Mele v. Turner
106 Wash.2d 73, 720 P.2d 787 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A supplier of a chattel has no duty to warn a user of a dangerous condition that is open and obvious. Furthermore, a supplier is not liable for entrusting a chattel to someone they do not know or have reason to know is incompetent to use it safely.
Facts:
- Ann Garrett arranged for her 13-year-old son to mow her neighbors', the Turners', lawn using the Turners' rotary mower.
- When the son was unable to mow, his mother asked the plaintiff, John Mele, an 18-year-old college student, to do the job instead.
- Garrett's son showed Mele the lawn mower, explained how to start it, and instructed him on what area to mow.
- After Mele had been mowing for about 20 minutes, Mrs. Turner returned home and agreed to the substitution.
- While mowing for over an hour, Mele noticed grass clippings accumulating around the mower's discharge chute.
- On several occasions, without turning off the mower, Mele used his hand to sweep away the accumulated clippings.
- In the process of clearing the clippings again, Mele placed his fingers under the chute and into the mower housing, where the spinning blade caused severe injury to his hand.
Procedural Posture:
- John Mele sued the Turners and the Garretts in trial court, alleging negligence.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing the lawsuit.
- Mele, as appellant, appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case for a trial.
- The Turners and Garretts, as petitioners, were granted review by the Supreme Court of Washington.
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Issue:
Does a supplier of a common chattel, such as a rotary lawn mower, owe a duty to warn a competent, 18-year-old user of the obvious danger of placing a hand near the spinning blade while the machine is running?
Opinions:
Majority - Andersen, J.
No. The defendants did not owe a duty to warn the plaintiff of the lawn mower's dangerous condition because the danger was obvious and known to the plaintiff. The court analyzed the defendants' duty under two sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. First, under § 390 (Chattel for Use by Person Known To Be Incompetent), there was no liability because there was no evidence that the defendants knew or had reason to know that the plaintiff, an 18-year-old college student, was incompetent or likely to use the mower in a manner involving unreasonable risk. Second, under § 388 (Chattel Known To Be Dangerous for Intended Use), there is no duty to warn if the supplier has reason to believe the user will realize the dangerous condition. The court found that the danger of a spinning blade in a lawn mower is obvious, and the plaintiff himself admitted in an affidavit that he knew he should not put his hand under the machine. Therefore, because the danger was both obvious and known, no duty to warn arose.
Dissenting - Pearson, J.
Yes, a duty to warn may have existed, and the question should have been decided by a jury, not by summary judgment. The dissent argues the majority improperly decided a question of liability rather than duty. The correct inquiry under Restatement § 388 is not whether the danger was obvious to the plaintiff, but whether the defendants had reason to believe the plaintiff would realize its dangerous condition. Given that the plaintiff had never used this specific mower before, and the defendants had never seen him use a similar mower, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to what the defendants had reason to believe. The plaintiff's general admission of knowing not to put his hand 'under' the mower does not resolve the specific danger posed by the blade's proximity to the discharge chute, a danger of which he may not have been aware. Therefore, the case should not have been dismissed on summary judgment.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the 'open and obvious danger' doctrine within tort law, limiting the duty of suppliers of common chattels. It establishes that, for ordinary tools, there is no affirmative duty to warn competent adults of dangers they would reasonably be expected to appreciate. The case clarifies that 'incompetence' under Restatement § 390 requires more than simple inexperience; the supplier must have a specific reason to know the user is likely to act unsafely. This ruling protects casual suppliers, like neighbors lending tools, from liability for accidents resulting from a user's disregard of an obvious risk.
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