Mills v. Wyman
20 Mass. 207 (1825)
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Rule of Law:
A promise based on a moral obligation, but lacking legal consideration, is unenforceable unless the moral obligation arises from a pre-existing legal obligation that has become inoperative by law.
Facts:
- Levi Wyman, the twenty-five-year-old son of Seth Wyman, had long been independent and lived separately from his father's family
- After returning from a voyage, Levi Wyman fell gravely ill
- Daniel Mills, a stranger to the Wyman family, provided care, shelter, and comfort to Levi Wyman until Levi died
- Mills provided this care without any request from Seth Wyman
- After his son's death, Seth Wyman was informed of Mills's kindness and the expenses he incurred
- In response, Seth Wyman wrote a letter to Mills promising to pay for the expenses Mills had incurred
- Seth Wyman later refused to honor his promise to pay
Procedural Posture:
- Daniel Mills sued Seth Wyman for breach of promise in the Court of Common Pleas (a trial court)
- The Court of Common Pleas directed a nonsuit against the plaintiff, Mills, resulting in a judgment for the defendant, Wyman
- The plaintiff, Mills, appealed the trial court's decision
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Issue:
Is a promise to pay for services rendered to a third party, made after the services have been completed and without a pre-existing legal obligation, enforceable as a contract?
Opinions:
Majority - Parker, C.J.
No. A promise is not enforceable if it is based solely on a moral obligation or gratitude for a past benefit that was not requested by the promisor. The court reasoned that for a promise to be legally binding, it must be supported by consideration—something of value given in exchange. While some cases suggest a moral obligation is sufficient consideration, the court clarified that this rule applies only when there was a pre-existing legal obligation that has since become unenforceable, such as a debt barred by the statute of limitations or discharged in bankruptcy. In those instances, a new promise revives the original obligation. Here, Seth Wyman never had a legal duty to care for his adult son, so there was no pre-existing obligation to revive. Mills's services, though commendable, were not rendered at Wyman's request, and Wyman received no material benefit from the promise. Therefore, the promise was a 'naked pact' (nudum pactum) based on a 'transient feeling of gratitude' and is legally unenforceable.
Analysis:
This case firmly establishes the common law principle that moral obligation alone is insufficient consideration to form an enforceable contract. It carves out a narrow exception for promises that revive a prior legal duty, thereby preventing the doctrine from expanding to cover any promise made out of conscience or gratitude. The decision draws a sharp distinction between moral duties, which are left to the 'tribunal of conscience,' and legal duties, which are enforceable by courts. This precedent reinforces the bargained-for exchange theory of consideration and promotes certainty in contract law by declining to enforce promises not rooted in a mutual agreement or pre-existing legal relationship.
