Miles v. Miles
711 S.E.2d 880, 2011 S.C. LEXIS 181, 393 S.C. 111 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
An obligation in a divorce agreement to maintain health insurance for a former spouse is a modifiable form of spousal support, unless the agreement unambiguously states that the obligation is non-modifiable.
Facts:
- Theodora Miles and James Richard Miles divorced in 2000.
- As part of their divorce, they signed a settlement agreement which was incorporated into the court's final decree.
- The agreement required James Richard Miles to maintain health and dental insurance on Theodora Miles until she remarried or obtained employment that provided such benefits.
- In the same paragraph, the agreement stated that both parties waived alimony.
- In the six years following the divorce, James Richard Miles suffered a triple bypass, a torn rotator cuff, and colon cancer, leading to seven surgeries.
- As a result of his health conditions, James Richard Miles became totally disabled and was no longer employed, causing his income to decrease by more than half to $1,830 gross per month.
- During this same period, Theodora Miles's annual income increased from $28,000 to $45,000.
- Theodora Miles had not remarried and her employment did not provide health insurance benefits.
Procedural Posture:
- Theodora Miles petitioned for divorce from James Richard Miles in the family court.
- The family court approved the parties' settlement agreement and incorporated its terms into the final divorce decree on August 16, 2000.
- Six years later, James Richard Miles filed an action in the family court seeking to terminate his obligation to provide health insurance.
- The family court denied the request, ruling that the health insurance provision was not a form of support and was therefore non-modifiable.
- James Richard Miles (appellant) appealed the decision to the South Carolina Court of Appeals.
- The court of appeals affirmed the family court's ruling.
- The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals.
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Issue:
Does a provision in a divorce agreement requiring one spouse to maintain health insurance for the other constitute a modifiable form of spousal support, even when the agreement also contains a mutual waiver of alimony?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Hearn
Yes, a provision requiring the maintenance of health insurance is a modifiable form of spousal support. The court held that unless an agreement unambiguously denies the court jurisdiction to modify it, its terms remain modifiable. The obligation to provide health insurance has the hallmarks of spousal support, as it provides a benefit normally incident to the marital relationship. The court rejected the argument that the waiver of 'alimony' meant the insurance obligation was not support, explaining that alimony is not the only form of spousal support and that courts should not be bound by 'semantic distinctions' or 'words of art.' Finding the agreement unambiguously created a support obligation, the court then determined that James Richard Miles demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances—his severe health decline and drastically reduced income, contrasted with Theodora Miles's increased income—warranting a modification.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice Pleicones
Yes, the insurance requirement is a modifiable form of support. This opinion concurs with the majority's legal conclusion that the lower courts erred and that the obligation to provide health insurance is modifiable. However, it dissents from the majority's decision to make its own factual determination that a substantial change of circumstances occurred. The dissent argues that this factual finding is beyond the Supreme Court's authority on certiorari and that the issue should be remanded to the family court for determination.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant default rule in family law, classifying health insurance provisions in divorce agreements as modifiable spousal support unless explicitly made non-modifiable. It reinforces the judicial principle of substance over form, directing courts to look at the function of a provision (i.e., providing support) rather than relying on labels like 'alimony.' The case also clarifies and simplifies the standard for modification by holding that the burden of proving a 'substantial change in circumstances' is the same whether the original support order arose from a settlement agreement or a contested hearing, thereby encouraging extrajudicial settlements.
