Merritt v. Dillard Paper Company
120 F.3d 1181, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22843, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 44,977 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision protects an employee who has 'participated in any manner' in a Title VII proceeding, regardless of whether the participation was voluntary or the participant's motive. The statutory protection extends even to an unwilling deponent who is also an alleged wrongdoer.
Facts:
- Harry Merritt worked as a sales representative for Dillard Paper Company, where the office atmosphere was crude and he fully participated in telling off-color jokes and making sexually explicit comments.
- A coworker, Janet Moore, complained of sexual harassment and subsequently filed a Title VII lawsuit against Dillard.
- Dillard required Merritt to give a deposition in Moore's lawsuit, though he did not volunteer to testify and was opposed to Moore's claim.
- In his deposition, Merritt reluctantly admitted under oath to some of the sexually harassing conduct of which Moore complained.
- After Dillard settled Moore's lawsuit, Dillard's president, Geoffry Clark, reviewed the deposition summaries to determine disciplinary action for the five alleged harassers.
- Clark met with Merritt and terminated him, allegedly stating: 'Your deposition was the most damning to Dillard’s case, and you no longer have a place here at Dillard Paper Company.'
Procedural Posture:
- Harry Merritt filed a retaliation charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
- After receiving a right-to-sue letter, Merritt sued Dillard Paper Company in the federal district court, alleging a violation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.
- The district court granted Dillard's motion for summary judgment, holding that Merritt's involuntary participation was not protected activity.
- Merritt, as the appellant, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, with Dillard as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does Title VII's anti-retaliation provision protect an employee from being terminated for giving involuntary deposition testimony that was unfavorable to the employer, even when that employee was one of the alleged harassers and was not trying to assist the Title VII claimant?
Opinions:
Majority - Carnes, Circuit Judge
Yes, Title VII's anti-retaliation provision protects the employee. The plain and unambiguous language of the statute's participation clause, which prohibits retaliation against an employee who has 'testified, assisted, or participated in any manner,' is expansively written and does not require that the participation be voluntary or motivated by a desire to assist the claimant. The court must presume Congress meant what it said, and the statute does not include any qualifiers like 'voluntarily testified' or 'participated with good motive.' The word 'any' has a well-established expansive meaning, covering all forms of participation, including that of a reluctant deponent. The court reasoned that the participation clause is broader than the opposition clause, which does require an oppositional motive. Furthermore, even if assistance were a prerequisite, Merritt’s testimony objectively assisted Moore's case, as evidenced by Dillard's president calling it the 'most damning.' The court concluded that while an employer can fire an employee for sexual harassment, it cannot fire them because of their participation in a Title VII proceeding.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the protective scope of Title VII's participation clause, divorcing its protection from the employee's motive or willingness to participate. It establishes that even the alleged perpetrators of discrimination are shielded from retaliation for their testimony, a move designed to encourage truthful, albeit reluctant, testimony in discrimination proceedings. This puts employers on notice that the reason for an adverse employment action must be clearly and demonstrably separate from an employee's participation in any Title VII investigation or proceeding. The case also highlights the power of direct evidence, showing that a single incriminating statement by a decision-maker can be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
