Middendorf v. Henry
425 U.S. 25, 47 L. Ed. 2d 556, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 29 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
Neither the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel nor the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires the government to provide counsel to a defendant in a summary court-martial, as such a proceeding is not a "criminal prosecution" and the military's justice system, which allows the accused to opt for a special court-martial with counsel, satisfies due process.
Facts:
- The plaintiffs were enlisted members of the United States Marine Corps.
- Five of the plaintiffs were charged with 'unauthorized absences' and other minor offenses.
- Three other plaintiffs were charged with similar minor offenses, including one for assault, and were ordered to stand trial.
- All plaintiffs were to be tried by a summary court-martial, an informal proceeding before a single commissioned officer who acts as judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel, with a maximum punishment of one month's confinement.
- The plaintiffs were informed that they would not be provided with counsel at the summary court-martial.
- They were also advised of their right to refuse trial by summary court-martial and instead be tried by a special court-martial, where counsel would be provided but the potential penalties were greater.
- All plaintiffs consented in writing to proceed with the summary court-martial without counsel.
- The five plaintiffs who were tried were convicted and sentenced to periods of confinement ranging from 20 to 30 days.
Procedural Posture:
- Enlisted members of the U.S. Marine Corps filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
- The plaintiffs challenged the military's authority to try them at summary courts-martial without providing counsel, seeking habeas corpus and injunctive relief.
- The District Court, a court of first instance, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, expunged their convictions, and issued a worldwide injunction against uncounseled summary courts-martial that could result in confinement.
- The government defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's judgment, holding that while there was no absolute right to counsel, the Fifth Amendment required counsel on a case-by-case basis depending on the complexity of the defense.
- Both the plaintiffs and the government defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the Sixth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause require that a military defendant be provided with counsel in a summary court-martial proceeding?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Rehnquist
No, neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment requires counsel in a summary court-martial. A summary court-martial is not a 'criminal prosecution' within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment because it is a non-adversarial, disciplinary proceeding unique to the distinct military community, dealing with minor offenses and limited punishments. Citing 'Gagnon v. Scarpelli' and 'In re Gault', the Court reasoned that not all proceedings involving potential liberty deprivation are 'criminal prosecutions.' The Fifth Amendment's due process standard is met because the military's structure for military justice, created by Congress, provides the accused with the option to refuse a summary court-martial and elect a special court-martial where counsel is provided. This choice, though it may expose the accused to greater penalties, is a constitutionally permissible mechanism that adequately protects the serviceman's rights.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Powell
No, counsel is not constitutionally required. The primary reason is that the military is a 'specialized society separate from civilian society' with its own unique laws, traditions, and disciplinary needs. The Constitution gives Congress the authority to regulate the armed forces, and the court-martial system is a product of that authority. For centuries, military disciplinary procedures have not been required to conform to those of civilian courts, and it would ignore history and the unique military exigencies to impose a requirement of counsel for minor military infractions now.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes, counsel is required. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that a defendant be accorded the assistance of counsel in a summary court-martial proceeding.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes, counsel is constitutionally required. The holding of 'Argersinger v. Hamlin'—that no person may be imprisoned for any offense unless represented by counsel—should apply directly, as a summary court-martial can result in a one-month jail sentence. A summary court-martial is a 'criminal prosecution,' and the majority’s reasoning for concluding otherwise is flawed. The offenses can be serious, the conviction creates a criminal record with significant collateral consequences, and the presiding officer cannot adequately substitute for a defense counsel due to conflicting roles. Furthermore, forcing a defendant to risk greater punishment in a special court-martial to obtain counsel unconstitutionally penalizes the exercise of a fundamental right.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant 'military exception' to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as articulated in 'Argersinger v. Hamlin'. It reinforces the principle of judicial deference to Congress's authority to regulate the armed forces and underscores that constitutional protections may apply differently within the military context. By classifying the summary court-martial as a non-criminal disciplinary proceeding, the Court limited the expansion of Sixth Amendment rights into the military justice system. The case affirms that procedural frameworks that would be unconstitutional in a civilian setting may be permissible in the military if they are deemed necessary for discipline and offer an alternative, rights-protective procedure.
