Metropolitan Park District v. Unknown Heirs of Rigney

The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two
399 P.2d 516, 65 Wash. 2d 788 (1965)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A grantor's right of entry for breach of a condition subsequent is extinguished if it is not exercised within a reasonable time after the breach occurs. An unreasonable delay in declaring a forfeiture constitutes a waiver of the power of termination.

Facts:

On August 2, 1884, John L. Rigney conveyed a strip of land to the Tacoma Light and Water Company via a deed.
The deed specified that the land must be used for conducting fresh water and that if this use ceased, Rigney or his heirs could re-enter and repossess the property.
In 1893, the Tacoma Light and Water Company conveyed the property to the City of Tacoma, subject to the same condition.
Sometime prior to February 1, 1905, the City of Tacoma permanently discontinued using the land for conducting water and designated it for park purposes, thus breaching the condition.
In 1907, the Metropolitan Park District of Tacoma was created and succeeded the city in managing the property as a park.
Around 1920, tennis courts were constructed on the property for public use.
Neither John L. Rigney nor his heirs made any attempt to re-enter the property or claim a forfeiture for over 50 years following the breach of the condition in 1905.

Procedural Posture:

The Metropolitan Park District of Tacoma filed a quiet title action in the trial court against the heirs of John L. Rigney.
The Rigney heirs filed a counterclaim, asserting a right of re-entry due to a breach of a condition subsequent in the original deed.
Both parties moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Metropolitan Park District, quieting title in its name.
Certain of the Rigney heirs (appellants) appealed the trial court's decision to the Supreme Court of Washington.

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Issue:

Does an unreasonable delay by a grantor's heirs in exercising their right of entry after a breach of a condition subsequent extinguish their power to declare a forfeiture?

Opinions:

Majority - Hamilton, J.

Yes. An unreasonable delay in exercising a right of entry after a breach of a condition subsequent extinguishes the power to declare a forfeiture. While the holder of a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent does not gain title by adverse possession merely by remaining on the land after a breach, the grantor's corresponding power of termination does not last forever. Public policy dictates that land should be used productively, and allowing a grantor to hold a perpetual threat of forfeiture over the grantee would discourage such use. Therefore, the grantor has a reasonable time after a breach to elect to declare a forfeiture. If the grantor fails to act within that reasonable time, the power to do so expires. In this case, a delay of over 50 years since the breach occurred in 1905 is unreasonable, meaning the heirs' power of termination has expired and the condition is extinguished.

Analysis:

This decision establishes a significant limitation on the durability of a right of entry associated with a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. While affirming the traditional rule that a grantee's post-breach possession is not adverse until the grantor elects forfeiture, the court imposes a common-law 'reasonable time' standard for exercising that right. This rule, grounded in public policy promoting land utility and title certainty, prevents grantors from indefinitely controlling land use after a breach. It effectively applies a laches-like principle to a traditionally durable future interest, thereby modernizing property law to favor active ownership over dormant, centuries-old claims.

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