Menna v. New York
423 U.S. 61 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
A counseled plea of guilty does not waive a defendant's right to raise a claim on appeal that the prosecution is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as such a claim challenges the State's constitutional authority to bring the prosecution itself.
Facts:
- On November 7, 1968, petitioner, after being granted immunity, refused to answer questions before a Kings County grand jury investigating a murder conspiracy.
- On March 18, 1969, petitioner refused to obey a court order to return to and testify before the same grand jury.
- For this refusal, petitioner was adjudicated in contempt of court under New York law.
- Petitioner was sentenced to and served a flat 30-day term in civil jail for the contempt adjudication.
Procedural Posture:
- On June 10, 1970, the State of New York indicted petitioner for his refusal to answer grand jury questions on November 7, 1968.
- In the trial court, petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
- The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
- Following the denial, petitioner entered a counseled plea of guilty to the indictment and was sentenced.
- Petitioner appealed his conviction to the New York Court of Appeals (New York's highest court), which was the appellee.
- The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that petitioner's double jeopardy claim had been waived by his guilty plea.
- Petitioner (as petitioner) sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a counseled plea of guilty waive a defendant's subsequent claim that the indictment to which he pleaded is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. A counseled plea of guilty does not waive a double jeopardy claim. The court reasoned that while a guilty plea is a reliable admission of factual guilt that renders irrelevant most pre-plea constitutional violations (like those concerning evidence gathering), it does not waive a claim that challenges the very power of the state to bring the prosecution. A double jeopardy claim asserts that the State is constitutionally forbidden from haling the defendant into court on a charge, regardless of their factual guilt. Therefore, unlike claims that are logically inconsistent with an admission of guilt, a double jeopardy claim survives a guilty plea because it contests the legitimacy of the prosecution itself, a principle established in Blackledge v. Perry.
Concurring - Justice Brennan
No. Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that a guilty plea does not waive a double jeopardy claim. However, he would not remand the case for further proceedings. Citing his concurrence in Ashe v. Swenson, he argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecutions for any offenses that arise out of the same criminal transaction. Under this broader view, he would reverse the conviction outright rather than send it back to the state court for a determination on the merits.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a critical exception to the general waiver rule associated with guilty pleas. It distinguishes between constitutional rights related to the establishment of factual guilt (which are waived) and rights that preclude the state from prosecuting at all (which are not). By allowing double jeopardy claims to survive a guilty plea, the Court protects a fundamental constitutional limitation on prosecutorial power. This precedent forces lower courts to analyze the nature of a constitutional claim post-plea, separating procedural or evidentiary issues from fundamental challenges to the state's authority to prosecute.
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