No. The court decided that the museum does not own the building. When Mr. Howard gave his speech in 1891, he used the words 'possession' and 'use,' but he never said the magic word 'ownership.' Using something, even forever, is not the same as owning it. The court also said the museum couldn't claim ownership from squatting because they were there with permission, not as trespassers. In fact, the museum's own old records showed they knew they weren't the real owners. Therefore, the library group always owned the building and had the right to give it to the university foundation.

No. This judge agreed with the outcome but explained it differently. He said the museum was like a special kind of renter with the right to use the property forever. If a renter decides they want to claim ownership, they have to clearly tell the landlord, 'I'm not your renter anymore, I'm taking this house for myself!' The museum never did that. All of their actions were consistent with them just using the property as they were allowed, not trying to steal it. Because they never gave the real owner notice, they could never become the owners.

No, the Museum doesn't own the building. Frank Howard only let the historical group use the building, not own it. He said they could 'possess' and 'use' it, but didn't say they owned it. Also, the Museum didn't clearly show they owned the building for a long enough time to claim it as theirs under the law. They kept acting like they were just using it, not owning it. Even when they made agreements about the building, it was more like they were sharing what they were allowed to use, not acting like owners. So, the original owners never lost their ownership, and they gave it to the University.

I agree with the main decision but want to add that the historical group was more like a long-term borrower of the building. In legal terms, we call this a 'usufruct'. When you're a borrower like this, the law assumes you know you don't own the thing. To start claiming you own it, you need to tell the real owner very clearly that you now think it's yours. The historical group never did this. Even when they let the original owners use part of the building, it wasn't the same as acting like they owned it. It was more like they were sharing what they were allowed to borrow. So, they never started the clock on claiming ownership through long use.

I agree with the decision because the 1891 speech only let the group use the building forever, not own it. My view differs from the majority because I stress that owning something requires a clear, strong message that it’s yours – something that never happened here. It’s like being allowed to play with a toy all the time without actually buying it. Because the building was never clearly given as personal property, I support the ruling in favor of the UNO Foundation.

***** HERE ARE THE OPINIONS. THERE ARE 2 OF THEM ***** 
*THIS IS A Majority OPINION* 
 *ITS CONTENT IS:* 

<opinion type="majority">
<author id="b688-13">I MOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge.</author>
This case is a dispute over the ownership of certain land and the building thereon in New Orleans. The appellant is the Memorial Hall Museum, Inc. (“MHMI”). The appellee is the University of New Orleans Foundation (“UNO Foundation”). The trial court found that the property in question is owned by the UNO Foundation rather than by the MHMI. We agree with the trial court that the UNO Foundation owns the property in question. Therefore, we will affirm.
The MHMI argues that the property (informally referred to as the “Confederate Museum”) was donated to its predecessor, the Louisiana Historical Association, or that it and/or the Louisiana Historical Association acquired title by acquisitive prescription. The UNO Foundation argues that the ownership of the property was not donated, that the MHMI did not acquire ownership by acquisitive prescription, and that, if title was acquired by the MHMI by acquisitive prescription, then the MHMI renounced that prescription. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the UNO Foundation as to all three issues and held that the ownership of the property was not donated, that there was no acquisitive | {¡prescription and, if there was acquisitive prescription, it was renounced. We agree with the trial court that ownership of the property was not donated and that title was not acquired by acquisitive prescription. We need not and do not address renunciation of acquisitive prescription.
The Howard Memorial Library Association (“HMLA”), the ancestor in title to the UNO Foundation, was organized in New Orleans in the late Nineteenth Century to administer the Howard Memorial Library in New Orleans. The library was housed on property in New Orleans. The library <page-number citation-index="1" label="627">*627</page-number>included a collection of materials related to the Confederacy. In order to house that collection, Frank T. Howard had constructed an annex next to the library. That annex, now known as the Confederate Museum, is the property at issue in the present case.
A group known as the Louisiana Historical Association (“LHA”), the predecessor to the MHMI, was seeking a place to house a collection of materials related to the Confederacy. Frank T. Howard decided to let the LHA use the annex building to house the LHA’s collection. He gave a speech in 1891 in which he stated:
<blockquote id="b689-6">It is with deep satisfaction that I perform the act of formally putting into your possession the Budding, which, while it is an Adjunct of the Howard Memorial Library Association, is to be set apart forever for the use of your organization.</blockquote>
Mr. Howard wrote down the speech and gave it to the LHA.
Appellant MHMI argues that, by giving the speech, writing it down, and giving the writing to the LHA, Mr. Howard donated the ownership of the annex labuilding to the LHA. We disagree. Mr. Howard did not say in the speech that he was donating the ownership of the building to the LHA. He spoke only of putting the LHA into “possession” of the building and of the building being for the “use” of the LHA. In short, Mr. Howard stated only that he would allow the LHA to use the building forever. The parties dispute as to exactly what rights, if any, Mr. Howard gave to the LHA. We need not, and do not, decide such issues. The present appeal concerns ownership of the property and it is apparent that Mr. Howard did not state that he was giving ownership of the annex building to the LHA. Thus, the trial court was correct in finding that ownership of the building was not donated to the LHA.
Because Mr. Howard’s 1891 speech did not donate ownership of the property to the LHA, ten year acquisitive prescription is not applicable. See La. Civ.Code art. 3474 (1870).
As the LHA took possession of the property in 1891, thirty year acquisitive prescription could have begun running at that time, and the LHA could have acquired title as early as 1921, if the LHA openly, uninterruptedly and unequivocally possessed the property as owner for thirty years. La. Civ.Code art. 3475 (1870); La. Civ.Code art. 3500 (1870). However, there is a great deal of undisputed evidence that, far from unequivocally asserting ownership of the property, the LHA recognized that the HMLA was the owner of the property. In 1912, at a meeting of the LHA’s Board of Governors, a committee appointed to investigate the status of the property concluded that the property belonged to the | ¿HMLA. At a March 4, 1931 meeting attended by the LHA and the HMLA members, an attorney retained by the LHA determined that the LHA had no legal claim to the property.
Appellant MHMI argues that a 1931 agreement, whereby the LHA allowed the HMLA to use part of the museum building, constituted an act of ownership by the LHA, recognized by the HMLA, and started the running of thirty year acquisitive prescription so that LHA acquired title to the property in 1961. We disagree, the LHA was given the right to use all of the building in 1891 and simply, in turn, gave some of that right to the HMLA in 1931. Both the LHA and the HMLA were of the understanding, in 1931, that the LHA had the right to use the entire building and so the fact that they entered into an agreement allowing the HMLA to use part of the building does not indicate that the <page-number citation-index="1" label="628">*628</page-number>LHA or the HMLA believed that the LHA was the owner of the building.
The MHMI points to a 1981 resolution of the LHA whereby the LHA “denied” the claim of HMLA to the property and thus, presumably, implied that the LHA owned the property. However, there is no evidence that this resolution was communicated to the HMLA or that there was any outward change in the routine of the LHA’s use of the property. Thus, there is no evidence that the LHA began to openly and unequivocally possess the property “as owner” in 1931. Accordingly, not only is there no evidence that the LHA ever possessed the property openly and unequivocally as owner for any thirty year period, the evidence to the contrary is undisputed.
I.Jn sum, the property was not donated by Mr. Howard to the MHMI’s predecessor, the LHA, and the LHA and the MHMI never acquired ownership of the property by acquisitive prescription. Therefore, the HMLA never lost ownership of the property until it conveyed ownership of the property, by deed, to the UNO Foundation. Consequently, the UNO Foundation is the owner of the property.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
MURRAY, J., concurs with reasons.
GORBATY, J., concurs.
</opinion>

 **END OF THIS Majority OPINION ***THIS IS A Concurrence Opinion OPINION* 
 *ITS CONTENT IS:* 

<opinion type="concurrence">
<author id="b690-11">| MURRAY, J.,</author>
concurs with reasons.
I concur in the affirmation of the summary judgment in favor of UNO Foundation, but for different reasons than those expressed in the majority opinion. The 1891 speech gave LHA only a right to possess the building forever for the use of its organization; it gave LHA no right to ownership. Apparently for that reason, both the LHA and the HMLA consistently characterized LHA’s right as a perpetual usufruct throughout their century long relationship.<footnotemark>1</footnotemark>
MHMI places great reliance on LHA’s possession and maintenance of the building for over a century. However, LHA possessed and maintained the building during that period as a usufructuary. A usufruc-tuary is a precarious possessor. Under La.C.C. art. 3438 (and former La.C.C. arts. 3446 and 3489), a precarious possessor “is presumed to possess for another although he may intend to possess for himself.” La.C.C. art. 3438. LHA was thus presumed to possess for HMLA. To overcome this presumption and commence to possess for himself, a precarious possessor must “give actual notice of this intent to the person on whose behalf he is possessing.” La.C.C. art. 3439.<footnotemark>2</footnotemark>
L.The principal act on which MHMI relies as constituting actual notice to HMLA of its intent to commence possessing as owner was a 1931 act by which LHA granted HMLA a perpetual right of use of part of the building.<footnotemark>3</footnotemark> That 1931 act was not an act of ownership sufficient to commence the thirty-year acquisitive prescription period running; rather, as the UNO <page-number citation-index="1" label="629">*629</page-number>Foundation argues, it was a grant by LHA to HMLA of a “sub-usufruct.” Although that legal label may be res nova, it has authoritative support in the jurisprudence. A usufructory “may burden his right of enjoyment with another usufruct.” 3 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Personal Servitudes § 103(4th ed. 2000)(noting that “[t]his faculty is rarely exercised in practice”). Such a usufruct of a usufruct can logically be labeled a “sub-usufruct.”
Another aspect of the sub-usufruct on which MHMI relies is that the term of the sub-usufruct was perpetual. Particularly, MHMI argues that the perpetual term invoked former La.C.C. art. 729, which provided that the right to impose a servitude permanently on an estate belonged solely to the owner. The UNO Foundation counters that former article applied only to predial servitudes and that the 1931 act created a personal servitude — a sub-usufruct. I agree. A better view of the perpetual term of the sub-usufruct is that it was simply an attempt by the parties to be consistent with the perpetual term of the original usufruct.<footnotemark>4</footnotemark>
Accordingly, I agree that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
hGORBATY, J., concurs.
I agree with the result reached by the majority. However, while I agree that the UNO Foundation has acquired ownership of the building in question, I note that the summary judgment only determines the issue of who owns the building. The issue of who has the right to use the building has not been determined.
<footnote label="1">
. That characterization, however, was technically inaccurate as La.C.C. art. 608 (and former La.C.C. art. 612) limits a usufruct in favor of a legal entity to a thirty-year term.
</footnote>
<footnote label="2">
. The official comments to this article indicate that it did not change the law. La.C.C. art. 3439, Official Revision comment (a).
</footnote>
<footnote label="3">
.MHMI also cites a 1931 resolution; however, that resolution was subsequently rescinded. Moreover, as the opinion points out, there is no evidence that resolution was communicated to HMLA.
</footnote>
<footnote label="4">
. Again, as with LHA’s original usufruct, the sub-usufruct in favor of HMLA, a legal entity, is limited by La.C.C. art. 608 (and former La.C.C. art. 612) to a thirty-year term.
</footnote>
</opinion>

 **END OF THIS Concurrence Opinion OPINION ******* END OF ALL OPINIONS FOR THIS CASE *****

No. A party does not acquire ownership of property through a grant of perpetual 'possession' and 'use,' nor through thirty-year acquisitive prescription when its possession began permissively and it acknowledged the true owner's title. Howard's 1891 speech explicitly granted only 'possession' and 'use,' not ownership, and therefore did not constitute a donation of the property. Regarding acquisitive prescription, the LHA did not possess the property openly and unequivocally 'as owner' for the required thirty years. Its possession was permissive from the start, and it repeatedly recognized HMLA's ownership through its internal committee findings in 1912 and its attorney's conclusion in 1931. The LHA's internal 1981 resolution was never communicated to HMLA and thus did not constitute an open act of adverse possession. Therefore, HMLA never lost ownership and validly conveyed it to the UNO Foundation.

No. The 1891 speech granted the LHA a right of use, making it a 'usufructuary' and therefore a 'precarious possessor' under Louisiana law. A precarious possessor is presumed to possess on behalf of the true owner. To commence the running of acquisitive prescription, a precarious possessor must give 'actual notice' to the owner of their intent to possess for themselves. The LHA's actions, including the 1931 agreement to let HMLA use part of the building (a 'sub-usufruct'), were consistent with its status as a usufructuary and did not provide the required actual notice to HMLA of an adverse claim. Since no such notice was ever given, the prescription period never began to run.

No. The property known as the Confederate Museum was not donated to the LHA, nor was it acquired by acquisitive prescription by MHMI. Because Frank T. Howard's 1891 speech only granted the LHA the right to use the building, not ownership. The speech specifically mentioned 'possession' and 'use' but did not indicate a transfer of ownership. Furthermore, the LHA and MHMI's possession of the property was never open, uninterrupted, and unequivocal as owners, which is required to claim ownership through acquisitive prescription. There is substantial evidence that the LHA recognized HMLA as the owner of the property, including a 1912 board meeting conclusion and a 1931 legal determination. The 1931 agreement allowing HMLA to use part of the building does not constitute an act of ownership by LHA, as it was merely a redistribution of the right to use granted in 1891. The 1981 LHA resolution 'denying' HMLA's claim to the property was not communicated to HMLA and did not result in any outward change in the LHA's use of the property. Therefore, there is no evidence that LHA or MHMI ever possessed the property openly and unequivocally as owner for any thirty-year period, which is necessary for acquisitive prescription. Consequently, HMLA never lost ownership until it conveyed the property to the UNO Foundation by deed.

I concur with the majority's decision to affirm the trial court's judgment, but for different reasons. The 1891 speech only gave LHA a right to possess the building forever for the use of its organization, not ownership. This right is best characterized as a perpetual usufruct. As a usufructuary, LHA was a precarious possessor, presumed to possess for HMLA under La. C.C. art. 3438. To overcome this presumption and commence possessing as owner, LHA would have needed to give actual notice to HMLA of this intent, which it did not do. The 1931 act granting HMLA a perpetual right to use part of the building was not an act of ownership, but rather the creation of a 'sub-usufruct.' This interpretation is supported by jurisprudence allowing a usufructuary to burden their right of enjoyment with another usufruct. The perpetual term of this sub-usufruct does not invoke former La. C.C. art. 729, as that article applied only to predial servitudes, not personal servitudes like usufructs. Therefore, LHA never commenced possessing as owner, and acquisitive prescription did not occur.

I concur in the affirmation of the judgment in favor of the UNO Foundation because the evidence shows that Mr. Howard’s 1891 speech granted only perpetual possession for use and not the transfer of ownership. My reasoning differs from that of the majority because I place greater emphasis on the requirement that a bona fide transfer of title must be explicit and unequivocal – a standard that was not met here. The historical record clearly indicates that LHA acted solely as a usufructuary, never taking deliberate steps to assert ownership as required for acquisitive prescription, because actual ownership demands formal notice and an unmistakable intent to transfer. For these reasons, I join in affirming the decision, despite a different analytical focus than that of the majority.

Memorial Hall Museum, Inc. v. University of New Orleans Foundation

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