Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. v. Dickenson
1986 Tex. App. LEXIS 9294, 720 S.W.2d 844 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A property owner is qualified to testify about the market value of their property, and such testimony constitutes legally sufficient evidence of damages as long as it explicitly refers to market value rather than personal or intrinsic value, even if the owner does not formally declare familiarity with the market value.
Facts:
- In April 1982, David Vincent Dickenson purchased a new 1982 Mercedes-Benz 300D from Ryan Oldsmobile, Inc., an authorized Mercedes dealer.
- A salesman for Ryan made several representations to Dickenson regarding the high quality and characteristics of the car.
- Dickenson signed a purchase contract containing a disclaimer of all warranties except for those in the manufacturer's warranty booklet, which he did not receive until the car was delivered.
- The manufacturer's warranty limited remedies to the repair or replacement of defective parts by an authorized dealer.
- Within three weeks of purchase, Dickenson began experiencing numerous defects, most notably with the transmission.
- Over an eight-month period, Dickenson returned the car to Ryan for repairs at least seven times; the transmission was replaced twice but continued to malfunction, and other defects were never corrected.
- In December 1982, Dickenson offered to return the vehicle for a refund or replacement, but both Ryan and Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. refused.
- In April 1983, after soliciting four bids, Dickenson sold the vehicle to the highest bidder at a significant loss.
Procedural Posture:
- David Vincent Dickenson sued Ryan Oldsmobile, Inc. (the dealer) in a state trial court for breach of warranty, negligence, and deceptive trade practices.
- Ryan impleaded Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (the manufacturer) via a cross-claim seeking indemnity.
- A jury found Ryan and Mercedes jointly and severally liable and awarded Dickenson actual damages, additional statutory damages, and attorney's fees.
- The trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict, which also ordered Mercedes to fully indemnify Ryan.
- Ryan (appellant) and Mercedes (appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals of Texas, an intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a property owner's testimony about their property's market value constitute legally sufficient evidence to establish damages in a breach of warranty case, provided the testimony specifically refers to market value rather than personal or intrinsic value?
Opinions:
Majority - Fender, C.J.
Yes, a property owner's testimony about their property's market value constitutes legally sufficient evidence of damages, provided the testimony refers to market value. The court held that an owner is qualified to give an opinion on their property's market value as long as the testimony refers to market value rather than intrinsic or personal value. The court distinguished this case from prior precedent like Porras v. Craig, where the owner's testimony was deemed 'no evidence' because it was based purely on personal value and fears. Here, Dickenson's attorney specifically framed the questions in terms of 'reasonable market value,' and Dickenson's answers directly addressed that standard. Therefore, his testimony was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's damage award. The court also found the dealer's warranty disclaimer to be inoperative against express warranties because the buyer was not given the warranty booklet until after the contract was signed, making the disclaimer an unexpected and unbargained-for term.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies and reinforces the 'owner opinion rule' in Texas, establishing that the substance of an owner's testimony—specifically, its reference to 'market value'—is what grants it legal sufficiency, not a particular procedural recitation like stating one is 'familiar with' market value. This lowers the foundational barrier for plaintiffs to introduce evidence of damages for their own property, shifting the burden to the defendant to present contradictory evidence. The ruling also underscores the principle that post-contract disclaimers are ineffective against pre-contract express warranties, protecting consumers from 'glove box' warranties that they do not see until after a sale is complete.
