actor will be considered.
