Mesa v. California
489 U.S. 121, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 596, 109 S. Ct. 959 (1989)
Rule of Law:
A federal officer can remove a state criminal prosecution to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) only if they assert a colorable federal defense to the state charges, not merely because the acts occurred while performing federal duties.
Facts:
- In the summer of 1985, Kathryn Mesa and Shabbir Ebrahim were employed as mailtruck drivers by the United States Postal Service in Santa Clara County, California.
- In unrelated incidents, the State of California issued a criminal complaint against Kathryn Mesa, charging her with misdemeanor-manslaughter and driving outside a laned roadway after her mailtruck collided with and killed a bicyclist.
- California also issued a criminal complaint against Shabbir Ebrahim, charging him with speeding and failure to yield after his mailtruck collided with a police car.
- The state charges arose from accidents involving Mesa and Ebrahim that occurred while they were on duty and acting in the course and scope of their employment with the Postal Service.
Procedural Posture:
- Kathryn Mesa and Shabbir Ebrahim were arraigned in the San Jose Municipal Court of Santa Clara County, California, on September 16 and October 2, 1985, respectively, facing state criminal charges.
- The United States Attorney for the Northern District of California filed petitions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to remove the criminal complaints against Ebrahim and Mesa to federal court.
- The District Court granted the United States Government's petitions for removal and denied California's responsive motions to remand the cases to state court.
- California petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus compelling the District Court to remand the cases.
- The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the petitions and, in a divided panel, held that federal postal workers may not remove state criminal prosecutions without a colorable claim of federal immunity or other federal defense, issuing a writ of mandamus ordering the District Court to deny removal and remand the cases.
- The United States (on behalf of Mesa and Ebrahim) petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals concerning the proper interpretation of § 1442(a)(1).
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Issue:
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) permit United States Postal Service employees to remove state criminal prosecutions for traffic violations committed while on duty to Federal District Court without asserting a colorable federal defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O’Connor
No, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) does not permit federal employees to remove state criminal prosecutions to federal court merely because the incidents occurred while on duty; a colorable federal defense must be alleged. The Court emphasized that an "unbroken line" of its decisions, extending back nearly a century and a quarter, has consistently understood all versions of the federal officer removal statute to require the averment of a federal defense. This interpretation is crucial for preserving the constitutionality of the statute by providing the necessary "arising under" jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which requires a federal question. Without a federal defense, § 1442(a) would be a "pure jurisdictional statute" unable to independently support Article III jurisdiction. The Court reviewed precedents such as Tennessee v. Davis and The Mayor v. Cooper, which focused on the presence of a federal question or defense as the basis for removal jurisdiction. It clarified that decisions like Maryland v. Soper (No. 1) and Willingham v. Morgan, while liberalizing pleading requirements for a federal defense, did not eliminate the underlying requirement itself. The Court rejected the government's argument for a broader reading of "under color of office" and declined to adopt a theory of "protective jurisdiction," emphasizing that federal courts have a strong judicial policy against interfering with state criminal proceedings, especially when no federal question is at issue.
Concurring - Justice Brennan
Yes, federal officer removal generally requires a federal defense, but the Court's decision today does not foreclose the possibility of removal in exceptional circumstances where a federal officer is prosecuted due to local hostility to their function, even if no formal "federal defense" is immediately apparent. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, emphasized that Congress's concern about local hostility to federal authority could come into play in situations where federal agents face harassment through unjustified state prosecutions for offenses like traffic violations, to which they might not have a traditional immunity or federal defense. He noted that the Court's opinion leaves open the possibility that in such cases, "careful pleading, demonstrating the close connection between the state prosecution and the federal officer’s performance of his duty, might adequately replace the specific averment of a federal defense," referring to the "causal connection test" discussed in Soper (No. 1). He stressed that today's decision only addresses the specific facts before the Court and does not prevent removal under such extraordinary circumstances.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), firmly tethering it to the existence of a colorable federal defense. By rejecting the argument that mere on-duty conduct is sufficient for removal, the Supreme Court prevented a broad expansion of federal jurisdiction into routine state criminal matters, thus upholding principles of federalism. The ruling ensures that federal courts intervene only where a genuine federal interest or question is at stake, preventing potential burdens on state judicial systems for offenses like traffic violations. Future litigants seeking federal officer removal must clearly articulate a federal defense to meet the constitutional requirements of Article III 'arising under' jurisdiction, solidifying the test for jurisdictional eligibility.
