Melvin Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County
828 F.3d 541, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12441, 95 Fed.R.Serv.3d 204 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
For class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), commonality requires a common contention capable of classwide resolution, where determining its truth or falsity resolves an issue central to all class members' claims in one stroke. Claims of deliberate indifference based on delays in prison medical treatment often do not satisfy this requirement if liability depends heavily on individualized circumstances.
Facts:
- Melvin Phillips, Malcolm Patton, Rodell Sanders, and Frank Powicki are among current and former detainees of Cook County Jail who brought the class action.
- A former detainee, John Smentek, initially filed a civil action in January 2009, alleging Cook County showed deliberate indifference in its administration of dental care, and five detainees subsequently joined the lawsuit.
- In 2007, Cermak Health Services, which provides dental care at the Jail, employed only one dentist whose sole contribution to inmates' dental health was extractions.
- In 2008, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a CRIPA action against Cook County, charging that the Jail provided “inadequate medical care.”
- In May 2010, Cook County entered into a consent order with the DOJ, agreeing to improve conditions at the Jail and to allow regular federal monitoring, including ensuring adequate and timely dental care.
- As of 2014, Cermak employed seven dentists, two dental hygienists, and seven dental assistants, a level the plaintiffs’ expert described as “optimum.”
- Cermak's policy required Health Service Request (HSR) forms for dental pain to be retrieved daily and reviewed by a registered nurse, with a qualified health professional examining the detainee within twenty-four hours.
- Eight detainees testified about their varied experiences, including delays in face-to-face evaluations, incorrect tooth extractions, rescheduled follow-up appointments, and delayed provision of pain medication or referrals for oral surgery.
Procedural Posture:
- A former detainee, John Smentek, filed a civil action against Cook County and the Sheriff in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, in January 2009.
- Five other detainees (Melvin Phillips, Malcolm Patton, Rodell Sanders, and Frank Powicki among them) subsequently joined the lawsuit.
- On November 10, 2010, the district court certified two classes of plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) concerning dental care at the Cook County Jail.
- The defendants took an interlocutory appeal from the district court's class certification order to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court's grant of certification in Smentek v. Dart, 683 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2012).
- After discovery, the detainees moved for preliminary and permanent injunctions on January 6, 2014.
- In response, the defendants moved to decertify the classes.
- The district court stayed briefing on the decertification motion and held a six-day bench trial on injunctive relief in June 2014.
- After considering the evidence, the district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.
- The district court later decertified the Rule 23(b)(2) class, modified the Rule 23(b)(3) class (to encompass only those whose claims arose when the Jail had only one dentist, which is still pending), and denied the motion for a permanent injunction as moot.
- The detainees timely appealed the district court’s decertification order (Case No. 14-3753) to the Seventh Circuit.
- While that appeal was pending, the detainees filed a motion in the district court for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) based on newly discovered evidence.
- The district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion, stating that it was not inclined to revise its order decertifying the class.
- The detainees timely appealed this denial (Case No. 15-1616) to the Seventh Circuit, and the two appeals were consolidated.
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Issue:
Did the district court abuse its discretion in decertifying a class of Cook County Jail detainees, who alleged deliberate indifference to their dental care, on the grounds that their claims lacked common questions of law or fact under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2)?
Opinions:
Majority - ripple, circuit judge
No, the district court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the class because the detainees' deliberate indifference claims lacked common questions of law or fact under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2). The Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes clarifies that commonality requires a common contention "of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." While a single common question is sufficient, it must "drive the resolution of the litigation." The district court correctly applied this standard. The court found that the detainees' claims constituted "isolated instances of indifference to a particular inmate’s medical needs" rather than systemic deficiencies. Their proposed common questions (failure to provide a face-to-face evaluation within 24 hours of a written complaint and failure to provide timely "return to clinic" appointments) were deemed unsuitable for classwide resolution because the "constitutionality of a wait for medical treatment will depend on a variety of individual circumstances." The tolerability of delay is contextual, depending on the seriousness of the condition and ease of treatment, precluding a rigid rule for class application. The varied testimonies of the detainees, involving different types of pain, times, medical professionals, and alleged deficiencies, demonstrated that each claim would require a unique factual inquiry, making common resolution impossible. While a class action could potentially address a systemic policy of deliberate delay or severe understaffing, the evidence presented by the detainees did not establish such a widespread, systemic, and gross deficiency applicable to the entire class. The policy of vesting scheduling authority in a department rather than dentists, for instance, was not shown to constitute deliberate indifference. Separately, regarding the Rule 60(b) motion filed while the appeal was pending, the court held that Rule 60(b) applies only to "final judgments or orders" and not to interlocutory orders like class certification rulings. Although new evidence can be presented through a motion to reconsider or amend certification, the denial of such a motion is only appealable if the district court "materially alters" its previous decision. Here, the district court explicitly stated it was not inclined to revise its decertification order and made no ruling that materially altered it, rendering the appeal of the Rule 60(b) denial inappropriate.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the high standard for commonality under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), as articulated by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. It clarifies that claims requiring highly individualized factual inquiries, such as deliberate indifference in medical treatment based on varied delays and circumstances, typically fail the commonality test unless a clear, systemic policy or practice uniformly causing the alleged harm to all class members can be proven. The ruling emphasizes that even if an illegal policy could provide the "glue" for individualized claims, plaintiffs must present concrete proof of such a policy's class-wide impact. Furthermore, the decision reiterates the limited scope of Rule 60(b) motions, clarifying that they are generally inapplicable to interlocutory orders and that denials of such motions are only appealable if they materially alter the underlying order.
