Miner v. Novotny
498 A.2d 269, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1449, 304 Md. 164 (1985)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A citizen's complaint of police brutality filed with a law enforcement agency is protected by an absolute common law privilege and cannot serve as the basis for a defamation action by the accused officer.
Facts:
- John J. Miner, a Harford County deputy sheriff, arrested Joseph A. Novotny for driving while intoxicated.
- The arrest was not peaceful, and Novotny was also charged with assaulting Miner.
- Two days after the arrest, Novotny filed a formal "Complaint of Brutality" with the Harford County Sheriff’s Office.
- In the complaint, Novotny alleged that Miner had kicked, choked, and otherwise treated him abusively during and after the arrest.
Procedural Posture:
- The Harford County Sheriff’s Office conducted an internal investigation into Novotny's complaint and concluded Miner was not guilty of misconduct.
- Miner sued Novotny in the Circuit Court for Harford County (a trial court) for defamation.
- The trial court sustained Novotny’s demurrer, dismissing the defamation count.
- Miner, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Court of Special Appeals (Maryland's intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that an absolute privilege under the First Amendment's Petition Clause barred the suit.
- The Court of Appeals of Maryland (the state's highest court) granted certiorari to review the decision.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a citizen's complaint of police brutality, filed with a law enforcement agency to initiate a formal administrative disciplinary proceeding, have an absolute common law privilege that bars a subsequent defamation action by the accused officer?
Opinions:
Majority - Murphy, Chief Judge
Yes, a citizen's complaint of police brutality filed with a law enforcement agency is protected by an absolute common law privilege, barring a defamation suit by the officer. The court first rejected the intermediate appellate court's reasoning that the First Amendment's Petition Clause provides an absolute privilege, citing the Supreme Court's decision in McDonald v. Smith, which held that the clause only provides a qualified privilege. However, the court affirmed the judgment on different grounds, finding that the complaint was protected by Maryland's common law absolute privilege for testimony in administrative proceedings. The court applied the two-factor test from Gersh v. Ambrose, which examines: (1) the nature of the public function of the proceeding and (2) the adequacy of procedural safeguards. The court found a vital public function in encouraging citizens to report police misconduct without fear of retaliatory lawsuits. It also found that the Law-Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR) provides sufficient judicial-like procedural safeguards—such as requiring a sworn complaint, the right to counsel, cross-examination, and penalties for false testimony—to warrant extending the absolute privilege that applies to judicial proceedings to this administrative process. The public interest in holding officers accountable outweighs the potential harm to an officer's reputation from a false complaint.
Analysis:
This decision provides robust protection for citizens who file formal complaints against law enforcement officers in Maryland, insulating them from retaliatory defamation suits. The court clarifies that while the First Amendment only provides a qualified privilege for such petitions, Maryland common law provides an absolute privilege when the complaint initiates a quasi-judicial administrative process with adequate procedural safeguards. This precedent encourages the reporting of police misconduct by removing the threat of civil liability, prioritizing public accountability over an individual officer's reputational interests. The case establishes a clear framework for determining when absolute privilege applies to administrative proceedings based on their public function and procedural integrity.
