Miller v. Bennett
56 S.E.2d 217, 21 A.L.R. 2d 364, 190 Va. 162 (1949)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A person who consents to and participates in an illegal or immoral act cannot recover civil damages from another participant for injuries sustained as a consequence of that act.
Facts:
- Kerneda C. Bennett was a mature, married woman.
- Bennett solicited the services of Iva Rodeffer Davis Coffman to procure an illegal abortion.
- Bennett voluntarily submitted herself to a procedure performed by Coffman for the purpose of producing an abortion.
- As a result of the attempted abortion, Bennett died.
Procedural Posture:
- Raymond J. Bennett, as administrator of Kerneda C. Bennett's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Iva Rodeffer Davis Coffman in a Virginia trial court.
- The defendant, Coffman, contended that the decedent's consent to the illegal abortion barred recovery.
- The trial court overruled the defendant's contention and allowed the case to proceed.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $8,000.
- The trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict.
- The defendant, represented by the committee of her estate, Francis S. Miller, appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a mature woman's consent to an illegal abortion, which results in her death, bar her estate from recovering damages in a wrongful death action against the person who performed the procedure?
Opinions:
Majority - Hudgins, C. J.
Yes, a mature woman's consent to an illegal abortion bars her estate from recovering damages for her wrongful death. The court applies the well-settled general rule, ex turpi causa non oritur actio, which dictates that a court will not lend its aid to a plaintiff whose cause of action is founded upon their own participation in an immoral or illegal act. While an exception to this rule exists for breaches of the peace (like mutual combat), that exception does not apply here. The court reasons that anti-abortion statutes are enacted to protect the unborn child and society, not the woman who consents to the procedure. Therefore, the decedent's voluntary participation in a criminal act reflecting moral turpitude and violating public policy precludes any civil recovery by her estate.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the common law doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio (from a wrongful cause, no action arises) in Virginia tort law, specifically within the context of illegal medical procedures. It establishes that a participant's consent to a crime bars them from seeking civil remedies for injuries arising from that crime. The court's distinction between the public policy goals of anti-abortion statutes (protecting the unborn and society) versus assault statutes (protecting individuals) creates a framework that prevents parties from using civil lawsuits to shift losses incurred during joint criminal endeavors. This precedent makes it exceptionally difficult for a patient, or their estate, to recover damages for malpractice or injury resulting from a consensual illegal act.
