Miller v. State
1999 Ark. App. LEXIS 842, 6 SW 3d 812, 68 Ark. App. 332 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
To establish constructive possession of contraband in a jointly occupied vehicle, the state must prove not only that the defendant knew of the contraband's presence but also present an additional factor linking the accused to the contraband, such as proximity or control; mere joint occupancy is insufficient.
Facts:
- Michael Alexander was driving a car with three passengers: James Giles in the front right seat, Damon Albert in the rear left seat, and James Luther Miller in the rear right seat.
- Alexander, Giles, and Albert drove to a residence and purchased crack cocaine while Miller was in the vehicle.
- According to Alexander, marijuana was already in the vehicle before the trip, and its presence was known to all occupants because it had been smoked in the car.
- Arkansas State Police Officer Tim Land initiated a traffic stop because the vehicle did not have a license plate.
- Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Land smelled a very strong odor of burned marijuana emanating from inside.
- A search of the vehicle revealed three rocks of crack cocaine and marijuana located together in a pouch on the back of the driver's seat, which was directly in front of passenger Damon Albert and across the back seat from Miller.
Procedural Posture:
- James Luther Miller was tried by a jury in a state trial court.
- Miller's counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing the evidence was insufficient for a conviction, but the trial court denied the motion.
- The jury found Miller guilty of possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana.
- Miller appealed his convictions to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict.
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Issue:
Does a passenger in a jointly occupied vehicle constructively possess illegal drugs found in a seat pouch not in his immediate proximity, where the only linking factor for one drug (marijuana) is its pervasive odor, and there are no linking factors for another drug (cocaine) found in the same location?
Opinions:
Majority - Neal, J.
No as to the cocaine; Yes as to the marijuana. The evidence is insufficient to establish constructive possession of the cocaine but is sufficient to establish constructive possession of the marijuana. For constructive possession in a jointly occupied vehicle, the State must prove an additional factor linking the accused to the drugs beyond mere presence. The pervasive, strong odor of burnt marijuana provided substantial evidence that Miller had knowledge of the marijuana's presence, which the court found sufficient to establish constructive possession. However, for the cocaine, none of the established linking factors from Plotts v. State were present: the cocaine was not in plain view, not among Miller's personal effects, not on his side of the car or in immediate proximity, he did not own or control the car, and he did not act suspiciously. Therefore, the State failed to present any evidence beyond Miller's occupancy in the vehicle to link him to the cocaine.
Dissenting - Bird, J.
Yes, as to both the cocaine and the marijuana. The evidence was sufficient to convict Miller for constructive possession of both substances. The drugs were located in a pouch in the back seat area, which was in 'close proximity' and accessible to Miller, who was a rear-seat passenger. It is contradictory to affirm the marijuana conviction based on the smell while reversing the cocaine conviction when both drugs were found in the exact same location. If Miller was in close enough proximity to possess the marijuana, he was also in close enough proximity to possess the cocaine.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Hart, J.
No, as to both the cocaine and the marijuana. The evidence was insufficient to establish constructive possession for either substance. While agreeing with the majority's reversal of the cocaine conviction, this opinion argues the marijuana conviction should also be reversed. Knowledge of the contraband's presence, inferred from the smell of marijuana, is not enough to establish possession. The State failed to prove the essential element that Miller exercised 'care, control, and management' over the contraband, and mere presence or knowledge is insufficient to establish criminal liability.
Analysis:
This case refines the doctrine of constructive possession in Arkansas, particularly in the context of joint occupancy of a vehicle. It establishes that circumstantial evidence of knowledge, such as the pervasive odor of marijuana, can serve as the 'additional linking factor' required to prove possession. However, the decision creates a narrow distinction, holding that this knowledge-based factor does not automatically extend to other contraband found in the same location if there is no independent evidence linking the accused to it. The split opinions demonstrate the deep judicial division over what constitutes a sufficient 'linking factor' and whether mere knowledge can satisfy the element of control required for constructive possession.
