Miller v. Warren
390 S.E.2d 207, 182 W. Va. 560 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
Compliance with a statute or regulation is evidence of due care but is not conclusive; circumstances may require a higher degree of care. The contributory negligence of a parent cannot be imputed to an infant plaintiff who is too young to be capable of negligence.
Facts:
- David Miller, Linda Grapes, and her two-year-old son, Joshua Grapes, checked into the Flagg Motel, owned and operated by Barbara Warren.
- The family fell asleep in their room in the early afternoon.
- A fire started in the room between the bed and a baseboard heater, filling the room with smoke.
- The motel room did not have a smoke detector, although this did not violate the local fire code.
- The family was unable to exit because the room door was too hot to open.
- A motel clerk saw the smoke, used a pass-key to open the door, and the family crawled to safety.
- All three members of the family sustained serious burns in the fire.
- The adult plaintiffs, Miller and Grapes, admitted to smoking cigarettes in the motel room.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs, David Miller, Linda Grapes, and Joshua Grapes, filed a negligence complaint against the defendant, Barbara Warren, in the Berkeley County circuit court (trial court).
- The case proceeded to a jury trial.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Warren.
- The plaintiffs appealed the verdict to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by instructing a jury that a defendant's compliance with a fire code meets the standard of care and that the potential negligence of adult plaintiffs can be imputed to their infant co-plaintiff?
Opinions:
Majority - Neely, Chief Justice
Yes. A jury instruction that suggests compliance with a safety regulation is sufficient to meet the standard of due care, and that allows the negligence of adult plaintiffs to be imputed to an infant co-plaintiff, constitutes reversible error. The court reasoned that a statute or regulation merely sets a 'floor of due care' and does not excuse a defendant from taking additional precautions if they know or should know of other risks not contemplated by the regulation. Compliance is competent evidence of due care, but it is not conclusive and does not create a presumption of due care. Furthermore, the court held that a two-year-old child is conclusively presumed incapable of negligence. Therefore, any negligence by the adult plaintiffs cannot be imputed to the infant plaintiff, Joshua Grapes, as the defendant's duty of care ran to him personally. The trial court's instruction improperly combined the negligence of all plaintiffs, which was a reversible error as it effectively and incorrectly imputed the parents' potential negligence to the child.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the common law principle that regulatory standards establish a minimum safety requirement, not a complete definition of due care. It clarifies that defendants must still adhere to the broader 'reasonable person' standard, which may require safety measures beyond what is mandated by law. The case also serves as a strong affirmation of the rule against imputing parental negligence to an infant plaintiff in a direct action for the child's own injuries. This protects child litigants from having their valid claims defeated by the potentially negligent actions of their guardians.
