Michel v. Michel
484 So.2d 829 (1986)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Upon termination of the community property regime, a spouse who uses separate funds to pay a community debt, such as a mortgage on the formerly communal home, is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the payments, even if that spouse had exclusive use of the property. Future income derived from efforts, skill, or industry expended during the marriage is a community asset, and its value must be apportioned between the community and the separate estate of the earning spouse.
Facts:
- Elizabeth Dubus Michel and Melvin M. Michel married on February 4, 1956.
- During the marriage, Elizabeth began the research and preliminary work on several literary projects, and Melvin worked as an insurance agent whose compensation included commissions based on agents he recruited and trained.
- The parties separated in September 1980.
- After the separation, Melvin Michel continued to live in the family home and made monthly mortgage payments totaling $29,825 between September 1980 and April 1983.
- Melvin Michel obtained a court order which had the effect of barring Elizabeth Michel from using the family home.
- After the separation, Melvin Michel also used his separate funds to pay $6,580 in interest on community promissory notes that he had refinanced.
- After the separation, both parties began to realize income from efforts expended during the marriage: Elizabeth from publishing contracts for her literary works and Melvin from insurance policy renewals and commissions.
Procedural Posture:
- Following a judgment of separation based on mutual fault, Elizabeth Dubus Michel filed a petition in a Louisiana trial court seeking a partition of community property.
- The trial court adjudicated the disputed issues, denying Melvin M. Michel's claim for reimbursement for mortgage payments but granting his claim for interest paid on refinanced community debt.
- The trial court also ruled on the division of the parties' literary works, insurance commissions, and retirement plans, classifying some post-dissolution income as separate property and apportioning others.
- Melvin M. Michel, as defendant-appellant, appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
- Elizabeth Dubus Michel, as plaintiff-appellee, answered the appeal, raising additional claims of error.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a spouse who makes all mortgage payments on the formerly communal home after the community is dissolved, while having exclusive use of that home, have a right to be reimbursed by the other spouse for one-half of those payments?
Opinions:
Majority - Cole, Judge
Yes, a spouse who makes mortgage payments on the formerly communal home after the community's dissolution is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of those payments, irrespective of their exclusive use of the property. The court reasoned that after a judgment of separation, the parties become co-owners in indivision. A co-owner is entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred for the preservation of the common property. Denying reimbursement as a penalty for barring the other co-owner from the premises is not an appropriate remedy; the proper remedy for the excluded spouse was to seek a partition by licitation (a forced sale) or to seek review of the order that barred her use. Since the mortgage payments accrued to both parties' benefit by preventing foreclosure, Mr. Michel is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the total payments. The court also held that future income from assets created through labor during the community, such as Mrs. Michel's literary works and Mr. Michel's insurance commissions, are community assets that must be apportioned based on the extent of the work performed during the marriage.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the application of co-ownership principles to former community property following a separation, establishing that the right to reimbursement for preserving common property is distinct from the right of use. It rejects an equitable argument that would conflate the two, reinforcing that specific legal remedies exist for exclusion from property. Furthermore, the decision solidifies the principle that the community's interest in assets generated by a spouse's skill and labor (like copyrights or commission rights) extends to income realized after dissolution. This requires courts to apportion the value of such inchoate assets between the community and the separate estate, confirming that the timing of the labor, not the receipt of payment, is critical for classification.
