Miller v. General Motors Corp.
565 N.E.2d 687, 207 Ill. App. 3d 148, 152 Ill. Dec. 154 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
A landowner's duty to a trespasser is to refrain from willful and wanton misconduct. A higher duty of ordinary care arises only if the landowner knows or should reasonably anticipate the trespasser's presence in a specific place of danger, and a landowner is not expected to foresee a trespasser taking extraordinary measures to access a secured, hazardous area.
Facts:
- General Motors (defendant) operated a foundry with an adjacent pumphouse on its property near the Vermilion River.
- The pumphouse contained an enclosed balcony, located nearly 10 feet off the ground, which housed high-voltage electrical transformers and exposed wires.
- The only access to this balcony was through a 12-by-20-inch gap in its floor, which was not accessible by a public ladder.
- General Motors was aware of occasional trespassers in the general vicinity of the pumphouse but had no knowledge of any prior attempts by trespassers to scale the wall and enter the elevated balcony.
- On June 14, 1984, Michael J. Miller (plaintiff), a 20-year-old trespasser, was exploring the area with a friend.
- Believing the structure was abandoned, Miller scaled a nine-foot wall using a pipe and eyebolts protruding from it.
- Miller then crawled through the small gap in the balcony floor and, in an effort to pull himself up, grabbed a live electrical wire carrying approximately 4,160 volts.
- Miller suffered severe and disfiguring injuries to his right hand as a result of the electrical shock.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael J. Miller filed a two-count complaint against General Motors in an Illinois trial court, alleging negligence and willful and wanton misconduct.
- A jury returned a verdict for Miller, awarding $2 million in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages.
- The jury found Miller 25% contributorily negligent, and the trial court reduced the compensatory award to $1.5 million.
- General Motors, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District. Miller is the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a landowner owe a duty of ordinary care to a trespasser who is injured by a high-voltage wire when the landowner had no reason to anticipate the trespasser would scale a nine-foot wall and crawl through a small opening to access an enclosed, elevated balcony?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Steigmann
No. A landowner in this situation does not owe a duty of ordinary care because the trespasser's presence in the specific place of danger was not foreseeable. The landowner’s only duty is to refrain from willful and wanton misconduct, which was not breached. Illinois law establishes that a landowner's duty to a trespasser is limited to refraining from willful and wanton injury, unless the landowner discovers or reasonably anticipates the trespasser's presence in a place of danger. Here, it was not foreseeable that a trespasser would undertake the extraordinary actions of scaling a nine-foot wall and crawling through a small opening to enter the enclosed, elevated balcony. While General Motors knew of general trespassing in the area, this did not create a duty to anticipate such an unlikely entry into a secured, dangerous location. Therefore, the higher duty of ordinary care was not triggered. Furthermore, General Motors' conduct did not constitute willful and wanton misconduct, which requires a reckless disregard for safety after knowledge of impending danger. By placing the dangerous wires in a secured, inaccessible area, General Motors did not exhibit reckless disregard for a trespasser whose presence they could not anticipate.
Analysis:
This decision strongly reaffirms the traditional common law distinction that limits a landowner's duty to trespassers. It clarifies that the foreseeability required to trigger a higher duty of care must be specific to the place of danger, not just the general property. The court's holding protects landowners from liability for injuries sustained by trespassers who take extraordinary or unforeseeable actions to place themselves in peril. This case serves as a significant precedent in premises liability law by reinforcing that a landowner is not required to make their property 'trespasser-proof' against all conceivable, however unlikely, methods of entry into hazardous areas.
