Yes, the company could be responsible. Even though Scanlon was on a personal 'frolic' earlier in the evening, he went back to being an employee when he drove to the dealership to check on the cars. Because his drive home began right after he finished that work duty, a jury could decide that the accident happened 'on the job.' The court said Scanlon's personal trip ended the moment he started doing something for his boss. However, the court ordered a new trial because the first judge gave the jury wrong instructions about a different, more complicated rule.

Yes, Scanlon was probably working when the accident happened. He was checking on his company's cars, which is part of his job. So, it was okay for the jury to decide if the company is responsible for what happened to Meyn. About the last chance to avoid the accident, if Scanlon saw or should have seen Meyn in danger and had time to stop, this rule might apply. But the way the jury was told about this rule was wrong. They were told it could apply even if Scanlon didn't actually see Meyn and Meyn knew he was in danger. This isn't right according to our previous decisions. So, while the part about Scanlon working was handled correctly, the part about the last chance to avoid the accident was explained wrong to the jury. Because of this mistake, we have to have a new trial.

Yes. An employee who has deviated from his employment for a personal trip re-enters the scope of his employment when he completes the personal errand and engages in a task for the benefit of his employer, and the subsequent commute home can be considered within the scope of that employment. Although Scanlon was on a "frolic of his own" while at the picnic and driving the women home, the situation changed when he drove to the company's place of business to perform an inspection. This act was in furtherance of his duties as department head, bringing him back within the scope of his employment. Since his commute home commenced directly after this work-related task, it was proper for the jury to determine whether he was acting within the scope of employment at the time of the accident. The court also held that Scanlon was not an independent contractor because the company retained the right to control his work. However, the judgment was reversed due to erroneous jury instructions on the doctrine of last clear chance, which incorrectly stated the conditions under which a contributorily negligent plaintiff could recover.

Yes, Scanlon was likely acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred, and the last clear chance doctrine may apply. I affirm that it was proper for the trial court to submit the question of scope of employment to the jury. Because Scanlon was returning from checking on the company's cars, which is considered part of his duties, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find he was acting within the scope of employment. Regarding the last clear chance doctrine, if Scanlon actually saw or should have seen Meyn's perilous position in time to avoid the accident, the doctrine could apply. However, the jury instructions on this issue were erroneous, as they allowed the doctrine to apply even if Scanlon did not actually see Meyn and Meyn was aware of his own peril. This is inconsistent with our precedents. Therefore, while the scope of employment issue was properly handled, the erroneous jury instructions on last clear chance necessitate reversing the judgment and ordering a new trial.

Meyn v. Dulaney-Miller Auto Co.

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