Menu v. Minor
1987 Colo. App. LEXIS 884, 745 P.2d 680 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A common carrier does not owe a duty to third parties to prevent harm arising from a pre-existing highway hazard merely by transporting a person involved in the original incident, unless the carrier establishes a special relationship by affirmatively inducing reliance, creating a peril, or changing the nature of the existing risk.
Facts:
- On February 4, 1983, John Dennis Minor was driving a vehicle owned by Dennis Radel on an interstate highway.
- Minor lost control of his car and collided with a median wall.
- Minor's car came to rest in a position that blocked one lane of the interstate highway.
- A Yellow Cab driver stopped at the scene and picked up Minor, transporting him to an unidentified location.
- Some unknown time after Minor's car blocked the interstate and after Minor was picked up, Peggy Menu's car ran into Minor's abandoned and inoperable car.
- The hazard on the highway (Minor's abandoned car) existed due to conditions outside Yellow Cab's control.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs Peggy Rae Menu and Candyce L. Wolf filed a negligence action against defendants Yellow Cab Company, John Dennis Minor, and Dennis Radel.
- Yellow Cab Company filed a motion to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)).
- The trial court granted Yellow Cab Company's motion, dismissing the action as to Yellow Cab.
- Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's dismissal as to Yellow Cab Company to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a common carrier, by picking up and transporting a driver from the scene of an accident where their vehicle remains a highway hazard, thereby assume a special duty to notify authorities or warn oncoming motorists of the hazard?
Opinions:
Majority - SMITH, Judge
No, a common carrier, by merely picking up and transporting a driver from the scene of an accident where their vehicle remains a highway hazard, does not assume a special duty to notify authorities or warn oncoming motorists of the hazard. The court determined that the question of whether a duty exists is a matter of law, considering factors such as the extent, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury, the social utility of the actor's conduct, and the burden of guarding against injury. Applying the 'special relation rule' from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315, adopted in Leake v. Cain, the court concluded that no duty exists to prevent a third person from harming another unless there is a special relation between the actor and the wrongdoer or between the actor and the victim. For such a special relationship to arise, the Yellow Cab driver would have had to voluntarily assume a duty by acting affirmatively to induce the plaintiffs' reliance, or by creating a peril or changing the nature of an existing risk. Since the hazard was outside Yellow Cab's control, there was no evidence Yellow Cab induced reliance, and Yellow Cab's actions (failure to notify police or transporting Minor) did not create a peril or change the existing risk, no special relationship was formed. Mere proximity to a dangerous situation, even with knowledge of the potential peril, does not establish a special relationship imposing a duty to cure the condition.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the limitations of the 'special relation rule' in establishing a duty of care, particularly for common carriers. It underscores that an affirmative duty to act or warn generally requires more than mere knowledge of a dangerous situation or incidental involvement. The ruling reinforces that courts are hesitant to impose broad, undefined duties on individuals or entities unless they actively create or exacerbate a risk, or intentionally induce reliance, thereby limiting potential liability for passive bystanders or those whose actions do not directly alter the existing danger. This principle serves to prevent an over-extension of tort liability to parties with minimal involvement in the direct cause of harm.
