Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego

California Supreme Court
32 Cal.3d 180, 185 Cal. Rptr. 260, 649 P.2d 902 (1982)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A court will not save a facially unconstitutional statute by judicial construction or severance if doing so would require rewriting the law contrary to its original legislative intent and would result in an ordinance that is difficult to enforce, may not achieve the original legislative goals, and which the legislature did not envision.

Facts:

The City of San Diego enacted Ordinance No. 10795.
The ordinance banned the erection of most off-site outdoor advertising display signs, commonly known as billboards.
The ban applied to both commercial messages and non-commercial messages displayed on off-site billboards.
The ordinance required the removal of all existing off-site billboards after an amortization period.
The ordinance permitted on-site signs, which were defined as signs identifying the owner/occupant of the premises or advertising goods and services available on those premises.
The ordinance also contained 12 specific and narrow exceptions for certain types of signs, including temporary political campaign signs, commemorative plaques, and religious symbols.

Procedural Posture:

Metromedia, Inc. sued the City of San Diego in the superior court, which is the trial court of first instance.
The superior court granted summary judgment for Metromedia, Inc., finding the ordinance unconstitutional and issuing an injunction against its enforcement.
The City of San Diego, as appellant, appealed to the California Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court reversed the superior court's judgment, upholding the ordinance's constitutionality.
Metromedia, Inc., as petitioner, sought review from the United States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court's decision, holding that the ordinance's prohibition on noncommercial speech was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the California Supreme Court to determine if the ordinance could be saved through judicial construction or severance.

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Issue:

May a court save a facially unconstitutional ordinance, which impermissibly bans non-commercial off-site billboards, by judicially construing it to apply only to commercial billboards when such a construction is contrary to the ordinance's plain language and original legislative intent?

Opinions:

Majority - Broussard, J.

No. A court may not save the facially unconstitutional ordinance by limiting its scope to only commercial speech. The language and history of the ordinance demonstrate a clear legislative intent to ban billboard structures themselves for traffic safety and aesthetic reasons, regardless of the commercial or non-commercial nature of the message they carry. To judicially restrict the ordinance's application to commercial speech would be to rewrite the statute, not interpret it, thereby usurping a legislative function. Furthermore, severance is inappropriate because the resulting ordinance would be difficult to enforce, as it would require the city to constantly police the content of signs, and it is doubtful that this truncated version would effectively achieve the city's original goals. Such a surgically altered law would compel the city to make the constitutionally difficult distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech, leaving the city with a law it never intended to enact.

Dissenting - Kaus, J.

Yes. The court should construe the ordinance to preserve its constitutionality by limiting its prohibition to commercial off-site billboards. The majority improperly fails to consider that the San Diego City Council, after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, enacted an interim ordinance explicitly stating its preference to have the original ordinance prevail 'in whole or in part.' This demonstrates a clear legislative desire to save as much of the ordinance as possible. Modern judicial practice allows for precisely this kind of constitutionally compelled revision to effectuate legislative will. The choice between a partial ban and an alternative regulatory scheme is a policy decision for the city, not the court, and the practical enforcement difficulties cited by the majority are not insurmountable.

Analysis:

This decision clarifies the limits of the judicial doctrines of severability and constitutional avoidance. It establishes that a court's power to 'save' a statute is constrained by the original legislative intent and the practical workability of the revised law. The court refused to engage in 'judicial surgery' that would create a law fundamentally different from what the legislature enacted, especially one that would introduce new constitutional complexities like distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial speech. This ruling serves as a precedent cautioning legislatures against enacting overly broad statutes with the expectation that courts will later narrow them to fit within constitutional bounds.

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