Meka v. Grant Plumbing & Air Conditioning Co.
2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 402, 2011 WL 2536177, 67 So. 3d 18 (2011)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
In Mississippi, a driver who stops a vehicle on the main traveled part of a highway when it is practical to stop off the highway is negligent per se, and any damages awarded for injuries resulting from an accident may be diminished proportionally to that driver's comparative fault.
Facts:
- On February 17, 2006, Satyadev Meka and his daughter, Pam Meka, were driving north in the right-hand lane on Interstate 55.
- Meka felt chest discomfort, turned on his right-turn signal, slowed, and pulled his SUV into a white-striped triangular area just past a concrete divider near the Adkins Boulevard exit.
- Jeffrey Koontz, driving a UtiliQuest truck immediately behind Meka, observed Meka's brake lights and right-turn signal activate, and saw the SUV come to a complete stop with approximately ten percent of the vehicle obstructing the right lane, necessitating Koontz to move to the left lane.
- Albert Grube, driving a Grant Plumbing truck immediately behind Koontz, saw Koontz's brake lights and truck veer left, at which point Grube first saw Meka's stopped SUV obstructing his lane of travel, approximately three to four car lengths away.
- Grube slowed, attempted to maneuver around Koontz's truck, and collided with the rear-passenger side of the UtiliQuest truck, then ultimately collided with Meka's SUV, causing it to roll over.
- Meka began feeling soreness and then severe pain in his back later that day, eventually seeking treatment months after the accident, and was diagnosed with two bulging discs.
- Meka, a computer engineer, had not been employed since 2002 but received a job offer in 2007 for $55,000 per year, which he did not accept, claiming medical inability to work due to his back problems.
Procedural Posture:
- Satyadev Meka sued Grant Plumbing & Air Conditioning Company and its employee Albert Grube (collectively, 'Grant Plumbing') in circuit court for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.
- A jury returned a verdict finding Meka suffered $100,000 in damages but assessed Meka with forty-percent comparative fault for the accident.
- The trial court entered a judgment awarding Meka $60,000 in total damages.
- Meka filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial or an additur of the damages awarded.
- The trial court denied Meka's motion.
- Meka appealed to the Court of Appeals of Mississippi (Meka as appellant, Grant Plumbing as appellee).
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Did the trial court err by allowing the jury to apportion fault to Meka based on evidence that he stopped his vehicle in a manner that violated Mississippi law, and by giving related jury instructions?
Opinions:
Majority - Griffis, P.J.
No, the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to apportion fault to Meka and in giving the related jury instructions because evidence supported Meka's comparative negligence in violating state law by stopping his vehicle on the highway. Mississippi is a pure comparative negligence state (Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-15), meaning damages are diminished proportionally to the plaintiff's fault. Grant Plumbing's defense centered on Meka's alleged negligence per se for violating Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-903, which prohibits stopping on the main traveled part of a highway when it is practical to stop off. The court referenced Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, which clarified that the term 'practical' applies throughout the statute, requiring a vehicle to turn as far to the right as practical and not stop on the traveled highway unless specific conditions (e.g., 200 feet clear view, disabled vehicle) are met. Further, Stong v. Freeman Truck Line, Inc. established that limited-access interstate highways are not 'business or residence districts' under the statute, and stopping on the main traveled part when practical to stop off constitutes negligence per se, with the question of practicality being a factual one for the jury. The jury instruction (C-11) given, despite a minor ambiguity, accurately stated the law and was supported by evidence from Grube and disinterested witness Koontz that Meka's SUV had come to a complete stop with a portion obstructing the lane, making it necessary for Koontz to change lanes and leaving Grube little time to react. The court also found no error in other general form-of-the-verdict jury instructions. Meka's argument that the trial court erred in refusing his proposed jury instruction regarding Grant Plumbing’s failure to train Grube was moot because the jury already found against Grant Plumbing on Meka’s respondeat superior claim, achieving the most favorable result possible for Meka on that theory. Finally, the court found Meka's work-authorization status relevant to the issues of causation and damages because Meka claimed he suffered lost wages solely due to his back injury, giving Grant Plumbing the right to inquire into other reasons for his inability to work. Meka's own attorney introduced his nationality into closing arguments, thus precluding Meka from complaining of related error.
Analysis:
This case affirms Mississippi's strict application of comparative negligence principles, particularly when a plaintiff's actions violate a statutory standard of care. It highlights that stopping a vehicle on a highway's main traveled portion, even partially, when it is practical to move off, can constitute negligence per se and lead to a reduction in damages. The decision also provides important guidance on the scope of evidence admissible concerning a plaintiff's lost wage claims, permitting inquiry into non-injury related factors that may affect a plaintiff's ability to work or earn income, which is crucial for defendants in personal injury litigation.
