Yes. The prosecutors' excuses for striking the black jurors were completely phony. The court found that when prosecutors claimed they struck a black juror for being hesitant about the death penalty, they had allowed white jurors who said the exact same things to serve. It's like a parent punishing one kid for eating a cookie before dinner but letting another kid do it. The court looked at all the shady tactics—the different questions for black and white jurors, the jury shuffling, and the office's racist history—and decided it was obvious that the real reason for the strikes was race.

No. The prosecutors had good, non-racist reasons for their strikes. This judge argued that the black jurors who were struck were not truly the same as the white jurors who stayed. He believed there were small but important differences in their answers that justified the prosecutors' decisions. He also complained that the majority was looking at new evidence that wasn't shown to the original trial court, which he argued is against the rules for this type of case.

Yes, but this whole case shows the system for picking juries is broken. This judge agreed that there was racism here, but he wrote separately to say that it's almost impossible to prove it in most cases. Lawyers can always invent a plausible-sounding excuse, and it's hard for a judge to know if they're lying or just have a 'gut feeling.' He thinks the only real way to stop this from happening is to get rid of peremptory strikes altogether, so lawyers can't just kick people off a jury for a secret, biased reason.

Yes, the lawyers were wrong to remove so many black people from the jury. They did it in a way that seems racist, especially when you look at how they treated black and white people differently. The local lawyer's office also had a bad history of doing this kind of thing. The Court pointed out that if the lawyers didn't really check the reasons they said were important, or if their reasons could also apply to white jurors but didn't, then it looks like they were making excuses to hide racism.

I agree with the decision, but I also think we need to rethink how we let lawyers remove jurors without giving a reason, because it can lead to unfairness. The Court's decision shows that proving discrimination is tough but possible, and that we can't just accept the state court's decision if it doesn't make sense.

No, there's not enough proof that the lawyers were being racist. The decision is based on new evidence that wasn't shown in the original trial, which isn't how things should work. But the Court also says that if the state court's facts are really off, then the higher courts can step in.

"If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step."

A federal habeas court must "presume the [state] court's factual findings to be sound unless [the petitioner] rebuts the `presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.'"

And a prosecutor's "failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire examination on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination."

—often the subjects of instinct, "" when illegitimate grounds like race are in issue, a prosecutor simply has got to state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he gives. A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis. If the stated reason does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade …

"The standard is demanding but not insatiable...[because] `[d] eference does not by definition preclude relief.'"

Third, the trial court must "assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it."

—holding that the striking of black jurors was pretextual and Miller-El was entitled to prevail on his Batson claim based on evidence of discrimination which was initially presented at a Swain hearing, ie, a pretrial hearing to determine whether there was evidence indicating a systemic exclusion based on race pre-Batson, and later used as part of the

As the United States Supreme Court has stated in a similar context, "Defendants are harmed, of course, when racial discrimination in jury selection compromises the right of trial by impartial jury, but racial minorities are harmed more generally, for prosecutors drawing racial lines in picking juries establish `state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of …

Under the standard set forth in § 2254 (d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Yes. The cumulative evidence of discrimination is too powerful to conclude anything but that the prosecutors' race-neutral explanations for striking black venire members were pretextual and violated the Equal Protection Clause. The statistical evidence showing that 91% of eligible black venire members were struck is stark. More powerfully, a side-by-side comparison of struck black jurors (like Fields and Warren) with nonblack jurors who were allowed to serve reveals that the prosecutors' stated reasons for the strikes—such as views on rehabilitation or the death penalty—applied equally or with greater force to white jurors who were not struck. The court also found compelling evidence of pretext in the broader patterns of prosecutorial conduct, including the disparate use of a 'graphic script' for death penalty questions, manipulative questioning about minimum sentences, and the strategic use of jury shuffles to disadvantage black potential jurors. When viewed in light of the Dallas DA's office's well-documented history of racial discrimination in jury selection, the proffered reasons for the strikes 'reek of afterthought' and are revealed to be a pretext for purposeful discrimination.

No. The state court's finding of no discrimination was reasonable and Miller-El has not shown otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. The majority improperly grants relief by relying on evidence, such as numerous juror questionnaires, that was never presented to the state court, in violation of AEDPA's strict standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). On the merits, the struck black jurors were not similarly situated to the empaneled white jurors; there were legitimate, race-neutral reasons for the prosecutors' decisions, such as juror Warren's ambivalence about the death penalty and juror Fields's strong religious views on rehabilitation combined with his brother's criminal record. The majority's comparative analysis is flawed because it fails to consider all of the prosecutors' reasons for each strike. The evidence regarding disparate questioning and jury shuffles is speculative and does not prove discriminatory intent.

Yes. While joining the Court's opinion, this case illustrates the profound practical difficulties of proving discrimination under the Batson framework and reinforces Justice Thurgood Marshall's prediction that the only way to end racial discrimination in jury selection is to eliminate peremptory challenges entirely. The Batson test is flawed because prosecutors can easily offer a plausible, non-persuasive reason for a strike, and judges face the 'hopeless task' of second-guessing subjective judgments that may be rooted in unconscious bias. The persistent, systemic nature of the problem, combined with the constitutional importance of a non-discriminatory jury, suggests it is necessary to reconsider the entire system of peremptory challenges.

Yes. The prosecutors' use of peremptory strikes to exclude 91% of the eligible African-American venire members, the side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve, and the broader patterns of practice during the jury selection indicate decisions based on race. The historical evidence of the general policy of the Dallas County District Attorney's Office to exclude black venire members from juries further supports this conclusion. The state court's conclusion that the prosecutors' strikes were not racially determined is unreasonable and erroneous. I emphasize that a prosecutor's failure to conduct meaningful voir dire on a subject of alleged concern, or the application of a proffered reason for striking a black panelist that equally applies to a nonblack panelist allowed to serve, is evidence of pretextual discrimination.

While I agree with the majority's decision, I express concern about the practical problems of proving racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges and suggest reconsidering the peremptory challenge system as a whole. The Court's decision underscores the demanding but not insatiable standard for proving discrimination, and that deference to state court findings does not preclude relief when those findings are unreasonable.

No. The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that the state court's factual finding of no racial discrimination was wrong. The majority's decision relies on evidence not presented to the state court, which is contrary to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). However, the majority's decision reflects the principle that habeas relief is available when the state court's decision is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Miller-El v. Dretke

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