Michael E. L. v. County of San Diego
183 Cal. App. 3d 515, 228 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A public mental health professional has a Tarasoff duty to exercise reasonable care to protect an identifiable victim from a dangerous patient, even if the patient was involuntarily committed. However, if the patient was involuntarily committed under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, the professional and the public entity are immune from liability for the patient's actions after release under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5154. Furthermore, law enforcement officers do not incur liability for failing to protect an individual unless a 'special relationship' is created through affirmative action, assumed responsibility, or detrimental reliance.
Facts:
- In early 1977, Cecelia left Michael R. L. and filed dissolution proceedings, but they later reconciled and resumed living together with their son, Mikie.
- On July 30, Michael repeatedly shot and killed the family sheepdog in the presence of Cecelia and Mikie.
- After the dog killing, Cecelia immediately left Michael, taking Mikie to her parents' house, and reported the incident to the sheriff's department. Deputy Jonathan Logan told her it was a domestic problem and she should get a restraining order.
- On September 6, at 3 a.m., Michael called the California Highway Patrol, stating he was going to shoot himself or someone else, and was later found by El Cajon police officers with a shotgun and shells, admitting he intended to shoot Cecelia.
- El Cajon police officers completed an involuntary commitment form and transported Michael to the County's Community Mental Health Center (CMH) for evaluation and treatment.
- CMH psychiatrists and psychologists, including Dr. Pappas and Dr. Schorr, evaluated Michael, recognizing him as an "explosive paranoid" and a "walking time bomb" who intended to kill Cecelia.
- On September 7, Dr. Pappas released Michael from CMH, advising him to see a private psychiatrist, Dr. Olenik, but Michael did not contact Dr. Olenik.
- On October 8, Michael lured Cecelia to Ramona, threatened her, and sexually assaulted her; Cecelia then called the sheriff, and Deputy Logan responded, advising her to go home, lock the door, and call if Michael appeared.
- On October 9, Michael went to Cecelia's parents' residence, smashed a glass door, beat Cecelia's mother with a pipe, then shot and killed Cecelia, and immediately committed suicide. Mikie was present.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael R. L. (Mikie), through his guardian Isadora (grandmother), sued the County of San Diego in the trial court for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress, alleging negligence by County-employed psychiatrists and a deputy sheriff.
- The trial court granted the County's motion for nonsuit following the plaintiff's opening statement, concluding that the Tarasoff holding was inapplicable or immunity applied for the CMH staff, and no special relationship existed with the deputy sheriff.
- Isadora appealed the trial court's judgment of nonsuit.
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Issue:
1. Does a psychiatrist employed by a county mental health facility (CMH) owe a Tarasoff duty to warn an identifiable victim of a patient's dangerous propensities, even when the patient was involuntarily committed under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, and if so, are the psychiatrist and county immune from liability for the patient's actions after release? 2. Did a deputy sheriff create a "special relationship" with an individual by responding to domestic disturbance calls and offering advice, thereby incurring a duty to protect her from her violent husband?
Opinions:
Majority - Butler, J.
Yes, a CMH psychiatrist owes a Tarasoff duty to exercise reasonable care to protect an intended victim from a dangerous patient, even if the patient was involuntarily committed; however, the psychiatrist and County are immune from liability for the patient's subsequent actions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5154. No, the deputy sheriff did not create a "special relationship" with Cecelia, and thus no duty to protect her arose. The Tarasoff duty applies equally to psychiatrists treating voluntary and involuntarily committed patients because once a special relationship is established (by taking on a patient), affirmative duties for the benefit of third parties arise. Michael was involuntarily committed because he was a danger to Cecelia, strengthening the case for duty. While Cecelia was aware of the danger, the question of what "reasonable care" required beyond a warning (e.g., counseling her never to be alone with Michael) would ordinarily be for a jury. However, Welfare and Institutions Code section 5154 grants immunity to "the professional person in charge of the facility...or his designee" for actions by a person released at or before the end of 72 hours. Michael was involuntarily committed under section 5150, and Dr. Pappas's decision to release Michael within 33 hours meant he was acting as the professional person in charge or a designee, thus falling under this specific immunity. The immunity for "any action by a person released" necessarily includes claims arising from a failure to warn, as the failure to warn is intrinsically linked to the post-release actions. Government Code section 856, related to decisions to confine or release for mental illness, also supports immunity. Deputy Logan did not take any affirmative action that contributed to, increased, or changed the risk Cecelia faced. He did not assume any responsibility to protect her, nor did she detrimentally rely on his statements. His advice to lock the door and call the sheriff did not create the peril or worsen her position in a way that would establish a special relationship under Williams v. State of California.
Dissenting - Staniforth, Acting P. J.
No, the trial court erred in granting nonsuit, as the Tarasoff duty applies and the therapists and county should not be immune from liability. No, the trial court erred in granting nonsuit, as a jury could reasonably find that Deputy Logan did create a special relationship. A nonsuit is rarely warranted and all inferences must favor the plaintiff. Tarasoff duty applies to all therapists, regardless of voluntary or involuntary commitment, and the majority's broad application of immunity contravenes the "liability is the rule, immunity is the exception" principle. The Legislature has not "clearly provided for immunity" in these circumstances. Section 5154 immunity is limited to the "professional person in charge" or "his or her designee," which Drs. Pappas and Schorr were not shown to be; Dr. Higgins was in charge. Furthermore, there was a factual question for the jury whether Michael's commitment was voluntary (as suggested by police report wording and his cooperation) rather than involuntary under section 5150. If voluntary, section 5154 would not apply. Government Code section 855.8, which provides immunity for diagnosis, has exceptions for negligence in prescribing or administering treatment, which Tarasoff liability falls under. Applying immunity differently to victims of involuntarily vs. voluntarily committed patients raises equal protection concerns, as there is no rational basis for such a distinction once the patient is released. Deputy Logan's advice to Cecelia (to stay at her parents' home, lock doors, call sheriff) could be seen as an affirmative action that increased her risk or induced detrimental reliance, lulling her into a false sense of security. She depended on his expertise, and his advice placed her in a dangerous position, especially given the availability of alternative advice (e.g., go somewhere Michael couldn't find her, file criminal charges). This falls within the Williams criteria for establishing a special relationship. The "failure to provide police protection" immunity (Gov. Code § 845) does not apply to negligence in the performance of an assumed duty.
Concurring - Work, J.
Yes, the majority is correct that the County is immune and the deputy had no special relationship. The dissent's equal protection argument is flawed. The classes of victims are legally distinct because the releasing authorities have no control over voluntarily committed patients (who can leave at will), whereas involuntarily committed patients are released according to statutory guidelines and staff discretion. Therefore, the legal duties and potential for liability for "release" are fundamentally different between the two groups, justifying the distinction in immunity.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the interplay between the Tarasoff duty to warn and statutory immunities for public mental health facilities in California. While reaffirming the broad application of the Tarasoff duty to involuntarily committed patients, it significantly limits the ability to sue public entities for its breach when a patient is released within 72 hours under the LPS Act. The court's interpretation of "designee" and the scope of Section 5154 immunity protects institutions and professionals from liability for post-release actions, prioritizing the policy of encouraging prompt evaluation and early release. The case also reinforces the strict requirements for establishing a "special relationship" with law enforcement, making it difficult to hold police liable for failing to protect individuals even in known dangerous situations unless specific criteria of affirmative action, assumed responsibility, or detrimental reliance are met.
