No. Free speech does not create a special 'opinion shield.' Just because you say something is your opinion doesn't mean you can't be sued for it. The main question is whether your statement implies something that can be proven true or false. Calling someone a liar under oath isn't just an idea; it's an accusation of a specific act (perjury) that can be investigated and proven or disproven. Therefore, it's not protected as an 'opinion,' and Coach Milkovich can sue.

No, there isn't a special shield for opinions, but the majority is wrong about this specific column. The writer made it obvious he was just guessing and sharing his personal feelings. He used words like 'apparently' and wrote in an angry, exaggerated style in a sports column. Any reasonable reader would know he wasn't stating a proven fact, but was just giving his angry, speculative take on the situation. Therefore, his column should be protected by free speech.

Yes, Ohio can use its libel laws here. The article suggested Milkovich lied under oath, which is something that can be checked for truth. The Supreme Court explained that even if the statement is presented as an opinion, if it hints at facts that can be proven false, it may still be considered defamation. The law already protects free speech enough, so we don't need a special rule for opinions. What matters is whether a reasonable person would think the article was saying Milkovich actually committed perjury in court, and the Court believed that was the clear message of the article, because it said Milkovich lied after swearing to tell the truth.

I disagree with the majority because I believe the columnist was merely giving his opinion, not stating solid facts. I think people understand that when someone writes in a colorful and exaggerated way, it is meant to be seen as a personal view rather than a clear-cut claim. This matters because if we start punishing opinions like these, we risk losing the freedom to express ideas and debate important issues.

The First Amendment protects "statements that cannot `reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual. "

—a false assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and the statement, `In my opinion Jones is a liar,'can cause as much damage to reputation as the statement, `Jones is a liar.'As Judge Friendly aptly stated: `[It] would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for accusations of …

In Milkovich, the Supreme Court held that there is no "wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled `opinion.'"

"[T] he First Amendment [protects] `statements that cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual,'"including" statements employing `loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that the writer was seriously maintaining'an assertion of fact. "

First, the court must determine if the statement is "sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false."

Therefore, "a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection."

The Supreme Court has stressed that "a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law

—went on to explain: "If a speakers says, `In my opinion John Jones is a liar,'he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of …

As statements of opinion relating to a matter of public concern, Evangelista's statements were themselves protected by the First Amendment.

Defendants contend that "[t] he Supreme Court consistently has held that such statements cannot form the basis for a defamation claim."

No. The First Amendment does not create a separate constitutional privilege for statements labeled as 'opinion.' Expressions of opinion may often imply an assertion of objective fact that is susceptible of being proven true or false. Existing First Amendment protections—requiring that a statement be provably false before there can be liability and protecting rhetoric that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts—are sufficient to protect free expression. The Court rejected the idea that the Gertz dictum, 'there is no such thing as a false idea,' was intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion.' The key inquiry is whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements in Diadiun's column imply a provably false assertion that Milkovich committed perjury. Here, the assertion that Milkovich lied under oath is not loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language; it is a factual assertion that can be proven true or false by comparing his testimony with other objective evidence.

No. While there is no separate, additional constitutional privilege for 'opinion,' the majority misapplies existing First Amendment doctrine to the facts of this case. The statements at issue should receive full constitutional protection because they cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating or implying defamatory facts about Milkovich. Diadiun disclosed the factual basis for his conclusion and used cautionary language (e.g., 'apparently,' 'seemed') that signaled he was engaged in conjecture, not asserting a provable fact. The column's context as a sports opinion piece, its exaggerated tone, and its clear bias would have put any reasonable reader on notice that the author was expressing a personal, speculative viewpoint rather than a factual accusation of perjury.

Yes. The First Amendment does not prohibit the application of Ohio's libel laws to the alleged defamations contained in the article because the statements implying that Milkovich committed perjury are sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false. The Court emphasized that a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law. The Court rejected the notion of a separate 'opinion' privilege and clarified that even statements that do not appear to be factual may imply an assertion of fact if they are based on underlying facts that are provably false. This is because expressions of 'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact. The dispositive question is whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements in the column imply an assertion that Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceeding, and the Court found this to be the case here because the clear impact of the article was that Milkovich lied at the court hearing after having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.

I dissent because the majority reinterprets the editorial tone of Diadiun’s column as if it were a factual assertion rather than a hyperbolic opinion. I hold that the language and context clearly signal personal conjecture and a rhetorical flourish, because readers are meant to understand that the commentary is speculative in nature rather than an unequivocal claim of wrongdoing. Unlike the majority, I view the disputed comments as expressions of opinion that do not cross the threshold into actionable defamation because they lack the requisite definitiveness of fact, and thus should remain under the broad shield of First Amendment protection. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent, emphasizing that penalizing such speculative expression endangers robust public debate and free discourse.

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.

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