Mickey v. Mickey
2009 Conn. LEXIS 206, 292 Conn. 597, 974 A.2d 641 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
Disability benefits awarded for an injury that occurs after the dissolution of a marriage do not constitute marital property subject to equitable distribution. While the portion of retirement benefits representing deferred compensation for service during the marriage is distributable, any enhancement specifically for a post-dissolution disability is considered a substitute for future lost wages and is too speculative at the time of divorce to be classified as property.
Facts:
- Darrell D. Mickey was employed by the state of Connecticut as a correction officer and was a member of the state employees retirement system.
- His employment plan made him potentially eligible for normal retirement, hazardous duty retirement, and disability retirement benefits.
- The marriage between Darrell and Jacqueline Mickey was dissolved on September 21, 2001.
- On February 28, 2002, approximately five months after the dissolution, Darrell Mickey suffered an injury in the course of his employment.
- This injury rendered him permanently disabled and forced him to retire.
- After his injury, his monthly retirement payments were increased to include an enhanced benefit specifically for his disability.
- Jacqueline Mickey began receiving 40 percent of Darrell's entire monthly retirement payment, which included the portion attributable to his post-dissolution disability.
Procedural Posture:
- The marriage of the parties was dissolved by a Connecticut trial court on September 21, 2001.
- The dissolution judgment awarded the plaintiff, Jacqueline Mickey, 40 percent of the defendant's 'monthly retirement benefit payment' but did not explicitly mention disability benefits.
- After the defendant became disabled and his benefits increased, the plaintiff began receiving 40 percent of the total amount, including the disability enhancement.
- The defendant, Darrell D. Mickey, filed a motion for clarification in the trial court, asking it to rule that the disability portion of his benefits was not subject to distribution.
- The trial court denied the defendant's motion, concluding the disability benefits were part of his retirement benefits and were properly distributed under the original judgment.
- The defendant (appellant) appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to the Appellate Court.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court transferred the appeal to itself before the Appellate Court could hear it.
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Issue:
Do disability retirement benefits, awarded to a spouse as a result of a disability incurred after the marriage has been dissolved, constitute distributable marital property under General Statutes § 46b-81?
Opinions:
Majority - Zarella, J.
No. Disability benefits awarded for an injury that occurs after a marriage is dissolved do not constitute distributable marital property. The court applied a two-step framework from Bender v. Bender to determine if the interest was 'property' at the time of dissolution. First, the defendant's potential interest in disability benefits was not a presently existing, enforceable right, as it was contingent on a future disabling event and could have been altered by the legislature. Second, the contingency of becoming disabled is far too speculative to be considered a concrete property interest, unlike an unvested pension which is contingent on the mere passage of time. The court distinguished between the base retirement benefit, which is deferred compensation earned during the marriage and is distributable, and the disability enhancement, which is a substitute for lost future wages and is not a fruit of the marital partnership.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Norcott, J.
Yes. The disability benefits should be considered distributable marital property. The dissent argues that the majority misapplied the first prong of the Bender test. From the moment the defendant began his employment, he had a presently existing and enforceable right to receive disability benefits in the event he became disabled on the job. The fact that the receipt of the benefits was contingent on a future injury does not degrade the underlying right to a mere expectancy, similar to how unvested stock options or potential lawsuit settlements have been treated as property. This right was earned during the marriage, and therefore the resulting benefits, whenever paid, should be classified as marital property.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundary between marital property and a non-distributable mere expectancy, particularly for contingent, employment-related benefits. By adopting an 'analytic approach,' the court separates a hybrid benefit into its distinct components: the part that is deferred compensation (marital property) and the part that replaces future lost wages due to a post-dissolution event (separate property). This ruling establishes that the timing of the triggering event—the disability itself—is critical in determining the character of the benefit. It prevents the non-injured spouse from receiving a windfall from a post-marital misfortune and will guide future courts to scrutinize the purpose of a benefit, not just its label as 'retirement,' when dividing assets.
