Miller v. Fabius Township Board
114 N.W.2d 205, 366 Mich. 250 (1962)
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Rule of Law:
A local ordinance is not invalid for conflicting with a state statute on the same subject if it is more restrictive, so long as the state has not pre-empted the entire field of regulation and the ordinance does not prohibit what the state statute expressly licenses or authorizes.
Facts:
- Plaintiff is one of several people who own property on the shores of Pleasant Lake in Fabius Township.
- Plaintiff and others enjoy the sport of water skiing on the lake during the summer months.
- Due to employment, Plaintiff is often unable to arrive at his lake property until after 5 p.m.
- The Fabius Township Board adopted an ordinance effective August 25, 1959.
- The ordinance prohibits powerboat racing and water skiing on Pleasant Lake each day from 4 p.m. until 10 a.m. the following day.
- This ordinance prevents Plaintiff from engaging in water skiing during the daylight hours after he arrives from work.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff filed a bill of complaint in the circuit court for the county of St. Joseph, seeking a declaratory judgment to void an ordinance adopted by the Fabius township board.
- The trial court found the ordinance to be constitutional and valid.
- The trial court entered an order dismissing the plaintiff's bill of complaint.
- Plaintiff appealed the trial court's decision to the Michigan Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a local township ordinance that prohibits water skiing on a lake between 4 p.m. and 10 a.m. conflict with, and is it therefore preempted by, a state statute that only prohibits water skiing from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise?
Opinions:
Majority - Kavanagh, J.
No, the local ordinance does not conflict with the state statute and is not preempted. A local ordinance can be more restrictive than a state law without creating a conflict, as long as the state has not occupied the entire field and the ordinance does not prohibit what the state expressly permits. The court reasoned that the state statute only set a minimum prohibition (no skiing from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise) but did not expressly permit or authorize skiing at all other times. Therefore, the ordinance 'speaks only where the statutes are silent' by adding a further, non-contradictory restriction. The court held that municipalities, under their general police powers to protect the 'health and safety of persons and property,' may enact additional requirements to address peculiar local conditions, such as traffic congestion on a specific lake, much like they can set lower speed limits than the state.
Dissenting - Souris, J.
Yes, the ordinance conflicts with the statute and is therefore invalid. The dissent reads the state statute as implicitly permitting water skiing during all hours it does not prohibit. By banning skiing from 4 p.m. until one hour before sunset, the township ordinance prohibits an activity that the state statute permits. This creates a direct conflict between the two laws, rendering the local ordinance invalid under established precedent.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the doctrine of state preemption, establishing that a state law setting a minimum standard of conduct does not automatically create a 'ceiling' for regulation. It grants local governments significant authority to enact stricter rules to address local health and safety concerns, provided the state has not explicitly intended to occupy the entire regulatory field. The key distinction articulated is between state silence, which allows for local regulation, and express state permission, which would preempt a more restrictive local ordinance. This precedent empowers municipalities to tailor regulations to specific local conditions without being constrained by less-stringent, general state laws.
