Miller v. NBD Bank, N.A.
1998 Ind. App. LEXIS 1825, 1998 WL 765163, 701 N.E.2d 282 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
When a party moves for summary judgment challenging the authenticity of a decedent's signature on a document presented as a claim against the estate, the movant bears the initial burden of presenting competent evidence demonstrating an absence of genuine material fact, and this burden is not satisfied by conclusory affidavits or expert opinions merely stating a 'highly probable' conclusion.
Facts:
- Anthony R. Mongan died on March 4, 1996.
- On March 23, 1995, Marvin F. Miller, Sr. and Anthony Mongan entered into an original lease and option to purchase agreement for forty acres of property known as Mongan’s Recreational Park.
- The original agreement required Miller to pay $200,000 toward the purchase price by December 31, 1996, stating that failure to make this payment by the deadline would render the agreement void.
- On February 12, 1996, a hand-printed document was created, purporting to modify the original contract between Miller and Mongan.
- This modification document allegedly increased the subject property to seventy-two acres, extended the lease period, and permitted Miller to pay the $200,000 in installments of $40,000 per year without interest.
- As consideration for the modification, Miller was 'willing to give' Mongan five percent ownership in Mongan’s Recreational Park.
- The central dispute revolved around whether Anthony R. Mongan's signature on this second modification document was genuine.
Procedural Posture:
- Anthony R. Mongan died on March 4, 1996.
- On April 1, 1996, the trial court appointed NBD Bank, N.A., as the personal representative of Mongan's estate.
- Approximately five months after Mongan's death, Marvin F. Miller, Sr. filed a claim against the Estate in the trial court, seeking to enforce a lease and option to purchase agreement as modified by a second document.
- The Estate responded with an Answer and Counterclaim, which stated that the February 12, 1996, modification instrument was invalid because it was never signed by Anthony R. Mongan, and counterclaimed for immediate possession of the property or, in the alternative, payment of $35,000 per year.
- Miller responded, asserting that Mongan had 'duly executed' the challenged modification document.
- The Estate filed a motion for summary judgment in the trial court, designating a verified statement by Lorraine Mongan and a letter, subsequently verified, from an alleged expert, Clarke Mercer.
- Miller responded to the summary judgment motion with an affidavit affirming that Mongan had executed the modification agreement in his presence.
- Both parties sought to strike the opposing party’s affidavits.
- During an evidentiary hearing on pending motions, the trial court denied Miller’s motion to strike as it pertained to Clarke Mercer.
- The trial court entered a general order granting the Estate’s motion for summary judgment, effectively disallowing Miller's claim.
- Miller, as appellant, appealed the trial court's ruling to the Indiana Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Did the Estate, as the moving party for summary judgment, present competent evidence sufficient to demonstrate that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the authenticity of Anthony R. Mongan's signature on the purported modification agreement?
Opinions:
Majority - Najam, Judge
No, the Estate did not present competent evidence to establish that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the authenticity of Mongan's signature on the second document. The court reiterated that summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the burden on the movant to prove the absence of such an issue. The court rejected the Estate's argument that it was not required to designate evidence, clarifying that Indiana Trial Rule 9.2(G), which addresses a deceased party's deemed denial of execution, does not relieve a summary judgment movant of its initial burden to present evidence negating a factual dispute. Analyzing the Estate's designated evidence, the court found Lorraine Mongan's affidavit insufficient because her statement that the document was 'never signed by Anthony R. Mongan' was conclusory and did not demonstrate personal knowledge as required by Trial Rule 56(E) and Evidence Rule 602. The court noted that a father-daughter relationship alone is insufficient to infer personal knowledge of a signature's authenticity. The court also found Clarke Mercer's expert letter insufficient; although Mercer opined it was 'highly probable' the signature was not genuine, this phrasing still left a question of fact rather than conclusively establishing its non-genuineness. Because the Estate failed to meet its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden never shifted to Miller to present counter-evidence. Although not dispositive of the appeal, the court also addressed the applicability of Indiana's Dead Man's Statute (Ind. Code § 34-1-14-6) for guidance on remand. It concluded that Miller would be an incompetent witness to testify about Mongan's execution of the modification agreement because he was a necessary party with an interest adverse to the estate, and the claim would diminish the estate, thereby falling under the 'judgment or allowance...for or against the estate' provision of the statute.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the high evidentiary bar for summary judgment, particularly in disputes involving a decedent's signature against an estate. It reinforces that movants must present conclusive, competent evidence, disallowing conclusory affidavits from close relatives and expert opinions that merely state probabilities. The decision also provides crucial guidance on the stringent application of the Dead Man's Statute, emphasizing its role in preventing fraud by barring interested parties from testifying about transactions with the deceased if the claim would affect the estate's value, even for equitable relief. Future cases will likely cite this decision to challenge the sufficiency of summary judgment evidence and to determine witness competency when claims are made against estates.
