Meiners v. State
540 S.W.3d 832 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on appellate counsel's failure to raise an issue, the claimant must demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice; counsel's performance is not deficient if the legal principle at issue was not clearly established or apparent to a reasonably competent attorney at the time of the appeal, but even if performance was deficient, no prejudice exists if there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the appeal would have been different.
Facts:
- Meiners was charged with second-degree murder.
- During his trial, Meiners requested an instruction for the nested lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter.
- The trial court denied Meiners' request for the involuntary manslaughter instruction.
Procedural Posture:
- Meiners was charged with second-degree murder, and the trial court denied his request for an involuntary manslaughter instruction.
- Meiners was subsequently convicted of second-degree murder.
- On direct appeal, Meiners' appellate counsel did not raise the issue of the trial court's refusal to give the involuntary manslaughter instruction.
- Meiners filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the motion court, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
- The motion court denied Meiners' motion for post-conviction relief, finding that appellate counsel was not ineffective.
- Meiners appealed the motion court's denial of his post-conviction relief motion to the Supreme Court of Missouri.
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Issue:
Did appellate counsel provide ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the trial court's denial of a requested involuntary manslaughter instruction, given the state of the law at the time regarding the jury's right to disbelieve evidence as a basis for such an instruction?
Opinions:
Majority - Author not specified in provided text
No, appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. The Court affirmed the motion court's finding that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred in denying Meiners' request for an involuntary manslaughter instruction. This conclusion rested on the premise that, at the time of Meiners' appeal, it would not have been apparent to a reasonably competent lawyer that the jury's right to disbelieve the evidence, in and of itself, entitled Meiners to this nested lesser-included offense instruction. The ultimate result, as indicated by the concurring opinion, was that even if counsel's performance was deficient, Meiners failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice, meaning there was no reasonable probability that raising the issue would have changed the outcome of his appeal.
Dissenting - Paul C. Wilson
Yes, appellate counsel's performance was deficient, and the motion court clearly erred. Judge Wilson disagreed with the majority's conclusion, arguing that it would have been apparent to a reasonably competent lawyer at the time of Meiners' appeal that the jury's right to disbelieve the evidence, by itself, entitled Meiners to the requested nested lesser-included offense instruction. He cited State v. Pond (2004) and State v. Williams (2010), noting that Williams explicitly held that the jury's right to disbelieve testimony about force was a sufficient basis for a lesser-included instruction. Judge Wilson further emphasized that State v. Jackson (2014), decided after Meiners' appeal, repeatedly clarified that it was merely following Pond and Williams and not establishing a new principle. He contended that the reasonable juror standard was irrelevant for nested lesser-included offenses after these precedents. Therefore, counsel should have challenged the trial court's refusal to give the involuntary manslaughter instruction.
Concurring - Zel M. Fischer
Concurring in the result, Chief Justice Fischer agreed with Judge Wilson's dissent that appellate counsel's performance likely fell below the professional standard of care. However, he concurred with the result reached by the principal opinion because Meiners failed to meet his burden of proving prejudice, the second prong of an ineffective assistance claim. Chief Justice Fischer argued that there was no reasonable probability that an appeal raising the denial of the involuntary manslaughter instruction would have resulted in a reversal of the second-degree murder conviction, due to overwhelming evidence of Meiners' guilt. Thus, even if counsel performed deficiently, Meiners could not show that this deficiency changed the outcome of his appeal.
Analysis:
This case highlights the complexities in applying the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly when the alleged deficiency involves the interpretation of evolving legal principles. The split among the justices reveals differing views on when a legal rule becomes 'apparent' to a reasonably competent attorney. The dissent argues that earlier precedents, Pond and Williams, had already established the jury's right to disbelieve evidence as a sufficient basis for a nested lesser-included instruction, making Jackson merely confirmatory. In contrast, the majority (as inferred from the dissent) and the concurrence's focus on prejudice suggest a higher bar for proving that a particular legal argument was so clearly established that its omission constituted deficient performance, or that its inclusion would have changed the outcome. This case serves as a reminder that even if counsel makes an error, a defendant must still prove that the error prejudiced their case, a difficult standard to meet, especially when the evidence for the greater offense is strong.
