Michigan v. Bryant

Supreme Court of the United States
562 U.S. (2011)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Statements made during a police interrogation are non-testimonial, and thus not subject to the Confrontation Clause, when the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.

Facts:

At approximately 3:25 a.m., Detroit police responded to a dispatch about a man being shot.
Police found Anthony Covington in a gas station parking lot with a mortal gunshot wound to his abdomen.
In response to police questions, Covington identified "Rick" (Richard Bryant) as the person who shot him.
Covington stated that Bryant shot him through the back door of Bryant's house, which was several blocks away, about 25 minutes earlier.
Covington explained that after being shot, he drove himself to the gas station.
The police questioning lasted approximately 5-10 minutes, ending when emergency medical services arrived.
Covington was transported to a hospital where he died within hours.

Procedural Posture:

Richard Bryant was convicted by a jury in a Michigan trial court of second-degree murder and firearms offenses.
The Michigan Court of Appeals, as the intermediate appellate court, initially affirmed the conviction.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, the state's highest court, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Washington.
On remand, the Michigan Court of Appeals again affirmed the conviction, finding Covington's statements were non-testimonial.
Bryant, as appellant, appealed again to the Supreme Court of Michigan.
The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed Bryant's conviction, holding that the statements were testimonial and their admission violated the Confrontation Clause.
The State of Michigan, as petitioner, successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

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Issue:

Does the admission of a dying victim's statements to police, identifying the shooter and the location of the shooting, violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause when the primary purpose of the questioning was to respond to an ongoing emergency?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Sotomayor

No. The admission of the victim's statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause because an objective analysis of the circumstances shows the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency. The Court determines the primary purpose by evaluating the statements and actions of both the declarant and the police in the context of the situation. Factors to consider include the existence of an emergency extending beyond the initial victim to the public (especially with an armed shooter at large), the informality of the encounter, and the medical condition of the victim. In this case, an armed shooter's motive and location were unknown, creating a potential threat to the public and police. Covington was grievously wounded, and the questioning was informal and focused on assessing the current threat. Therefore, Covington's statements were not testimonial and were properly admitted.

Dissenting - Justice Scalia

Yes. The admission of the victim's statements violated the Confrontation Clause because the declarant's purpose is what matters, and Covington's statements were clearly made to establish past events for future prosecution. The emergency had ended 25 minutes prior and six blocks away; Covington was in no immediate danger from his attacker while surrounded by five police officers. The police questioning was a structured interrogation about a past crime, not an attempt to resolve a present emergency. The majority's approach creates a vague, multi-factor test that distorts the Confrontation Clause analysis and improperly resurrects the discredited reliability standard of Ohio v. Roberts.

Dissenting - Justice Ginsburg

Yes. The statements were testimonial for the reasons articulated by Justice Scalia. The majority's decision creates an expansive and confusing exception to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes. The Court could have addressed whether the historical 'dying declaration' exception to the confrontation right survives Crawford, but the issue was not properly preserved by the prosecution in the state courts and therefore cannot be decided.

Concurring - Justice Thomas

No. The statements were not testimonial, but not because of the flawed 'primary purpose' test. The proper inquiry is whether the interrogation possessed sufficient formality and solemnity to be considered 'testimonial' in the historical sense the Confrontation Clause was designed to prevent. Because the questioning of a dying Covington in a gas station parking lot was highly informal and lacked any indicia of solemnity, his statements were not testimonial and their admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

Analysis:

This decision significantly broadens the scope of the 'ongoing emergency' exception to the Confrontation Clause established in Davis v. Washington. The analysis now extends beyond the immediate safety of the victim to encompass potential threats to the police and the general public, especially when a firearm is involved and the perpetrator is at large. By adopting a highly context-dependent, 'totality of the circumstances' inquiry that considers the perspectives of both police and declarant, the Court makes the line between testimonial and non-testimonial statements more flexible and less predictable. This ruling provides prosecutors with greater leeway to admit on-the-scene statements from victims in violent crime cases.

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