Miller v. AT&T Corporation
250 F.3d 820 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
The Secretary of Labor's regulations defining “serious health condition” under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), specifically including common conditions like the flu if they meet objective criteria for incapacity and continuing treatment, are a permissible construction of the statute, warranting Chevron deference.
Facts:
- Kimberly Miller was employed by AT&T as an account representative from September 1990 until her termination in March 1997.
- AT&T maintained a progressive disciplinary system for attendance, where absences covered by FMLA were considered non-chargeable, and Miller was issued a final letter of warning on June 25, 1996, indicating her next chargeable absence could result in dismissal.
- On December 26, 1996, Miller began feeling ill at work and was subsequently too sick to work on December 27.
- On December 28, Miller sought treatment at an urgent care center, where Dr. T. Donald Sommerville diagnosed her with the flu, noted severe dehydration and significantly low blood cell and platelet counts, administered intravenous fluids, and directed her to return on December 30 for reevaluation.
- On December 30, Dr. Sommerville examined Miller and conducted another blood test, which revealed persistent low blood counts but with improvement, and directed her to return two weeks later for a third blood test.
- Miller received a work-excuse slip for December 28 through 31, and after telephoning the urgent care center, she received an additional work-excuse slip for January 1.
- Miller requested FMLA leave for December 27 through January 1, and Dr. Sommerville completed AT&T's FMLA-2 form, indicating Miller suffered a period of incapacity of at least three consecutive calendar days involving treatment two or more times.
- AT&T denied Miller’s FMLA leave request on February 26, 1997, based on the belief that the flu was not generally covered by FMLA and that the submitted information did not demonstrate treatment on two or more occasions, leading to Miller's termination for excessive absenteeism on March 20, 1997.
Procedural Posture:
- Kimberly Miller filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia in August 1998, alleging violations of her rights under the FMLA by AT&T.
- Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Miller on the issue of liability, holding that Miller’s flu constituted a serious health condition and that she had provided adequate certification of her need for FMLA leave.
- The question of the appropriate remedy was submitted to the district court on stipulated facts, and the court held that Miller was entitled to back pay, plus interest, from the date of her termination.
- AT&T appealed the district court's orders finding it liable and awarding back pay and attorneys’ fees to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, with AT&T as the appellant and Miller as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does an employee's illness, such as the flu, qualify as a “serious health condition” under the FMLA when it causes more than three consecutive days of incapacity and involves treatment on two or more occasions by a healthcare provider, and are the Secretary of Labor's regulations defining “continuing treatment” valid as applied to such conditions, and was the employee's FMLA certification adequate?
Opinions:
Majority - Wilkins, Circuit Judge
Yes, Kimberly Miller’s illness qualified as a serious health condition under the FMLA, the Secretary of Labor’s regulations defining "continuing treatment" are valid, and her certification was adequate. The court determined that Miller met the regulatory definition of a “serious health condition” under 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2) because she was incapacitated for more than three consecutive calendar days and received “treatment” two or more times. It clarified that “treatment” includes examinations and evaluations of a condition, making Miller's second visit to Dr. Sommerville qualify. The court reconciled the “ordinarily” language of 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(c) (which lists flu as generally not covered) by interpreting it to mean such common ailments normally won't meet the objective criteria, not that they are automatically excluded from FMLA coverage. Applying Chevron deference, the court found the Secretary of Labor’s regulations to be a permissible construction of the FMLA, even if they might cover illnesses Congress did not explicitly envision, given the broad statutory definition and explicit delegation of rulemaking authority. Furthermore, Miller’s FMLA certification was deemed adequate because Dr. Sommerville completed the required Category II on the form, and AT&T failed to request additional medical facts or provide Miller an opportunity to cure any perceived deficiency as required by regulations. The court also affirmed the full back pay award, rejecting AT&T’s arguments regarding after-acquired evidence (finding AT&T did not prove Miller was not entitled to FMLA leave for later absences) and failure to mitigate damages (as Miller enrolled in school only after a diligent but unsuccessful job search for a lower-paying career).
Dissenting - Hilton, Chief District Judge
No, the Secretary of Labor exceeded her delegated authority in promulgating regulations that defined "continuing treatment" to include diagnosis and monitoring, and effectively expanded FMLA coverage to minor illnesses like the ordinary flu, which Congress did not intend to cover. Chief District Judge Hilton argued that the plain meaning of the word “treatment” in the medical context is clear and unambiguous, meaning a “systematic effort to cure illness and relieve symptoms,” and is distinct from “diagnosis” or mere “monitoring.” He contended that by expanding “continuing treatment” to include diagnosis and monitoring in 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b), the Secretary directly contradicted the express will of Congress and engaged in an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power under Article I. The dissent cited legislative history indicating Congress's intent for FMLA to cover “major” illnesses, not short-term conditions like the flu, and criticized the majority for acknowledging this intent while still deferring to regulations that permit such coverage. Judge Hilton asserted that the agency’s regulations, which could provide FMLA coverage to illnesses Congress never envisioned, were “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” under Chevron, and therefore should be found unconstitutional.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the interpretation of “serious health condition” under the FMLA, emphasizing an objective, effects-based analysis rather than a categorical exclusion of common illnesses. It reinforces the robust deference courts afford to agency regulations under Chevron, particularly when there's an explicit delegation of rulemaking authority, allowing agencies to reasonably interpret broad statutory terms. The ruling obligates employers to recognize that even common ailments like the flu can qualify for FMLA leave if specific regulatory criteria are met, and highlights the importance of proper FMLA certification procedures, placing the onus on employers to request clarification or further documentation rather than unilaterally denying leave. This broad interpretation provides substantial protection for employees by preventing employers from summarily denying FMLA leave for conditions not explicitly listed as serious, thereby expanding the practical scope of FMLA coverage.
