Mims v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
200 F.2d 800 (1952)
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Rule of Law:
The dictation of a letter by one corporate employee to another in the regular course of business does not constitute publication for a libel claim against the corporation, nor does sending the letter to an agent of the defamed person when the communication was solicited by that person or their agent.
Facts:
- After being employed by the defendant company for approximately 32 years, the plaintiff was discharged.
- The plaintiff suspected his discharge was due to his refusal to contribute to a political campaign.
- The plaintiff asked his friend, U.S. Senator Sparkman, to investigate the cause of his termination.
- With the plaintiff's knowledge and approval, Senator Sparkman sent a letter of inquiry to the defendant's president.
- In response, the defendant's president dictated a letter to a company-employed stenographer, who then transcribed it.
- The letter stated that the plaintiff was discharged for inefficiency and unsatisfactory performance.
- The defendant company mailed this letter to Senator Sparkman, who received and read it in Washington, D.C.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff brought an action for libel against the defendant corporation in a trial court.
- The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant corporation, finding no publication of the alleged libel.
- The plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the dictation of a defamatory letter by a corporate officer to a fellow corporate employee, or the sending of that letter to the plaintiff's authorized agent who solicited the information, constitute publication for the purposes of a libel action against the corporation?
Opinions:
Majority - Strum, Circuit Judge
No, neither act constitutes publication. Dictation of a letter by a corporate officer to a company stenographer is not publication because both individuals are acting as instrumentalities of a single corporate entity performing one corporate function; the stenographer is not a third party in relation to the corporation. The court reasons that this is the majority rule in New York, where the letter was produced. Furthermore, sending the letter to Senator Sparkman was not publication because he was acting as the plaintiff's agent at the plaintiff's express request. Therefore, the communication was, in the contemplation of law, a reply to the plaintiff himself, and a communication to the defamed party is not publication. Because the plaintiff solicited the inquiry, he impliedly consented to the defendant's reply through the same channel.
Dissenting - Rives, Circuit Judge
Yes, there was publication in both instances. A corporation should not be granted greater immunity for defamation than an individual, and a stenographer is a human being whose esteem for the plaintiff can be diminished, regardless of their employment status; thus, dictation constitutes publication. The controlling New York precedent should be Ostrowe v. Lee, which established that dictation is publication, and there is no reason to create a corporate exception. Regarding the letter to Senator Sparkman, a request for information does not invite a malicious and defamatory reply. The issue is one of qualified privilege, which can be overcome by malice, rather than a lack of publication. A jury could also have reasonably found that Senator Sparkman was acting in his public capacity as a U.S. Senator, not merely as the plaintiff's private agent or 'alter ego'.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the legal fiction of the corporation as a single entity for defamation purposes, establishing that intra-corporate communications made in the regular course of business are not 'published' to a third party. It creates a significant shield for corporations against libel claims arising from internal documents. The ruling also solidifies the 'invited libel' or consent defense, preventing a plaintiff from suing over a defamatory statement they solicited, thereby limiting claims where the plaintiff initiated the communication that led to the harmful statement.
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