Michael D. Tann v. United States
2015 D.C. App. LEXIS 533, 127 A.3d 400 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant can be held liable for aiding and abetting a crime committed by a principal whose presence and participation were unknown to the defendant, provided the defendant shared the principal's criminal intent (a "community of purpose") and it was foreseeable that the defendant's actions would incite a third party who shared that purpose to join the criminal act.
Facts:
- A long-running feud existed between Michael Tann, a member of the 22nd Street Crew, and drug dealer Leslie Jones over competition for drug sales. On April 11, 2003, Tann found Jones at a pay phone and shot him.
- On April 17, 2004, Terrence Jones and Richard Queen came to 22nd Street after an argument involving a gang member. Antonio Arnette pointed them out to Lannell Cooper, a high-ranking gang member, and told him to bring his gun.
- Cooper pointed a gun at Terrence Jones while Arnette assaulted him. When Terrence Jones resisted, Cooper shot and killed him. Simultaneously, Michael Tann and other gang members beat, robbed, and shot Richard Queen as he tried to escape.
- On May 4, 2006, after an outsider named Omar Harrison argued with the girlfriend of a 22nd Street Crew member, several gang members, including Saquawn Harris and Michael Tann, raced toward Harrison.
- Harris, Tann, and other gang members opened fire on Harrison. A junior gang member, Robert Foreman, who was across the street and unseen by Harris and Tann, saw the shooting, felt compelled to join, and also began firing.
- Harrison escaped, but a bystander, James Taylor, was killed by a stray bullet, and another bystander, Bernard Mackey, was wounded. There was no evidence Harris or Tann knew of Foreman's specific involvement during the shooting.
- In June 2006, Lannell Cooper was convicted for Terrence Jones's murder, based partly on testimony from Kyara Johnson. Her older sister, Laquanda Johnson, was known to be her 'gatekeeper' and supporter.
- On July 11, 2006, Dajuan Beaver saw the Johnson sisters back on 22nd Street, and he and other gang members decided they should be killed for their cooperation with law enforcement. Beaver persuaded fellow member Alphonce Little to commit the murder, and James Rushing agreed to drive the getaway car. Little subsequently shot and killed Laquanda Johnson and wounded her friend, Keisha Frost.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury returned a superseding indictment in February 2008, charging the six appellants with conspiracy and numerous related violent crimes.
- The six appellants were tried jointly in a nine-month jury trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the court of first instance, from November 2008 to July 2009.
- The jury found all six appellants guilty of conspiracy and various other counts, including first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and assault with intent to kill.
- The appellants filed separate appeals from the judgments of conviction to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the highest court for D.C. matters, where the appeals were consolidated for review.
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Issue:
Can a defendant be convicted of aiding and abetting a murder committed by a principal whose presence and participation were unknown to the defendant at the time of the offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, a defendant can be convicted of aiding and abetting a murder committed by a principal whose presence and participation were unknown to the defendant. This is permissible where the defendant shares the principal's criminal intent and it was foreseeable that the defendant's actions would incite a third party with a shared 'community of purpose' to join in the criminal act. The court reasoned that while aiding and abetting liability typically requires intent to assist a specific principal, this novel fact pattern calls for an analysis rooted in common law principles of group criminality. The court found a 'community of purpose' existed between appellants Harris, Tann, and the shooter Foreman, as all were members of the 22nd Street Crew acting to defend the gang's reputation by attacking Omar Harrison. Given the nature of the gang conspiracy, it was foreseeable to Harris and Tann that initiating a shootout would cause other members present to join in. This foreseeability allows a jury to infer the required intent to assist any fellow gang member who might participate, even one whose presence was unknown. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient for a conviction, although the trial court's jury instruction was erroneous but ultimately harmless.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Glickman, Associate Judge
No, a person cannot be found guilty as an aider and abettor without proof that he intended to assist or encourage the specific principal offender. The majority creates a novel and erroneous theory of accomplice liability that is not supported by the law of the District of Columbia, which requires a dual mental state: the mens rea for the underlying crime and the specific intent to facilitate the commission of that crime by another person. The majority's 'community of purpose' and 'foreseeability' test improperly conflates aiding-and-abetting with Pinkerton conspiracy liability and wrongly equates foreseeability with intent, which this court rejected in Wilson-Bey v. United States. The majority's theory was devised sua sponte on appeal, which is unfair to the appellants who had no opportunity to brief it. Accomplice liability requires intentional assistance to the principal, not just sharing the same motive or engaging in parallel criminal conduct.
Analysis:
This decision incrementally expands accomplice liability, particularly in the context of gang-related crimes where members may act in furtherance of a common goal without explicit, real-time coordination. By introducing a 'community of purpose' and 'foreseeability' framework, the court allows for aiding and abetting convictions without proof that the defendant intended to assist a known principal. This potentially lowers the evidentiary bar for prosecutors in cases involving group violence. However, the dissent strongly critiques this as an unjustified departure from the established requirement of specific intent to aid the principal, warning that it blurs the line between aiding and abetting and conspiracy, and risks holding individuals liable for the independent acts of others.
