Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc.

Supreme Court of Delaware
1989 Del. LEXIS 149, 559 A.2d 1261 (1989)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

When a corporation's board of directors decides to sell the company, its fiduciary duties shift to maximizing shareholder value through a fair and evenhanded auction process; preferential treatment of a bidder, especially when management is self-interested and the board fails to exercise proper oversight, constitutes a breach of the duties of loyalty and care and will not withstand heightened judicial scrutiny.


Facts:

  • In May 1987, Macmillan's chairman Edward P. Evans and president William F. Reilly explored defensive measures against potential takeovers, including a corporate restructuring designed to give management majority control of a new 'Information' company without investing new capital.
  • On October 21, 1987, the Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. began acquiring Macmillan stock, becoming a potential bidder.
  • Macmillan's board, relying on management's inaccurate and pejorative portrayal of the Bass Group, adopted anti-takeover measures and approved the management-controlled restructuring plan, which would have given management substantial ownership in a new Information company and management control over another new Publishing company.
  • On May 17, 1988, the Bass Group offered to buy all of Macmillan's common stock for $64 per share; Evans did not disclose this offer to shareholders at the annual meeting the next day.
  • On July 20, 1988, Robert Maxwell, through Mills Acquisition Co., proposed a consensual merger at an all-cash price of $80 per share, which Macmillan's management largely ignored while intensifying discussions with Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR) for a management-sponsored buyout.
  • On September 6, 1988, Evans and other senior managers met with KKR, indicating they would endorse a KKR buyout even before KKR disclosed its bid amount, while Evans' financial advisors were instructed to notify other bidders of a September 9 deadline, giving Maxwell less than 24 hours.
  • In the first round of a renewed bidding process on September 26, Maxwell offered $89 all-cash, and KKR offered a blended bid of $89.50 (cash and securities); Macmillan's financial advisors deemed the bids too close to recommend either.
  • Evans secretly telephoned a KKR representative, informing him that Maxwell had offered '$89, all cash' and that the bids were 'a little close', a tip that KKR immediately recognized as improper.
  • Later that evening, Macmillan's lead financial advisor, Bruce Wasserstein, spoke to KKR, impressing upon them 'the need to go as high as [KKR] could go' and advising them on the conditions for a lockup, while intentionally misleading Maxwell into believing its bid was higher and not informing Maxwell of KKR's higher bid or the additional information given to KKR.
  • KKR submitted a final revised offer of $90 per share, contingent on a 'no-shop' clause and a lockup option to purchase four Macmillan subsidiaries for $775 million, structured to create a $250 million tax liability for Macmillan, effectively ending the auction.

Procedural Posture:

  • Macmillan's board approved a restructuring plan (the 'Evans designed restructuring').
  • The Bass Group filed suit against Evans and Macmillan challenging the restructuring.
  • The Delaware Court of Chancery (in Macmillan I) preliminarily enjoined the Evans-designed restructuring, finding it inferior to Bass's offers and that the 'threat' it addressed was primarily to management's incumbency.
  • Maxwell initiated a tender offer for Macmillan and filed an action in the Court of Chancery seeking a declaration that the Delaware Takeover statute, 8 Del. C. § 203, was inapplicable.
  • After Macmillan's board accepted KKR's offer and granted a lockup, Maxwell amended its complaint in the Court of Chancery, adding KKR as a co-defendant, and sought to enjoin the lockup agreement, break-up fees, and expenses granted to KKR.
  • On October 17, 1988, the Court of Chancery denied Maxwell's request to enjoin the lockup, break-up fees, and expenses, finding that while KKR was favored, Maxwell was not deterred from bidding higher, but did enjoin the 'poison pill' shareholder rights plan against Maxwell.
  • Mills Acquisition Co. (Maxwell) filed an interlocutory appeal from the Court of Chancery's denial of injunctive relief regarding the lockup agreement to the Delaware Supreme Court.

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Issue:

Does a board of directors, when conducting an auction for corporate control, breach its fiduciary duties of loyalty and care by granting a lockup option to a favored bidder following an auction process tainted by management's self-interest, active tipping of competing bids, and a lack of proper board oversight, even if the favored bidder's final offer is nominally higher?


Opinions:

Majority - Moore, Justice

Yes, a board of directors breaches its fiduciary duties of loyalty and care by granting a lockup option to a favored bidder following an auction process tainted by management's self-interest, active tipping of competing bids, and a lack of proper board oversight, even if the favored bidder's final offer is nominally higher, because such conduct fails to maximize shareholder value. The Court found that the trial court's legal conclusions were inconsistent with its factual findings regarding the unfairness of the bidding process. When a board decides to sell a company, its 'Revlon duty' requires it to maximize shareholder value, necessitating 'the most scrupulous adherence to ordinary standards of fairness' in the auction process, focusing solely on advancing general shareholder interests, as established in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. The record reflected breaches of the duties of loyalty and care by corporate fiduciaries (Edward P. Evans and William F. Reilly) and a lack of serious oversight by the allegedly independent directors, which tainted the board's evaluative and deliberative processes. Given the divided loyalties, the governing standard was one of 'intrinsic fairness' as outlined in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., and the conduct here failed that rigorous test. The Court specifically identified several issues: management's clear self-interest in the KKR buyout, their deliberate concealment of material information from the Macmillan board, and the board's passivity in establishing a truly independent auction process. The board materially contributed to this misconduct by placing the entire auction in the hands of Evans’ handpicked financial advisors (Wasserstein, Perella & Co.) with little to no board oversight, even though insiders were among the bidders. The auction was 'clandestinely and impermissibly skewed in favor of KKR', which repeatedly received significant material advantages to the exclusion and detriment of Maxwell, serving to stymie rather than enhance the bidding process. The 'telephonic tip' by Evans to KKR, revealing Maxwell's $89 all-cash offer and that the bids were 'a little close,' was a clear breach of the duty of candor and provided KKR with a crucial, unfair tactical advantage. Similarly, Wasserstein's subsequent 'long script' to KKR, which advised them on how to tailor their bid (to 'focus on price' and amend the lockup terms) while denying similar information to Maxwell and misleading Maxwell, constituted another material tip. The knowing concealment of these tips by Evans, Reilly, and Wasserstein at the critical September 27 board meeting constituted 'a fraud upon the board.' Decisions made by a board based on such deceptive and incomplete information are voidable at the behest of innocent parties to whom a fiduciary duty was owed and breached. While lockup agreements are not per se illegal, they must confer a substantial benefit upon stockholders to withstand exacting scrutiny. Here, the lockup was not necessary to draw KKR into the contest, KKR’s 'enhanced' bid was nominal, and the lockup involved 'crown jewel' assets without the independent directors attempting to negotiate alternative bids. This action was intended to end the active auction prematurely without materially enhancing general stockholder interests, rendering it impermissible under Revlon.



Analysis:

This case significantly refined the application of Revlon duties, emphasizing that once a company is for sale, the board's primary goal shifts to maximizing shareholder value through an evenhanded auction process. It underscores the importance of rigorous independent board oversight, especially when management has a conflict of interest in a potential transaction. The ruling established that self-interested fiduciaries who manipulate the bidding process or conceal material information from the board breach their duties of loyalty and care, rendering board actions taken under such deception voidable. This case sets a high bar for boards conducting sales of corporate control, requiring them to ensure a truly level playing field for all bidders and to maintain scrupulous independence and transparency to avoid similar legal challenges.

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