Miller v. Superior Court
89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 21 Cal. 4th 883, 986 P.2d 170 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
The California constitutional shield law provides an absolute immunity from contempt for a newsperson refusing to disclose unpublished information to the prosecution, as the state constitutional right to due process of law (Cal. Const., art. I, § 29) does not override this immunity in the same manner as a criminal defendant's federal constitutional right to a fair trial.
Facts:
- KOVR news reporter Tom Layson conducted a videotaped interview with Anthony Lee DeSoto in the San Joaquin County jail after DeSoto confessed to sheriff’s investigators about killing his cellmate.
- Portions of the interview were broadcast on KOVR news programs on March 19 and March 20, 1996.
- In April 1996, the People issued a subpoena duces tecum for KOVR to produce the entire interview tape, including broadcast and unbroadcast portions (outtakes).
- KOVR submitted only the broadcast portions, invoking the shield law (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2; Evid. Code, § 1070) for the unbroadcast material.
- KOVR's news director, Ellen Miller, was later ordered by the superior court to turn over the unedited videotape to the prosecution.
- Ellen Miller refused to turn over the unedited videotape as ordered by the court.
Procedural Posture:
- In April 1996, the People issued a subpoena duces tecum against KOVR for the full interview tape of Anthony Lee DeSoto.
- KOVR moved to quash the subpoena in superior court, invoking the newspersons’ shield law.
- The superior court denied KOVR's motion to quash and ordered the videotape unsealed and provided to the prosecution, but stayed the order.
- KOVR filed a petition for an extraordinary writ in the Court of Appeal, challenging the superior court's ruling.
- The Court of Appeal (in SCI-Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court) denied the petition as premature because no contempt adjudication had occurred, but issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and allow KOVR to choose to be held in contempt or disclose the materials.
- At the ensuing hearing, the superior court ordered KOVR's news director, Ellen Miller, to turn over the unedited videotape; Miller refused and was adjudged in contempt, with the court ordering her jailed and to pay attorney fees, but stayed its order.
- Miller filed a petition for extraordinary relief (treated as a writ of prohibition) in the Court of Appeal to set aside the contempt order.
- The Court of Appeal denied the writ of prohibition, upholding the trial court’s contempt order, and lifted the stay, reasoning that the People’s state constitutional due process right overcame the shield law.
- The Supreme Court of California granted review and further stayed enforcement of the contempt order.
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Issue:
Does the California shield law's immunity for newspersons refusing to disclose unpublished information yield to the prosecution's state constitutional right to due process of law, as established by article I, section 29, of the California Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - MOSK, J.
No, a newsperson cannot be held in contempt for refusing to surrender unpublished information to the prosecution, as the state constitutional right to due process of law (Cal. Const., art. I, § 29) does not overcome the shield law's immunity. The California shield law (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2(b)) provides an absolute immunity from contempt for refusing to disclose unpublished information obtained in the newsgathering process, whether confidential or not. This absolute protection can only be overcome by a conflicting federal constitutional right, such as a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial, as established in Delaney v. Superior Court. However, the People’s state constitutional right to due process under article I, section 29, is not such a right. The court reasoned that article I, section 28(d) (the “truth-in-evidence” provision of Proposition 8, enacted earlier than Proposition 115, which introduced section 29) explicitly states that nothing in it shall “affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press.” Since the shield law was an existing constitutional right of the press, section 28(d) implicitly determined that such press rights, including the shield law, do not undermine the truth-finding function or deny due process. Therefore, even if section 29 generally encompasses a right to obtain evidence, it is controlled by the specific exemption for press rights in section 28(d) and the specific, absolute immunity granted by section 2(b). The court applied the principle that a specific constitutional provision governs a general one, concluding that section 29 does not implicitly permit what section 28(d) explicitly precludes: using prosecutorial need to override existing evidentiary privileges and rights of the press.
Concurring - BROWN, J.
Yes, I concur with the majority's result and most of its reasoning, but disagree with its analysis regarding the alleged conflict between California Constitution, article I, sections 28, subdivision (d) and 29. The principle that a specific provision governs over a general provision applies only if there is an actual conflict between them. Justice Brown argued that the media exception in section 28, subdivision (d) is expressly confined to 'this section' and does not explicitly prevent a more general provision from narrowing the scope of a newsperson's immunity, nor does any ballot measure suggest such an intent. Therefore, while agreeing that the shield law prevails, Justice Brown found the majority's reliance on the specific-over-general rule in this context to be 'suspect and unnecessary' and potentially impactful on other constitutional provisions.
Analysis:
This case significantly affirms the robust, near-absolute nature of California's constitutional shield law for newspersons, especially against prosecutorial demands for unpublished information. It clearly delineates that the state's 'right to due process' does not equate to a criminal defendant's federal constitutional right to a fair trial when it comes to overcoming press immunities. This ruling reinforces the autonomy of the press in California, protecting newsgathering activities from the chilling effect of compulsory disclosure to the state, and establishes a higher bar for compelling journalists to reveal sources or unpublished materials, particularly for the prosecution.
