Midland Asphalt Corp. et al. v. United States
489 U.S. 794 (1989)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A district court's order denying a criminal defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment for an alleged violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) is not an immediately appealable final decision under the collateral order doctrine.
Facts:
- Midland Asphalt Corporation and its president, Albert C. Litteer, were under federal grand jury investigation for allegedly violating the Sherman Act by conspiring to rig bids on road-paving contracts.
- During a related civil proceeding, the Government filed a memorandum agreeing to retain its notes from witness interviews.
- Approximately one year later, in a separate criminal case against different defendants (United States v. Allegany Bitumens, Inc.), the Government filed another memorandum.
- This second memorandum attached a copy of the memorandum from the earlier Midland-related civil case.
- Midland and Litteer alleged that the Government's filing in the Allegany case publicly disclosed secret grand jury matters, including the investigation's focus and a witness's identity, in violation of Rule 6(e).
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York indicted Midland Asphalt Corporation and Albert C. Litteer.
- Petitioners moved in the District Court to dismiss the indictment, alleging a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2).
- The District Court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss.
- Petitioners appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Government moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
- The Court of Appeals granted the Government's motion, holding the District Court's order was not an appealable final decision.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a district court order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment for an alleged violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) qualify as an immediately appealable final decision under the collateral order doctrine?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No. A district court's refusal to dismiss an indictment for an alleged violation of grand jury secrecy is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it does not involve a right that would be irretrievably lost if not vindicated before trial. The general rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is that appeals may only be taken from 'final decisions,' which in criminal cases means after conviction and sentencing. The narrow 'collateral order' exception applies only to orders that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. This standard is met only when an order involves an 'asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial,' such as the right not to be tried at all. Such rights stem from explicit constitutional guarantees like the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Speech or Debate Clause. Rule 6(e) provides no such guarantee; a violation of its secrecy provisions, while a serious procedural error, is not a fundamental defect that confers a right to be free from the trial itself.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the strong federal policy against piecemeal, interlocutory appeals in criminal cases by narrowly construing the collateral order doctrine. The Court clarifies the crucial distinction between a 'right not to be tried' and a right whose violation is remedied by dismissal, holding that only the former justifies an immediate appeal. This precedent limits defendants' ability to delay trials by appealing pretrial rulings on most procedural matters, including grand jury errors. Consequently, it promotes judicial efficiency by requiring that most alleged errors be addressed in a single appeal following a final judgment.
Unlock the full brief for Midland Asphalt Corp. et al. v. United States