Michael H. v. Gerald D.
491 U.S. 110 (1989)
Rule of Law:
A state law that presumes a child born into an intact marriage is a child of that marriage does not violate the substantive due process rights of a man who claims to be the biological father. An adulterous natural father's interest in a relationship with his child is not a fundamental liberty interest traditionally protected by our society.
Facts:
- Carole D. and Gerald D. were married in 1976 and established a home in California.
- In the summer of 1978, Carole D. began an adulterous affair with her neighbor, Michael H.
- In 1980, Carole conceived a child, Victoria D., who was born on May 11, 1981.
- Gerald D. was listed as the father on Victoria's birth certificate and always held her out as his daughter.
- Shortly after the birth, Carole informed Michael H. that he might be the father, and blood tests taken in October 1981 showed a 98.07% probability of his paternity.
- For the first three years of Victoria's life, Carole, Michael, and Victoria lived together intermittently, and Michael held Victoria out as his daughter.
- In April 1984, Carole and Michael signed a stipulation that Michael was Victoria's father, but Carole later instructed her attorneys not to file it.
- In June 1984, Carole reconciled with Gerald and moved to New York with him and Victoria, where they continued to live as a family.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael H. filed a filiation action in California Superior Court (a state trial court) to establish his paternity and secure visitation rights.
- The Superior Court granted Michael H. limited, temporary visitation rights.
- Gerald D. intervened in the action and moved for summary judgment, arguing that California Evidence Code § 621 created a conclusive presumption that he was Victoria's father.
- The Superior Court granted Gerald D.'s motion for summary judgment, upholding the constitutionality of § 621, and denied Michael H.'s request for continued visitation.
- Michael H. and Victoria (through her guardian) appealed to the California Court of Appeal (an intermediate appellate court).
- The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The California Supreme Court (the state's highest court) denied discretionary review.
- Michael H. and Victoria appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which noted probable jurisdiction.
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Issue:
Does a state law that creates a conclusive presumption that a child born to a married woman cohabiting with her husband is a child of the marriage, thereby preventing a putative biological father from establishing his paternity, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No. A state law creating a conclusive presumption of legitimacy for a child born into an intact marriage does not violate the putative biological father's due process rights. The Due Process Clause protects only those liberty interests that are fundamental and 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' The asserted interest of an adulterous natural father in his child born into an existing marriage has no historical protection in our nation's traditions; to the contrary, our legal traditions have consistently protected the integrity of the marital family from such claims. The California statute is a substantive rule of law reflecting a legislative policy choice to protect the peace and tranquility of the family unit, and it is not the role of the judiciary to second-guess this choice. Because Michael H. has no constitutionally protected liberty interest, the state is not required to provide him a hearing to establish his paternity.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
No. Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's conclusion but wrote separately to express disagreement with the rigid historical test proposed in footnote 6 of Justice Scalia's opinion. She argued that the Court should not foreclose its ability to identify protected liberty interests by imposing a single mode of historical analysis that requires looking only to 'the most specific level' of tradition. This approach, she cautioned, might be inconsistent with past decisions and could unduly restrict the Court from addressing unanticipated situations in the future.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
No. Although a natural father in this situation could potentially have a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with his child, the California statutory scheme, as applied, did not violate Michael H.'s rights. Justice Stevens interpreted California law (specifically Cal. Civ. Code § 4601) as permitting a non-parent, such as Michael, to seek visitation rights if it is in the child's best interest. Because the California trial court considered Michael's request for visitation and denied it on the grounds that it was not in Victoria's best interests, Michael received all the process he was constitutionally due. Therefore, the statutory scheme is not fundamentally unfair.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The California statute violates the Due Process Clause. The plurality's reliance on a narrow, specific historical tradition is a 'stagnant' and 'hidebound' approach to interpreting the Constitution's protection of 'liberty.' The relevant liberty interest is parenthood, which is clearly established as fundamental. Michael H. demonstrated his commitment as a father by developing a substantial relationship with Victoria, which gives rise to a protected liberty interest under the Court's precedents like Stanley v. Illinois. The state's conclusive presumption unconstitutionally terminates this interest without affording any hearing whatsoever, a clear violation of procedural due process.
Dissenting - Justice White
Yes. Michael H. has a protected liberty interest in his relationship with his daughter that cannot be denied without due process. Prior cases establish that an unwed father who demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood has a protected interest. Michael lived with Victoria, supported her, and held her out as his daughter, more than satisfying this standard. The California law unconstitutionally denies him a meaningful opportunity to be heard by preventing him from presenting definitive blood-test evidence of his paternity, rendering him a stranger to his child.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of substantive due process rights related to fatherhood and non-traditional families. By rejecting a right based on biology plus an established relationship, the plurality establishes a much stricter test requiring that an asserted right be specifically and traditionally protected by society's historical practices. Justice Scalia's methodology, focusing on the 'most specific level' of tradition, signals a more restrictive approach to identifying fundamental rights that could limit constitutional protections for family structures that do not conform to historical norms. The case solidifies the state's powerful interest in preserving the integrity of the 'unitary' marital family, even against compelling biological evidence.
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