Miller v. United States
20 L. Ed. 135, 11 Wall. 268, 78 U.S. 268 (1871)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Congress, under its constitutional war powers, may authorize the seizure and confiscation of property belonging to enemies during a civil war through an in rem proceeding, and such actions are not subject to the criminal procedure protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Seizure of intangible property like corporate stock can be effected constructively through notice to the entity holding it, such as the corporation itself, which is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.
Facts:
- Samuel Miller, a resident of Amherst County, Virginia, owned shares of stock in two Michigan-based railroad corporations.
- The American Civil War was ongoing between the United States and the rebellious Confederate States, including Virginia.
- Under the Confiscation Acts of 1861 and 1862, the President of the United States was authorized to cause the seizure of property belonging to persons engaged in or aiding the rebellion.
- A U.S. Marshal, acting under executive orders, served a notice of seizure for Miller's stock upon the vice-president of one corporation and the president of the other.
- The government alleged that Miller was a 'rebel citizen' who was engaged in armed rebellion and did not cease aiding the rebellion within sixty days of a presidential proclamation.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States filed an information in rem in the U.S. District Court for the District of Michigan to confiscate Samuel Miller's corporate stock.
- The District Court issued a warrant and monition, and notice was given by publication.
- Miller failed to appear, and the court entered a default judgment against him.
- The District Court condemned the stock as forfeited to the United States and ordered it to be sold.
- Miller later filed a petition asking the District Court to set aside the decree, which the court denied.
- Miller, as plaintiff in error, appealed the decision to the U.S. Circuit Court.
- The Circuit Court affirmed the decree of the District Court.
- Miller then brought the case to the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of error.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Are the Confiscation Acts of 1861 and 1862 a constitutional exercise of Congress's war powers, and does seizure of corporate stock by serving notice on corporate officers confer jurisdiction for an in rem forfeiture proceeding?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Strong
Yes, the Confiscation Acts are a constitutional exercise of Congress's war powers, and the seizure by notice was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. The acts are not municipal regulations for punishing crime, but rather a legitimate exercise of the government's war powers to weaken the enemy. The Constitution's restrictions on criminal prosecutions, such as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, do not apply to belligerent actions like the confiscation of enemy property. During the Civil War, those who aided the Confederacy were public enemies, and their property was a proper subject of confiscation as an instrument of coercion. Furthermore, the seizure of intangible property like corporate stock does not require physical manucaption; a constructive seizure, such as serving notice upon the corporation holding the stock as a quasi-trustee, is sufficient to bring the property within the court's jurisdiction for an in rem proceeding.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Field
No, the Confiscation Acts are unconstitutional punitive statutes, and the seizure was invalid. The legislation is not directed at 'enemies' under the law of nations but at persons who have committed overt acts of treason, making it a punishment for a crime. As such, proceedings under the act must comply with the constitutional safeguards for criminal defendants, including indictment and trial by jury, which were not provided here. The joint resolution limiting forfeiture to the offender's natural life confirms the penal nature of the act. Furthermore, the seizure was invalid because jurisdiction in an in rem proceeding depends on the court taking the property into its custody. Simply giving notice to corporate officers, who are not the owner's agents and do not possess the stock, does not constitute a valid seizure that can confer jurisdiction.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Davis
No, the judgment should be reversed due to fatal errors in the proceeding, although the acts themselves are constitutional. While Congress has the constitutional authority to pass such acts under its war powers, the seizure method here was deficient. Seizing intangible property like stock by merely serving notice on corporate officers does not provide adequate notice to the owner as required for a proceeding in rem, especially when the owner is in an enemy state and cannot legally receive communications. The law failed to provide a statutory method for such a seizure, creating a 'casus omissus' (a case for which no law exists). Additionally, the decree of condemnation was procedurally flawed because it failed to specify the facts found by the court that justified the forfeiture.
Analysis:
This decision affirmed the broad scope of federal war powers during the Civil War, establishing that property confiscation is a legitimate belligerent tool rather than a criminal punishment. By framing the Confiscation Acts as a war measure, the Court allowed the government to bypass the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections typically afforded to citizens, thereby justifying the seizure of property from those deemed enemies without a criminal trial. This ruling set a powerful precedent for expansive executive and legislative authority in wartime, legitimizing property confiscation as a means to weaken a domestic or foreign enemy. The case also provided a practical rule for seizing intangible assets like corporate stocks, endorsing constructive seizure as sufficient for establishing in rem jurisdiction.
